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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

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Roberta Wohlstetter

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Kenneth Jowitt

Views and Reviews
The New *Kontinent*
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Kidnapping to Win Friends and Influence People

Roberta Wohlstetter[1]

POLITICAL kidnapping and hijacking are now world-wide affairs. Arab terrorist acts stand out most prominently in the public mind, with Latin American incidents running a close second. But for North American citizens in particular, Latin American kidnapping for political purposes is of more immediate concern, and in the last decade or so, we have become increasingly familiar with this particular form of political coercion.

Venezuelan uses in the early sixties were particularly spectacular. Hostages to the Castroite Venezuelan organization the FALN (Armed Forces for National Liberation), included an internationally known Spanish soccer star, two distinguished American military officers, and the crew of a Venezuelan freighter, along with the freighter. As a publicity device, Venezuelan kidnappings were on a par with their snatching of some famous French paintings on loan for exhibit in Caracas in the winter of 1963. Four FALN members armed with sub-machine guns carried off Cézanne's "The Bathers," Braque's "Still Life with Pears," Van Gogh's "Lilies in a Copper Vase," a still life by Picasso and another by Gauguin, before the eyes of some 900 grammar and high-school students assembled for a tour of the Museum of Fine Arts. "We are taking these," one of them shouted, "not as common thieves, but so the world will know that the Communist Party is at war with the Venezuelan government . . . to free Venezuela's oil from the Yankee imperialists. . . . When we have won we shall return the paintings undamaged to France." [2]

It was not care for human life that directed these young rebels to paintings rather than persons for their hostages. When one student in the audience protested, they shot him. The booty was selected for maximum publicity value. The rebels wanted and got a satisfactory number of French and Venezuelan headlines before the police located the masterpieces, carefully wrapped in furniture crates and undamaged.

A similar motivation seems to have inspired the hijacking of the freighter *Anzoategui* the following month. The rebels radioed from the ship that the FALN aim was "to denounce to world opinion the crimes of the Betancourt dictatorship." [3] And so it was later also with the abduction of the American, Colonel Michael Smolen, who affirmed, "The main object of these people is publicity." [4]

Fidel Castro's 26th of July rebels set the style for this sort of stunt,

[1] Prepared for the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy. Copyright © Roberta Wohlstetter, Sept. 1973.

[2] *Newsweek*, 28 Jan. 1963.

[3] *Los Angeles Times*, 16 Feb. 1963.

[4] *New York Times*, 16 Oct. 1964.

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where the main motive is not coercion aimed at obtaining a specific concession or reward, but rather to call public attention to the existence and vigour of the rebel movement and the inability of the legal government to cope with it. In his case, the most important public target was outside the country: an audience of North Americans, a potent source of financial support and possibly pressure on the U.S. government to influence the ruler of Cuba, Batista.

Viewed today from the vantage point—or perhaps the disadvantage point—of the civilian battlefields of the 1970s, Castro's " non-violent " and " educational " type of kidnapping belongs to an age of seeming innocence in techniques of revolutionary coercion. After the kidnapping of diplomats culminating in murder, the hijackings of aeroplanes that menace the lives of innocent passengers and sometimes destroy them, the taking of hostages and the assassination of athletes at games devoted to international understanding and fair play, Castro's pioneering acts may look like schoolboy pranks, an almost charming and daring defiance of authority.

However, viewing them from the 1970s it is also easy to see the continuity and slippery descent from these comparatively innocuous coercive beginnings—romanticized by the guerrillas themselves, and apologized for by the press—to the now familiar bloody ends. Castro's kidnappings were a political use of force, meant ultimately to overthrow a government. They used foreign nationals (many of whom were simply bystanders, and none of whom was engaged in combat against the guerrillas) as pawns in a domestic struggle for power. They violated not only internal rules of political order, but also the meagre international rules that lend some stability to relations among states: for example, the rules that concentrate relations among countries on negotiation among governments.

In this essay we shall look in detail at this Cuban example: a mass kidnapping engineered by Fidel's brother, Raul Castro, in 1958, the last year of Batista. We shall first try to reconstruct the episode from North American press accounts, since the reaction of that press was what the rebels were aiming at and counting on, and since a large section of the American public learned about Castro and his movement for the first time with this incident. Today this kidnapping looms as a major operation in Cuban rewriting of the early rebel history. Raul Castro claims it as a feather in his cap, while one of the Havana Libre radio versions gives credit to Soviet agents. But at the time, both brothers learned how certain methods of coercion for publicity's sake can be dangerously double-edged and can lose more support than they gain.

North American Press Accounts

On 26 June 1958, the rebel forces under the leadership of Raul Castro started an intensive series of raids and kidnapping of American

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citizens. Raids of one sort or another had been going on for some time. They had proved highly irritating to some administrators of joint Cuban-American enterprises, who had lost to the rebels trucks, tractors, jeeps, food, medical supplies, petrol and dynamite. But kidnapping was something else again. As an individual act of violence by anyone resident under U.S. jurisdiction, kidnapping is usually associated with murder in the American mind, most prominently with the murder of Lindbergh's infant son. Under U.S. law it is a felony punishable in many states by death, with kidnapping for ransom carrying graver penalties than simple kidnapping. The taking of hostages is also one of the oldest ways of coercing rulers of another power. As an act of foreigners outside U.S. jurisdiction, designed to coerce the U.S. government, kidnapping American citizens appears as a challenge to U.S. sovereignty and to the ability of the government to protect its citizens. Moreover there has been a history of such challenges to the American government—challenges which have been met, but not without exciting the more violent emotions of patriotism. Trouble could be expected.

As reported in American newspapers, the first victim was the Moa Bay Mining Company, a subsidiary of the Freeport Sulphur Company of New Orleans, located on the northern coast of Oriente Province. Some 2,000 Cubans were working there under American supervision, to establish nickel and cobalt mines and extraction plants, which eventually would provide year-round work for 1,000 Cubans and would pump about three million dollars a year into the Cuban economy through wages and payments for Cuban products and services. American investments represented some 76 million dollars. The plants, on some hopeful estimates, were to make Cuba into the biggest producer of cobalt in the Western hemisphere and the world's second largest producer of nickel. The province of Oriente, the site of the Moa Bay mines, included the Sierra Maestra mountains where Fidel Castro had his rebel headquarters; also the Sierra Cristal mountains where Raul Castro and Juan Almeida had only recently established the Second Front of Frank Pais, to compete with the independent rebel group operating in the Sierra Escambray, known simply as the Second Front.

Under Raul's leadership, a band of rebels estimated by journalists at 200 strong made off with 10 Americans and 2 Canadians, who worked at the mine in various key capacities of construction superintendent, engineer, chemist, and geologist. In this skirmish on the night of 26 June, 2 Cuban civilians and 6 Cuban rebels [5] were killed, and 3 Cuban Army soldiers were wounded. The rebels made off not only with their hostages, but also with 19 vehicles, a number of beds, surgical equipment, all the medical supplies and all the food.

[5] Other estimates say 8. Raul Castro's account gives the number as 6. "Operacion Anti-Aerea," *Noticias de Hoy*, 7 July 1963.

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A Cuban Army garrison of 63 men, located a mile and a half from the company, arrived on the scene after the rebels had left.

However Cubans regarded the issues between the Cuban rebels and the Cuban government, foreign investors, particularly in extractive industries, did not inspire loyalty or enthusiastic defence; this was particularly true for the province of Oriente where there was much popular support for the rebels. Sentiments of affection did not cling to Freeport sulphur and few of the local inhabitants would have died for Moa Bay Mining.[6] Earlier the same year, for example, in March 1958, there had been a raid on the neighbouring Nicaro nickel plant, a property of the United States government, administered by the General Services Administration (G.S.A.). It was located at Levisa Bay on the north shore about fifty miles east of the Moa Bay Company. The defending garrison at that time took refuge on a ship in the harbour. In the preceding six months the rebels had taken from Nicaro 15 trucks and jeeps, a tractor, 2 electrical generators, tools, petrol, and 1,500 pounds of dynamite. The G.S.A. had not publicized these thefts,[7] and indeed appears to have been so lenient that by 21 October 1958, the rebels had taken over the entire area and facilities of the Nicaro plant without meeting resistance. The total loss to property sustained during the rebellion has been estimated at more than $1,000,000.[8]

News of the kidnapping was headlined in the leading U.S. newspapers. In the West and Middle West some parts of the American public learned about Castro for the first time. Canadian newspapers also headlined the event, especially in Montreal and Winnipeg, the native towns of the two kidnapped Canadians. Apparently Mr Kristjansen, one of the two captured Canadians, was experiencing his second abduction. In March he had been held for six hours by the rebels while they loaded supplies from his plant. Ottawa was reported to be sending a sharp protest to Havana, and the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Sidney Smith, indicated that the abduction would be discussed at a cabinet meeting. Both Canadian and American newpapers reported that a rebel leader had told the wife of one of

[6] " Cuba's Expropriation of U.S.-owned Nickel Plant at Nicaro, Cuba," Twelfth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, 97th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 4.

[7] *Washington Post*, 28 June 1958.

[8] It may be unfortunate that the stereotype casts foreign investment in the role of a villain. It leads to some irrationalities. Mr Leland Johnson, for example, has pointed out that the Mexican tax on automotive components has discouraged the expansion of automobile assembly plants in Mexico, which is a natural step towards the industrialization and economic self-development the Mexicans desire. Raul Castro was himself particularly incensed over American enterprises that used or laid claim to Cuban soil. His kidnapping raids were therefore directed at Moa, Nicaro, United Fruit and Guantanamo. Castro's pronouncements on his own management of these nickel plants explain his drop in nickel production by the capitalist brain-drain and the general " underdevelopment " of Cuba.

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the kidnapped men that they were taking the group " as a reprisal for alleged U.S. aid to the Cuban government."

Moa Bay Mining officials trekked through the hills that night, seeking contact with the rebels and passing on heated messages " to get those prisoners down, but fast." In New Orleans, Freeport officials stayed in radio-telephone communication with one of their construction engineers in Moa Bay. In New York, the president of Freeport was said to be in touch with Secretary Dulles.

The rebels attacked again on the night of 27 June. This time they captured a bus full of Marine Corps personnel en route from the inland town of Guantanamo to the port of Caimanera where the naval base is located. First reports estimated the number of servicemen missing at 24. Later estimates reached 28; then 29; then after another single abduction, 30. The driver and conductor of the bus, both Cubans, were also missing. Reports also reached the press that on 26 June another band of rebels had seized the American field superintendent of the Ermita sugar mill, just west of Guantanamo, and had abducted from his home the Canadian manager of the Central Isabel mill, north-east of Guantanamo.

Although one may surmise that the U.S. Navy did not welcome the publicity, American newspapers on 29 June naturally headlined the news of the missing servicemen. They also carried various reassuring statements about their imminent release. These statements were sometimes attributed to the Cuban bus driver, who on some accounts had been returned, and sometimes to " U.S. sources representing the rebels, according to State Department Press Officer, Francis Tully." In Canada the press continued to headline the kidnapping news, especially since a third victim had been added. The abducted manager of the Central Isabel mill was a native of Toronto.

On 30 June a band of 8 rebels seized 2 officers of the Nicaro nickel plant, the administrator general, and his assistant. Presumably they were seized at the mine, about 12 miles from the town of Nicaro where 6,000 workers and officials lived. A raid on the plant on the night of 26 June had already netted the rebels 2 tractors and 5 trucks, but the mine, although alerted, was still " unprotected." Early the same morning of 30 June, 4 more Americans were kidnapped from a United Fruit sugar plantation near the village of Guaro. They were the agricultural superintendent, his assistant and two district superintendents. The bus used by the marines was found by U.S. naval planes, abandoned about 30 miles from the base in the foothills of the Sierra Maestra. Tracks at the site indicated that the captives had been placed in trucks and taken further into the mountains. The *Washington Post* reported that a separate rebel band under the leadership of Juan Almeida had probably engineered the kidnapping of the servicemen, while Raul's group had seized the civilians.

As this summary of the newspaper accounts makes clear, the

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largest rebel band numbered 200, and the smallest 8. The sallies were performed with great skill and daring, and a minimum of bloodshed. Final figures put the total of Americans kidnapped at 47, of whom 30 were servicemen.

At this time no reporter had seen, or was aware of, Raul Castro's Military Order Number 30,[9] issued on 22 June 1958, which called for the detention of all Yankees resident in the area bordering on the Sierra Cristal. The detentions were to start on 26 June and to continue until there were 100 hostages. The reason given at the start of the Military Order is that in the month of March the enemy Air Force had been furnished with bombs of all types at the North American base of Guantanamo. Hundreds of families, it was claimed, were now living in caves because their homes had been destroyed by North American planes, flown by pilots trained in North American camps, using North American bombs; and this collaboration between Batista and North America was increasing. The prisoners were to be detained so that they could witness personally the crime that their government was committing against the defenceless Cuban people.

The U.S. government in the person of the Ambassador, Earl E. T. Smith, followed first the practice of dealing only with the officially recognized government of Cuba, in attempting to obtain the release of the captives. This was in accordance with international law, and was the course adopted by the Canadians. The local government is supposed to be responsible for law and order in its territory and in particular for the safety of foreign nationals. Ambassador Smith called on the Cuban Foreign Ministry on 27 June and sent Park Fields Wollam, U.S. Consul at Santiago, to Moa Bay to investigate. Wollam was instructed not to deal with the rebels directly. Both he and the Ambassador at this time thought they were dealing with a single incident rather than a series. But after two days, Consul Wollam realized he was up against something more than a " stunt." In the meantime, President Batista, his Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Pedro Rodrigues Avila, and General Euologio Cantillo, in charge of operations against the rebels, were reported to have promised full cooperation in obtaining the release of the captured men.

Ambassador Smith described the first abduction as a " useless gesture which will boomerang against the rebels." " If this is a publicity act,"

[9] The text in Spanish of the Order, as published after the event: " En el mes de marzo la fuerza aerea enemiga se ha estado abasteciendo de bombas de todos tipos en la base naval norteamericana de Caimanera. . . . Cientos de familias siguen viviendo en cuevas porque sus hogares han sido arrasados por aviones norteamericanos, manejados por pilotos entrenados en los campos norteamericanos, que arrojan bombas noteamericanas. . . . Y esa colaboracion aumenta cada dia, por lo tanto se resuelve: Unico: la detencion do todos los yanquis que residan en los puntos que se indican en los instrucciones secretas que completan esta orden militar, para que sean presentados a disposicion de la Comandancia Central del Segundo Frente y se percaten, personalmente, del crimen que su gobierno comete contra el indefenso peublo cubano. Mario Gill, *Cuba Si, Yanquis No* (Mexico City, 1960), p. 132. (Now Raul has released all but some secret instructions.)

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he added, " it is an unfortunate one." He was not at that time in receipt of a letter from the captives. This letter reached him in Havana on 28 June, along with the news of more kidnappings. It was signed by four of the Moa Bay abducted engineers and it made quite clear that the rebel action was not merely retaliatory, but rather a means of forcing the fulfilment of several conditions:

> 1. That the United States government announce publicly that they will cease to furnish arms to the Cuban government under the Mutual Assistance Pact. These people feel strongly that the pact has been violated by using the ammunition against civilians.
> 2. That no Cuban military planes are allowed to take on arms at the Guantanamo Naval Base.[10]

According to other news reports, the rebels also accused the Guantanamo base of supplying fuel as well as arms to Cuban Army planes engaged in strafing the Oriente hills. In the United States at this time, the 26th of July Movement circulated photographs of a Cuban plane being refuelled, with a caption identifying the plane as belonging to the Cuban Army and the petrol as belonging to our naval base. Other photographs purported to show rockets being loaded on to Cuban aircraft at the base. (These had been obtained by Castro supporters working on the base).[11] Somewhat later, news reports added a rebel demand for negotiation at the ambassadorial level, and recognition of their " free territory of Cuba."

Not much was heard of the official Cuban government's interpretation of the events. In the 30 June edition of the *New York Times,* General Avila speculated that the kidnapping might be " an attempt to draw the armed forces away from the Sierra Maestra, where the army has had the main group of rebels ' isolated and fleeing for the past month.' " In fact, fighting in the Sierra Maestra continued. But in response to a U.S. request, bombing of the rebel area in the Sierra Cristal by Batista's forces ceased during the time that the captives were held, from 29 June until 18 July.

Upon receipt of the captives' letter and of Wollam's report, Ambassador Smith changed his instructions and told Wollam " to get in direct contact with the rebels, and arrange the release of the Americans and Canadians." [12] He also sent William Bowdler, second secretary of the Embassy, to the Naval Base to serve as a source of communication between Moa Bay and the Embassy. There was no telephone line to Havana from the Bay. Moa's only link was by radio via Miami's Marine Radio Telephone Station through a ship anchored in the bay. Ten days later it became necessary to send a radio expert from the Embassy into the rebel area with Wollam to facilitate communications with the Guantanamo base. The primitive communication

[10] *New York Times*, 11 July 1958.
[11] They are reproduced in Raul's article, " Operacion Anti-Aerea," op. cit.
[12] *New York Times*, 29 June 1958.

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links at this end of the island would seem to justify the rebels' complaints about the facilities of the Cuban telephone company—it was under American control, charged high rates and had failed to link up the island. On the other hand, a primitive state of communications is highly favourable to guerrilla warfare; it is one of the conditions which Che Guevara mentions in defining "favourable ground" for a guerrilla fighter.[13] It was certainly "favourable ground" for the series of kidnappings.

Ambassador Smith maintained to the press that he had heard nothing of Raul Castro's demand that he himself conduct the negotiations. Other accounts state that he had heard and refused. When Eugene Gilmore, Smith's right hand man and political counsellor, arrived at the Guantanamo base on 9 July "to form a more effective liaison between the base and the embassy," he was careful to deny reports that he came as the high official Raul Castro wanted to meet. Smith's official answer to the accusation of U.S. intervention in the civil war in favour of Batista read: "In compliance with the United States' policy of 'non-intervention' in Cuban internal affairs, the base has not and will not refuel or in other ways service Cuban military aircraft engaged in combat activity."[14] (This use of the general rubric of non-intervention is interesting, perhaps, precisely because of its emptiness. It is used constantly in discussing inter-American affairs and remains a burning issue. Yet one may doubt if the United States has a choice of not intervening in the sense of not affecting the affairs of Latin America. At any rate, when we induced the official Cuban government to stop bombing, we were, in effect, intervening on the side of the rebels.)

On 30 June Ambassador Smith also dispatched Robert Wiecha, the American Vice Consul in Santiago, to make contact with the other group of rebels who were holding the Marine and Naval personnel. Wiecha met them at a point forty or fifty miles northeast of the Naval Base. It was, in fact, the same rendezvous point as that used by Wollam (though Wollam had been conducted in from Moa on the opposite shore), an extremely small village, Las Calabazas, on the northern slope of the Sierra Cristal near El Naranjo.

On 30 June the press reported a State Department announcement that the rebels appeared to be trying to force the U.S. government to impose a more complete curb on assistance to Batista. For the past year, there had been much discussion in the press and in Congress about our Military Aid Program, which included aid to the Cuban government, along with aid to other Latin American countries. There were many statements about the fact that this aid favoured Batista. Protests had finally been instrumental in stopping arms shipments to Batista on 14 March, with the cancellation of an order of Garand

[13] *Guerrilla Warfare* (Monthly Review Press: New York, 1961), Chap. 4.
[14] *New York Times*, 30 June 1958.

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rifles which had been earmarked for the Cuban government. The rebels claimed that they did not believe that the arms embargo was really being enforced. As Fidel put it, what had excited the rebels was discovery of the " recent gifts of 300 rockets from the American Naval Base at Guantanamo, given to Batista's aeroplanes, with which the civilian population of this territory occupied by our rebels has been bombed in the last few weeks." He continued: " Fragments of the American rockets have been found, some with the complete serial number." It is true that in May we had shipped in 300 rockets to replace dummy warheads which had been sent by mistake in October 1957 in fulfilment of a Cuban government purchase order of December 1956. But Castro's use of the word " gifts " is inaccurate. The Cuban Army on discovering the dummies, insisted on fulfilment of the contract and the American contractor complied. The fact that the order had been placed before the March embargo was not a convincing argument to the rebel forces who regarded the shipment as a clear violation of the announced intention of the State Department on 3 April 1958 to examine with care all requests for munitions from the Cuban government. This was the message the rebels tried to convey to the captive Americans. It reached the general public in the United States in splashing accusatory headlines: " U.S. Admits Batista Aid." " U.S. Admits Selling Rockets to Batista."

On 1 July, Dulles held a press conference and announced, in a phrase to become familiar in the 1970s, that the United States would never yield to blackmail to obtain the release of American hostages abroad. At this point the question of hostages was enlarged to include not just Cuba, but the recent detention of 9 American airmen in Russia, the detention of 9 American Army men in East Germany and the detention for the past two-and-a-half years of 4 American prisoners still held by Communist China. One reporter noted that " our nationals have been held and seized in several parts of the world; it seems to be on the increase." He mentioned the criticism of certain members of Congress who say " that this is a consequence of our previous slow action in China and now again in East Germany and urge stronger action." Dulles replied: " I believe that we have taken, and are taking, the strongest, most effective measures that we can to get Americans out." [15] He distinguished between the Cuban case and the others, but apparently referred to all of them in saying:

> The effort to get political advantage out of these things is, I think, a very improper course of action. I believe that it is going to be counterproductive for those who try it. I think, as soon as they realize that it is counterproductive, that then they will act accordingly. I can't think of anything that could be worse than, in effect, to pay blackmail to get people out. We are willing to use any methods to get them out, short of paying blackmail. If we

[15] *New York Times*, 2 July 1958.

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started doing that, then that would only encourage further efforts to use Americans as hostages.[16]

President Eisenhower in a press conference on 2 July also distinguished the Cuban from the Chinese, East German and Soviet detentions. "We are trying to get live Americans back," he said with some feeling, "we are not disposed to do anything reckless that would create consequences for them that would be final!" [17]

> Here it is a dissident portion of the nation (Cuba) which, alleging that this country—and I might say inaccurately—but nevertheless alleging that this country has been giving improper support to the Government of Cuba, having taken these individuals apparently as hostages to secure some kind of accommodation or support for themselves.
>
> This is completely as I say—it has no foundation in the fact, and it is unjustifiable to have innocent people seized to be held as hostages for this kind of a purpose. So that, in every way that we can do, we are trying to convince these people of the errors they have made and to release our people instantly.[18]

Now, at this point, while negotiations were being conducted with the rebels, none of the captives had yet been released. Apparently Raul decided to let them go in small groups. The first civilians were freed on 2 July (the news arriving, however, after the President's press conference), and continued to come out until by 11 July all the civilians had been delivered to Guantanamo, along with the Navy airman, T. R. Mosness, who had been kidnapped alone, and held with some of the civilians.

No other servicemen were released, however, until 15 July. Raul stated that he would let them go in groups of four, beginning on 14 July. Since none of the returned civilians and not one of the six newsmen, who had gone into the mountains to confer with the rebels, had seen or heard anything of the busload of servicemen by 14 July, and apparently none of this group had been allowed to send messages to the outside world, it is understandable that fear for their well-being had reached a fairly high pitch. Delivery of the first group of servicemen had been promised for 14 July, and when the rebel group failed to meet the helicopter sent to the appointed rendezvous point, Admiral Robert Ellis, in charge of the Guantanamo Naval Base, referred bitterly to the large number of promises broken by the rebels. But a first group of 7 men was released the following day, on 15 July. Four more servicemen were released on 16 July, another 4 on 17 July, and then the remaining 15 on 18 July. The sudden release apparently surprised the negotiators on the spot. Consul Wollam had resigned himself to waiting another five days. An unnamed American news-

[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid. 3 July 1958.
[18] Ibid.

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man [19] returning from the Sierra Cristal told *New York Times* correspondent Peter Kihss that "it was he who had persuaded Raul Castro to release all the kidnapped servicemen immediately because of the situation in Lebanon, where United States marines have been landed this week." Robert Taber who had also been in the mountains quoted a rebel major, Anibal Castillo, as saying, "We are going to release all the servicemen immediately because of the Lebanese situation and the higher priority of the fight against world communism." Jules Dubois also came back from a stay in a rebel hospital to report that he had suggested the release "because of the alerting of the Atlantic Fleet in the present world crisis." [20] The strangeness of the reasoning on the Lebanon crisis went unnoticed in the sense of relief that the problem was solved and the men restored in good health. The term of confinement for the majority of the servicemen had lasted from 27 June to 18 July and they had been held incommunicado.

ONE of the most interesting on-the-spot reports at this time was written by Lee Hall and Jay Mallin.[21] It features Raul Castro and his "political counsellor," Vilma Espin, the attractive *guerrillera* whose combat name was Deborah, a former MIT chemical engineering student, who later became Raul's wife and a militant Communist Party member. The article reports events of early July, as the civilian captives were being released. The intransigence and inflexibility of Raul's character come through here, as well as the impression of someone "partly heroic, partly melodramatic, partly sinister." Raul has struck many Cubans this way, too; he has always needed the smile and fluent tongue of Fidel for his front. The article also catches the simple-minded character of the rebel beliefs—the equation of Wall Street and big business with the U.S. government, and Raul's desire to negotiate with a U.S. official who "would combine the authority of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Fidel later complained to Bernard Relin, his public relations man in America, that he was displeased with *Life's* coverage of his movement, and it is easy to see why. The kidnapping is dismissed for what it was, "a public relations gesture, since American arms aid to Batista stopped four months ago." And it included some observations which, with somewhat more documentation, might have signalled some of the later developments:

> Aside from the military aspects, an ominous cloud seemed to be spreading over the 26th of July Movement. "It's a question of peripheral vision," said one observer close to the rebel politicos.

[19] Later identified as Jules Dubois. His account appears in his book, *Freedom Is My Beat* (Bobbs Merrill Co.: Indianapolis and New York, 1959), Chap. 25.
[20] *New York Times*, 20 July 1958.
[21] "Inside Rebel Cuba with Raul Castro," *Life*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 14 July 1958.

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> "You think you may see, out of the corner of your eye, a red flag waving. But when you look directly at the spot, it's disappeared." Political officers are being added to each command. Soldiers are encouraged to write panegyrics to "world communism." The rebel political structure closely parallels that of Communist partisans.[22]

It is unfortunate, but understandable that the American public did not at that time have access to the observations of the two American negotiators, Wollam and Wiecha. Their reports were of course kept confidential, and were for the most part oral. Another close observer of the Cuban scene was the American political counsellor in our Havana Embassy, John Topping. He was in contact with, and knew a great deal about, the rebel groups in the Escambray Mountains near Havana. The combined Santiago and Havana observations might have turned up some useful signals of what was to come.

On-the-spot observations of the activities and leadership of the 26th of July organization tended to get lost en route to Washington, partly because Cuba was not a priority item in the State Department in 1958, and partly because the State Department had no clear policy towards Cuba. The Department was split into two factions; one which believed Batista's days were numbered and that Castro offered the only leadership which would unite the quarrelsome exile groups and the opposition within Cuba, and another, headed by Ambassador Smith, who tried to do what he could to strengthen and liberalize the existing government, and finally in the last two months to encourage some sort of non-Castro coalition government to replace Batista. Ambassador Smith is bitter about what he regarded as sabotage of his efforts on the fourth floor of the State Department.[23] But it is not surprising that Castro had found support with some American officials, genuinely interested in reform. He had been able to deceive many of his own countrymen, and he also had a genuine interest in some sorts of reform.

The two consuls were able to use their stay in the rebel encampment to learn more about the character of the Castro brothers' organization. Park Wollam has written a detailed account of his stay in Calabazas[24]; he calls attention to several features of the 26th of July organization which Americans might have found disturbing. First, the anti-American slant was pronounced in Raul's headquarters. For example, at the funeral of the six rebels shot at Moa, the ceremony consisted of a long anti-Yankee diatribe. The peasants in the area had been thoroughly indoctrinated to believe that any bombings had U.S. sanction and encouragement. A rebel soldier, who showed Wollam the Military Order Number 30, was severely reprimanded when he revealed that Wollam would like a copy of the Order. Raul was

[22] Ibid. p. 32.
[23] Earl E. T. Smith, *The Fourth Floor, An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1962).
[24] Unpublished manuscript in Mr Wollam's possession.

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anxious to keep his hatred of North Americans under cover, while he was trying to win their support against Batista. The order Raul distributed to his soldiers was quite different from the edited version published for North American consumption after the kidnapping incident. Wollam remembers that it began with a long attack on U.S. imperialism, dating back to 1898, charged that Guantanamo was being operated as a base against the rebels and accused the United States of providing Batista with napalm.[25] In fact, however, it was against U.S. law to export napalm to Cuba or South America, and the U.S. base at Guantanamo often harboured 26th of July sympathizers and other Cubans who were afraid of Batista's police.

Wollam's meeting with one of the Cubans in Raul's group, Fajardo, is described in a volume of reminiscences by the Cuban journalist Carlos Franqui.[26] Wollam had arrived at their camp at three in the morning and when Fajardo told him that Raul was not there, he attempted to leave, but Fajardo held him prisoner. He protested, and for a while the confrontation seems to have been touch and go, but as Fajardo explained, "I went to get a bottle of Bacardi and we began talking more friendly to each other. I asked him to stop saying that it was very serious [to arrest an American official] because I wouldn't stand for it, I had my orders. . . . The consul wanted to know the political ideology of the officers of the Rebel Army. I answered that my ideology was never to be interested in politics, that I was quite simply a revolutionary fighting for his country's liberty. . . . He also wanted to know if Russia sent me cargoes of weapons. I told him that I'd accept them from Russia, as well as from his country if he'd send me any." [27]

Fajardo writes with pride of the kidnapping and describes it as "the spectacular coup of our time in the Sierra." He took care of 36 people, most of them Marines, "the most detestable men in the world." He complains that they "looked down on us Cubans as savages. Even as prisoners they looked on us with contempt. There was one fat guy who weighed over 250 pounds, who kept saying that he was in the jungle." But what offended him most was that they would "undress themselves and come out completely naked on their way to the bathing area. We had to tell the peasant women to stay away from the surrounding field." [28]

Fajardo did not identify the prisoners as North Americans, but rather as a mixed bag of Syrians and Mexicans. He throws his weight around a good deal, at least in retrospect, and brags about how he would have shot down anyone trying to escape. "I told him [Wollam] that it was dangerous to try to escape because the whole area was

[25] Part of this attack has been published in Raul's account, "Operacion Anti-Aerea," op. cit.
[26] Carlos Franqui, *The Twelve*, transl. by A. B. Teichner (Lyle Stuart, Inc., New York, 1968).
[27] Ibid. pp. 106–7.
[28] Ibid. p. 105.

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mined. Once I dressed a comrade to look wounded and I made them believe that it was the result of a mine. That kind of thing held them." [28] Fajardo is typical of the Cubans I interviewed from the Sierra Cristal: simple-minded, though shrewd, apolitical, uneducated, anti-American and strongly nationalist.

Wollam's most interesting observations concern an embryo state operating in the Sierra Cristal:

> Castro had formed embryo ministries to deal with the civilian problems of the population. Schools were in operation under rebel teachers. Crude hospital facilities had been established and the local civilians were being treated, as well as the rebels. There was a Minister of Public Works, who was using "liberated" bulldozers and tractors to scrape rudimentary roads along some of the mule trails.
>
> We picked up forms that the rebels had recently made up for an agricultural census detailing all the farms, their ownership and their production, to be used as a basis for collecting taxes. We observed that meetings of farmers and other residents were being held for organizational purposes.
>
> The rebels had, in effect, part of what my military colleagues now call a civic action programme. I think it had a considerable impact in this isolated area which had been pretty much neglected by all Cuban governments. The people had the rebels there whether they liked it or not. If they lived in the area they were subject to rebel control, which was firm, and there was nothing they could do about it, except leave their possessions and depart. Raul Castro had, according to his and other reports, eliminated the "bandit" gangs which had preyed on the area earlier. These combinations of bandits and/or non-Castro revolutionaries were dealt with by shooting or were "rehabilitated" and incorporated into the rebel forces. Crimes were severely punished, especially those of spying and informing. On one occasion we photographed a *26th of July* poster listing approximately thirty persons resident in a sugar *central* near Guantanamo who had been sentenced to death *in absentia* by rebel courts for informing or helping the government forces. I do not know whether these sentences were ever carried out in full.[29]

A more accurate label than civic action would be the one chosen by Lee Hall in his *Life* article: the organizational form of the Yugoslav partisans. These impressions of Raul's government have since been confirmed by many Cubans who were in the Sierra Cristal and later defected. Of these, several officers and soldiers and one woman major [30] whom I interviewed helped to run the miniature state. They entertained no suspicions whatsoever about a communist model. They were told when they inquired about the communists

[29] Wollam Manuscript, Chap. IX, p. 10; cf. a similar account in Mario Gill, op. cit. pp. 130 ff.

[30] Names withheld by request.

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living in the camp that they were hiding from Batista and had nothing to do with the 26th of July organization. They attended courses set up by Raul in "revolutionary instruction." In November 1958 they noticed that Raul was establishing a special kind of police. These were security guards, most of them new arrivals from other parts of Cuba, who wore civilian clothing rather than any semblance of uniform, and as the rebels moved down the island, capturing small towns, they would assign one security guard to each town (the equivalent of the political commissar). "Red Beard" Pineiro was one of this special security detail. He had acted as a guide for Consul Wollam on one helicopter trip, and later became a prominent figure in Castro's G-2 (the intelligence organization) and then Minister of the Interior. The defectors saw nothing suspicious about this at the time, but regarded it rather as very efficient. A few years later, Raul proudly reproduced the organization chart for his miniature state.

According to this group of defectors Vilma Espin originated the idea of kidnapping the Americans. She explained to them that the point was to capture Americans who were educated enough to know about, or recognize, American bomb manufacture. They thought this was an excellent idea, and in fact approved of all the activities they had undertaken in 1958. It was obvious, they argued, that the arms embargo was not being enforced, because Batista's planes were continuing to bomb. If the United States was really serious, then an arms embargo properly enforced would mean an end to the bombings. They found strictly irrelevant any argument of a time lag between putting into effect an embargo and Batista's loss of supplies, or the fact that Batista could still buy arms from England or the Netherlands. They believed implicitly the slogans aimed at them and at the rural population: "Land, Bread and Peace." Later when land and bread did not materialize, they blamed Castro and held him responsible in the same direct way that they had held the United States responsible for the bombings.

The reaction of these rebel soldiers makes clear that if the United States is going to adopt measures like the arms embargo which attempts to soften a dictatorial regime, it would be helpful to get that message across to the local population. To my knowledge there are no members of the early 26th of July Movement who honestly believed that the United States was trying to help. This is partly because they all assumed that as a great power the United States could or should be able to do anything it wants, but also partly because they were uninformed about the help we tried to give.

Rebel Pronouncements

In this connection, let us look at the language of the rebel pronouncements on this incident at the time and their own explanations for their conduct. The statement of conditions for release was elabora-

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ted by Raul Castro in a written communication to Jules Dubois, a *Chicago Tribune* correspondent, who interviewed him in the mountains on 17 July. Raul hoped and intended, he said, that the kidnappings would:

> 1. . . . attract world attention in general, and that of the United States in particular, to the crime that was being committed against our people with the arms which the government of the United States of North America had supplied to Batista for continental defence. In one of the clauses of the treaty is the express prohibition that said arms would be used in the domestic questions of the respective countries. And in that way those citizens would serve us as international witnesses.
>
> 2. . . . deter the criminal bombardments—with incendiary bombs, rockets and even napalm bombs—which in those moments were being carried out against our forces and above all against the defenceless towns of the *campesinos* without taking into account at all the fact that they were not military objectives.[31]

To comment on the second point first, the rebels had not originally demanded or expected a truce, though they quickly saw its propaganda value and later presented it as a victory won in answer to a rebel demand. References at the time to captured Americans by members of Raul's group were sarcastic. The rebel radio first expressed "surprise" and added the comment, "It's too bad these army officers were not concerned about killing so many Cuban farmers while shooting at our forces."[32] A few days later the American captives were described as "very good 50-millimetre anti-aircraft protection." "The Cuban Army," Raul boasted, "won't drop any bombs while the Americans are here."[33]

At the time, these seemed to the American reader like anti-Batista rather than anti-American remarks, but for Raul they were the same thing. For the most part, the anti-Yankee line was carefully camouflaged by the 26th of July leaders for American consumption.

President Batista was perfectly clear about the fact that the truce was not in his favour. Indeed on 10 July, he declared that a "prudent period of time" had been allowed for U.S. authorities to negotiate. He announced that his army would resume operations shortly, even if the remaining hostages were not released. The United States government saw to it that the truce continued until the release was effected. In fact, Consul Wollam, who had experienced one strafing attack, in spite of a personal promise to refrain given him by some of Batista's officers, communicated his indignation to the American authorities at Guantanamo, and no extra spur was needed.

The language of Raul's second point in his written communication to Jules Dubois is also interesting, because actual destruction of

[31] Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro* (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1959), pp. 274–5.
[32] *New York Times*, 30 June 1958.
[33] *The Times Picayune* (New Orleans), 7 July 1958.

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campesino homes from the air had been minor. Pilots tended to drop their bombs in open pasture rather than on the cluster of huts. It was the guerrilla fighters with inadequate cover as well as the defenceless *campesinos* that worried Raul and he was also concerned that the *campesinos* were blaming the rebels for the attacks on their property. In his lengthy article celebrating the fifth anniversary of the incident,[34] he gives as a primary motive his disturbance at peasant accusations and the saying in Oriente, " Before we lived badly, but now that the rebels have arrived, we live worse." (" *Antes viviamos mal, pero desde que llegaron los Rebeldes vivimos peor.*") Raul had been conducting an intensive propaganda campaign among the peasants to convince them that the United States was responsible for the bombings. In guerrilla warfare, in any case, the traditional " military objectives " do not exist. Just as peasants who inform on the guerrillas are exterminated by the guerrillas, so for the legal government peasants also became objects of attack if they support the guerrillas.

Robert Taber, the CBS reporter who was an active participant in rebel fighting and was with them during the truce and later, has this to say in his diary for 24 July, at a time when the government of Batista had announced a new offensive:

> Much talk about airplanes, but this is purely psychological and intended to make rebels unpopular with the civilian population. (Succeeding to a degree; some merchants very uneasy). It can't work. Army has few big bombs, mainly anti-personnel and incendiary. People will realize that big noise does not mean big casualties necessarily.[35]

He mentions one big bomb, which exploded outside Los Calabazas, " creating a crater twelve feet deep and twenty feet wide, in a pasture half a mile from the village. Nearby a *campesino* was seriously burned by white phosphorus and his home was destroyed." This is the only example which Taber mentions of injury to a *campesino* during the summer of 1958. Indeed, he complains about the long period of inaction on both sides, an inconvenience to a reporter looking for stories! However, it is quite true that the peasants were genuinely afraid of air attacks, and Batista's air force destroyed the small town of Calabazas after Consuls Wollam and Wiecha and the hostages had left. The local population there had cleared out in expectation of the attack, and was not harmed.

To return to Raul's first point, a major motivation, perhaps *the* major motivation, was to " attract world attention " to the rebel cause. This aim was fully accomplished. International publicity not only advertised the fact of civil war, but managed to present in many ways a sympathetic picture of the rebels. Rebel broadcasts announced immediately after the first kidnapping news had reached the press that the

[34] " Operacion Anti-Aerea," op. cit.
[35] *M–26: Biography of a Revolution* (Lyle Stuart, Inc., New York, 1961), p. 261.

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prisoners were being carefully handled, and given opportunities for recreation and food. Both the rebels and the prisoners in their accounts to reporters stressed the primarily educational character of their imprisonment. It helped prisoners learn that bombs furnished by the U.S. government to Batista were killing native Cubans.

A typical example of this publicity is furnished by a statement from four of the captives, which was published on 11 July in the *Miami Herald*. They identify themselves as "guests of Cuba" in their letter to Mr Tucker of the Stebbens Engineering and Manufacturing Company of Watertown, New York, one of the Moa Bay subcontractors. "The movement of the 26th of July," they write, "has been fighting for the liberation of their country for the last seven years. During that time they have sacrificed their families, homes, possessions to liberate their countrymen from graft and corruption."

"The movement consists of many fine and intelligent men. Many of these people are extremely well-educated. Above all these men are definitely not of the rabble type—they have a burning desire to be of service to their countrymen."

"They have been forced into drastic action because American (the home of the free and the brave) bombs and ammunition are killing many innocent people, including women and children. Certainly such a situation would turn the stomach of any American. This is a heinous insult to the American way of life." The letter goes on to explain that "during our three days here we have seen no trace of communism." Most of the weapons, they observe, are home-made, and they conclude that "such ingenuity would not be needed if the Red Arm of Russia were around these men." The letter is signed by Howard Roach, Edward Cannon, Henry Salmonson and William Koster.

The only sour note struck at that time for domestic North American consumption is the sarcastic parenthesis "home of the free and the brave." It is not enough to arouse suspicion certainly, but neither is it typical of a U.S. engineer's associations with bombs. It is rather the sort of association that has now received more than enough publicity and practice from the American Weathermen.

Among the returning civilian captives, the manager of the Ermita sugar mill described the average rebel soldier as well-educated and religious, wearing the familiar symbol of the Catholic Church on his shoulder. A photograph by George Skadding of Raul Castro shaking hands with U.S. Vice Consul Robert Wiecha shows the crucifix glistening at the neck of his armed escort. An engineer from Oregon said he and his companions had been swimming and "on happy tours of the wilderness." Another reported: "These men are fighting for their liberty," still another described the feast of roast pig, rice and beans on the Fourth of July, Independence Day, which the rebels

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celebrated because " they wanted independence, too." Lee Hall of *Life* magazine, reporting from the rebel-held town of Calabazas, refers to Raul's phrase " invited guests " for the hostages and writes, " . . . many captives seemed to reciprocate Raul's good feeling. Most said they were treated as well as they could have been under the circumstances. One sugar plantation manager spoke for most, saying ' I lived like a millionaire without a cent in my pocket.' This mutual admiration was most evident as civilian captives were released. Most shook hands with or even embraced their captors and laughed and chatted with them at farewell. Then they made gifts to the rebels of their remaining toothpaste and toilet paper." [36] It is all very touching and child-like, and the kidnapping—of the civilians at any rate—takes on the cloak of a boyish adventure. The single airman who had been kept with the civilians and was released with the last of them had also been on a spree. Admiral Ellis, commandant of the Guantanamo Naval Base, said " he had understood Mosness was having a fine time drinking beer with the rebels," and warned that he had better get back to the base and " straighten himself out." [37] A picture of Mosness stretched out on the porch floor of a rebel cabin in Calabazas has the caption, " U.S. Navy Airman Thomas Mosness, abducted on his 22nd birthday, takes it easy on the porch. He says, ' I always wanted to come up here anyway. I am just like one of them. They treat me very well.' The rebels gave him the pistol he wears, call him ' Cowboy ' because he wears it low on his hip." [38] And so it went. Cops and robbers. Cowboys and Indians. In those good old days.

Raul Castro was able to exhibit later a sizeable bill—$1,400—for entertainment of the captives. Such excellent public relations were of the same cast as the news dispatches featured at this time of rebel requests for aid from the Red Cross for Batista's wounded, and the rebel policy of immediate medical care for wounded prisoners and their delivery as soon as possible to the Red Cross. In Castro's early speeches he boasts that no other revolution has ever been so mild, so humanitarian, so little dependent on the use of force,[39] and that no other army has ever shared its medical supplies with the enemy.

During 1958 it was a vital part of the Cuban rebels' public relations that they should present to the world an image which would contrast sharply with Batista's dictatorship and his methods of torture, murder and repression of all opposition. It was important that even in their use of force the rebels should appear gentle. Kidnapping, of course, is one of the more dangerous tricks to use in this game, because its execution is not normally humane, and like some sorts of personal terror rejected by Guevara, it may backfire in a wave of reprisals. Even

[36] *Life*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 14 July 1958.
[37] *Miami Herald*, 11 July 1958.
[38] *Life*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 14 July 1958.
[39] Speech of 6 February 1959 to the Shell Oil Co. workers in *Political, Economic & Social Thought of Fidel Castro* (Editorial Lex: Havana, 1959), p. 172.

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today, the hard-line manual of Marighella qualifies the endorsement of a kidnapping for publicity only:

> The kidnapping of personalities who are known artists, sports figures, or are outstanding in some other field, but who have evidenced no political interest, can be a useful form of propaganda for the revolutionary and patriotic principles of the urban guerrilla, provided it occurs under special circumstances, and the kidnapping is handled so that the public sympathizes with it and accepts it.[40]

The rebels had been eminently successful in their first stunt of this sort. On 24 February 1958, one of the urban cells of the 26th of July Movement kidnapped Juan Manuel Fangio, world auto-racing champion, from the lobby of the Lincoln Hotel in Havana. The rebels' motivation had been publicity for their cause, a flaunting of their power in the face of Batista's police and, according to some accounts, a demonstration of their disapproval of holiday celebrations while the Cuban people suffered under a dictatorship. The rebel orders had called for blowing up the racetrack, spreading oil on it or sabotaging the racing cars. But these proved impossible because the track and the cars were too well protected by the police. So the young trio of Cubans decided on kidnapping. They selected one of the most popular racers, Fangio, an Argentinian who was in Havana for the *Gran Premio,* the annual auto-race. The kidnappers felt he was like all racers, not only rich but cultivated, and therefore understood their cause after his first fear vanished.[41] He was held from the evening before the race until the *Gran Premio* had been run, and was then released to the Argentine Ambassador in the presence of reliable witnesses, so that there was no danger of his being shot by Batista's police in order to lay the blame on the July 26ers. This sleight of hand received wide publicity and made the Cuban police look silly. Reporters did not forget to include Fangio's account of his courteous and pleasant hosts, his good treatment and his equanimity about the incident, " another adventure " in his life.

The Cuban rebels' attitude towards force formed one of the crucial elements in the North American picture. U.S. citizens responded naturally to rebel protests against Batista's police state. But they found positively appealing what was presented as the idealistic character of the 26th of July Movement, and the composition of the group: courageous, humane, well-educated, religious, temperate middle-class gentlemen who were ready to die for liberty and justice, but who nevertheless refused to use Batista's methods. And there were, in fact, a good many Cubans in the 26th of July Movement who were just that,

[40] Marighella, *The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, transl. by Robert Moss in Adelphi Paper No. 79. *Urban Guerrilla Warfare* (International Institute of Strategic Studies: London, 1971), pp. 34–35.

[41] Interview by the author with one of the kidnappers (1 Oct. 1964).

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they did not believe in fighting " fire with fire." In the words of the *Lider Maximo*,

> We have never thought of our action resting on armed force. . . . We have said that this revolution is different from all the other revolutions of the world. . . . In other revolutions through the course of history, the revolutionary minorities, in order to manage to govern with substantial changes in the social order, have had to apply force, have had to use terror against vested interests, have had to impose their revolutionary laws by direct force. We have not.[42]

It was this image that had to be reconciled with the first month of executions and star-chamber proceedings under Castro's rule. The kidnapping of American citizens had been a shock, too, but it was tempered by the returning captives' favourable reports of the gentleness and burning idealism of their captors, and by the caution and moderation of the U.S. official response.

From the historian's point of view there is one feature of Cuban guerrilla tactics which contributed more than anything else to keeping intact the picture of the fighting rebel as a temperate, Christian gentleman. And that was the July 26ers' use of bribery. It is not necessary to kill a man if you can buy him out. This device, as Daniel Ellsberg has pointed out,[43] was a unique and original Cuban application of the classical guerrilla doctrine of " adaptation to the terrain." The corruption of the Batista government is famous, but the use of bribery as a tool of rebellion never reached the American press. For somehow it didn't go well with the fanatical purity proclaimed by the July 26ers. One of the most crucial instances of bribery involved getting supplies into rebel headquarters in Oriente. It cost $50 for a jeep and $100 for a truck to cross the Batista lines. Castro was scrupulous not only in paying the *guajiros* but also in paying Batista's soldiers. And to encourage their defection he held out the incentive of a higher wage than Batista's.[44] In the large-scale operation of establishing contact with the rebels in the Escambray when Ché Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos travelled down across the middle of Cuba from the Sierra Maestra, there were no engagements with Batista's army detachments and yet they had to travel through 300 miles of open country.[45] This was accomplished by bribing the Cuban army commander of Camaguey, Colonel Dueñas, with a sum which ranges in estimate from a conserva-

[42] *Political, Economic and Social Thought*, op. cit. p. 172.

[43] Interview by the author (April 1962).

[44] *Political, Economic and Social Thought*, op. cit. p. 48f.

[45] See Cienfuegos' account. Ché was bitter about the treatment accorded the rebels by the peasants on this march. The peasants constantly informed on them and refused to feed them. A signal perhaps of what was to come in Bolivia. Camilo Cienfuegos, " La longue marche," in J. Grignoan-Dumoulin (ed.), *Fidel Castro Parle* (François Maspero, Paris, 1961), pp. 45–53.

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tive $50,000[46] to $100,000.[47] Dueñas had also been used to get July 26ers out of the country when they were in danger of being apprehended by Batista's police. (Apparently the Americans were not aware that Colonel Dueñas was one of the main links to the rebels until he was put in prison on the Isle of Pines after Castro's triumph. He was socially ostracized there by the other officers of Batista's army.)

Reporters who went into the hills to interview Raul Castro were also influential in helping to re-establish the image of the heroic idealist rather than the tough and ruthless guerrilla. Some of them explained that the rebels were completely unprepared for the American reaction to the kidnappings. They were like a band of Boy Scouts out camping in the mountains, who intended only to teach, not to harm in any way, and they were completely surprised by the violent hostility of some American comments.[48] The same accounts usually attribute different national reactions in Cuba and North America to the fact of kidnappings. But this is simply not the case. In 1953, Castro's famous speech, "History will Absolve Me," refers to the sharp world reaction to kidnapping:

> Society is moved to compassion on hearing of the kidnapping of one child, but they are criminally indifferent to the mass murder of so many thousands. . . .[49]

Another device, conscious or not, is that rebel pronouncements and the accounts of the newspapers covering the events kept the image of Fidel distinct from that of Raul. State Department news releases described Raul as more "extremist" than his brother. There were rumours of a split between the two and verbatim reports of Fidel's disapproval of the kidnapping.

The first statement attributed to Fidel in a radio broadcast from his headquarters in the Sierra Maestra began, "If the news of the arrests is true, and I am not at all certain that it is true. . . ." He also stated flatly, "I am sure that no rebel troops will ever take as hostages any American citizens." However, he added, with a certain ease in the face of contradiction that has become familiar, if the report is true, he "will give an immediate order that these Americans be granted their liberty."[50] Supposedly on 11 July, Fidel issued another radio order to Raul to release all the captives immediately. This broadcast was relayed from *Radio Continente* in Caracas, Venezuela which was the link frequently used by *Radio Rebelde*.

[46] Interview by the author with John Topping (16 December 1961).
[47] Interview by the author with Ernesto Betancourt (2 December 1961). Noted also in Nicolas Rivero, *Castro's Cuba: An American Dilemma* (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 42.
[48] See, for example, Ruby Hart Phillips' account in *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York, 1961).
[49] *History Will Absolve Me: the Morcada Trial Defence Speech, Santiago de Cuba* (Grossmann Publishers, Inc., New York, 1969).
[50] *New York Times*, 3 July 1958.

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Raul maintained to Jules Dubois and later to Charles Shaw, the news director of WCAU, Philadelphia, that Fidel did not approve, but that there was no conflict between him and his brother. To Shaw he said:

> Fidel is the chief. He is the great disciple of Martí. He is the man around whom we rally . . . here in the mountains, in the cities, and in exile. He did not approve of the kidnappings, but I am convinced that I did the right thing in the circumstances.[51]

Today Raul is happy to take the credit. There were many Cubans who fought under Raul and Fidel who were also uneasy about Raul. But they were all quite confident apparently that once in power Fidel could control his little brother ("Raulito" was then the nickname). Much was made in connexion with the kidnappings of the difficulties in communication between the two headquarters in the Sierra Maestra and the Sierra Cristal. Discipline within the rebel forces was extremely strict; so it could not have been a matter of disobedience. Raul gave to Jules Dubois, as his reason for refusing to honour Fidel's radio request to free the captives, the fact that he distrusted radio reports. He felt he should accept only written orders. At that time, on Raul's estimate, communications by letter from Fidel's headquarters in the Sierra Maestra to Raul's in the Sierra Cristal took an average of 25 days.[52] These figures seem highly doubtful today. According to Ché Guevara's description of rebel communications, the courier system was efficient,[53] and the two headquarters cannot have been more than 100 miles apart. Raul managed to convey a letter from his "guests of Cuba" to Ambassador Smith in Havana in less than 48 hours. And according to Consul Wollam, in the summer of 1958 communications within Oriente Province were just as slow or as rapid as the rebels pleased. He recounts one incident of the deadline he had established with the Santiago consulate, before leaving to negotiate the release of the captives. Beyond that deadline the consulate was to assume that Wollam was in trouble or held captive himself, and that some measures other than negotiation were in order. As the deadline approached, Wollam composed a letter containing a message of reassurance that both he and the civilian captives were safe, and the letter was delivered in Santiago in a matter of hours.

RAUL CASTRO and Ché Guevara regarded kidnapping as simply one of the many standard guerrilla tactics involving the use of force. It appears in its most brutal form today in the Black September Arab movement, accompanied by mutilation and death. The guerrilla manuals of Mao and Giap do not justify or apologize for the use of

[51] Interview (3 August 1958).
[52] Jules DuBois, *Fidel Castro*, op. cit. pp. 273–74.
[53] *Guerrilla Warfare* (Monthly Review Press: New York, 1961), pp. 31–32, 35–36, 71.

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any kind of terror, and the Brazilian Marighella adopts it with pride.[54] But the Cuban rebel was a different breed.

Ché Guevara in his textbook, *Guerrilla Warfare,* is careful to counter the argument that guerrilla fighting itself is a cowardly hit-and-run tactic inconsistent with Cuban ideals of honour and heroism in open man-to-man battle. He defines the "positive quality" of guerrilla fighters as readiness to die, "not to defend an ideal, but to convert it into reality . . . to establish a new society, to break the old moulds . . . and to achieve, finally, the social justice for which they fight."[55] His orientation is eminently practical, and he stresses that the guerrilla fighter must stay alive in order to win; he must not become a martyr, no matter how tempting the historical examples of noble Cuban patriots. He must not think of himself as engaged in a "romantic and sporting" form of battle; he must wait, lie in ambush, hit and run again and again until he has exhausted the enemy. "War," says Ché with his usual candour, "is always a struggle in which each contender tries to annihilate the other. Besides using force, they will have recourse to all possible tricks and stratagems in order to achieve the goal."[56]

This statement expresses an important fact for any study of restraints on the use of force. So far as the revolutionary in one of the underdeveloped countries is concerned, his preoccupation is likely to be how to use force rather than to avoid it, and Ché Guevara's book is a treatise and a manual on the use of force to seize power. The revolutionary's problem is to act in a way that will encourage restraint on the part of the big power he is trying to influence and, at the same time, goad the legitimate government in his own country to an unpardonable excess of violence.

[54] (1) Marighella's definitions follow: "Terrorism is an action, usually involving the placement of a bomb or fire explosion of great destructive power which is capable of effecting irreparable loss against the enemy. . . . The terrorist act . . . is no different from other urban guerrilla acts and actions whose success depends on the planning and determination of the revolutionary organization. It is an action the urban guerrilla must execute with the greatest cold-bloodedness, calmness and decision." *Minimanual,* op. cit. p. 36. (2) "Execution is the killing of a North American spy, of an agent of the dictatorship, of a police torturer, of a fascist personality in the government involved in crimes and persecutions against patriots, of a stool pigeon, informer, police agent, or police *provocateur.* Those who go to the police of their own free will to make denunciations and accusations, who supply clues and information and finger people, must also be executed when they are caught by the urban guerrilla. Execution is a secret action. . . . In many cases . . . [it] can be carried out by one sniper, patiently, alone and unknown, and operating in absolute secrecy and in cold blood." Ibid. p. 34. (3) "Kidnapping is capturing and holding in a secret spot a police agent, a North American spy, a political personality, or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement. Kidnapping is used to exchange or liberate imprisoned revolutionary comrades, or to force suspension of torture in the jail cells of the military dictatorship." Ibid. p. 34. "The kidnapping of North American residents or visitors in Brazil constitutes a form of protest against the penetration and domination of United States imperialism. . . ." Ibid. p. 35.

[55] Op. cit. p. 20.

[56] Ibid. p. 19.

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North American Editorials and U.S. Reactions

The rebels had apparently not anticipated an unfavourable press in North America. But this is, in some measure, what they received.

Editorial opinion on the kidnappings began to be expressed on 30 June and continued through the following two weeks. Most papers attempted to keep the Cuban incident separate from the East German and Russian detentions. The main expression, however, was one of outrage.

> Hands off U.S. citizens. Americans are likely to have just one feeling about interference with freedom of Americans abroad: righteous indignation against the perpetrators (*Miami Herald*, 1 July).
> Castro should be told that the Americans had better be released not soon, but now (*The Times Picayune*, New Orleans, 2 July).
> What kind of prestige can be preserved if we permit any nation, big or small, to grab off our citizens and hold them as hostages. . . . Around the world we must be looking like prize dumbbells (*Miami Herald*, 2 July).

The *Washington Post* commented sternly:

> Rebel leader Fidel Castro has not helped his cause by abducting [Americans] . . . in order to gain a few headlines and to show disdain for U.S. policy in Cuba. The seizing of political hostages is an ugly practice, whether perpetrated by a foe of tyranny or by the Russians in East Germany. Indeed, wanton kidnapping is the kind of terror which Castro's 26th of July Movement charges against the dictatorship of President Fulgencio Batista.

New York Times editorials referred mildly at first to " these dangerous and rather juvenile escapades " on 30 June, but by 2 July they were warning that:

> Fidel Castro is perpetrating a major blunder, from every possible point of view, including his own.
>
> The basis for his actions was the deep resentment that he and many Cubans feel toward the United States Government and the Pentagon for what is considered to be a policy of aiding the dictator, General Batista. However, in the first place, there is no excuse for venting this resentment on innocent Americans who have nothing whatever to do with making policy. In the second place, Fidel Castro is reacting at a time when the dictator is not getting American arms or even fuel for Cuban Air Force planes, despite what the rebels believe. Since last March the United States Government has refused to permit any arms to go to the Cuban forces. This was a major policy move on the part of the State Department and, indeed, the first time arms shipments have been blocked to Latin America since the Mutual Security Act was passed.

The outrage of public opinion was matched by statements from

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some of our Congressmen. Senator William Knowland, Republican Senator from California, and Senator Styles Bridges, Republican Senator from New Hampshire, both called for direct action by our government. Senator Knowland put it to his colleagues in this way.

> Mr Castro has received a considerable amount of publicity in the press in our country . . . presumably hoping to build up some goodwill in the United States.
>
> If Mr Castro has any public relations advisers, he ought clearly to understand that what has happened is merely the act of a bandit, a kidnapper, and an extortioner, and is so looked upon by the American people, and should be looked upon as such by the American government.
>
> Unless these persons are released within 48 hours, Mr Castro should be informed this is a clear indication of the need for our government to furnish sufficient arms to the existing government of Cuba to permit it to establish law and order in that area.[57]

Senator Knowland went on to contrast our inglorious hedgings with the forthright behaviour of President Theodore Roosevelt, now a heroic legend in all but our revisionist textbooks, in the case of the kidnapping of one single U.S. citizen, a Mr Perdicaris, by the bandit Raisuli. He recalled Roosevelt's famous slogan, " Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead."

Senator Styles Bridges said that " the United States must expect such kidnapping of its citizens as long as it displayed weakness in international affairs." He urged a tougher approach. "Asked whether U.S. marines should be sent to rescue the kidnapped Americans, Mr Bridges snapped, ' I'd get them out.' "

Representative Victor Anfuso (Democrat, New York) telegraphed Dulles on 1 July, to confront the rebels and the Cuban government with a demand for release of the captives within 48 hours. Senator Jacob Javits (Republican, New York) followed this up with a telegramme of protest to the State Department on 10 July.

Editorial opinion in some cases had noted that " There was a time when this nation's response to such outrages would have been to dispatch a gunboat to the nearest waters. Evidently this has gone out of fashion or been discarded." [58] As in most such easy contrasts of our heroic past with the unheroic present, both the past and present are altered. Dispatching warships is precisely what the United States government had done only six weeks earlier during Vice President Nixon's difficulties in his trip through South America. Then critics of the Administration had been outspoken in condemning this form of " gunboat diplomacy," reminiscent, as they put it, of our worst days in relations with the banana republics. Considerable embarrassment was expressed in the press and in Congress over the fact that

[57] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 104, Pt. 10 (1 July 1958), p. 12755.
[58] *Miami Herald*, 1 July 1958.

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American political leaders had been unaware and misinformed about the depth of anti-American feeling in some of the South American countries, and also over the crude demonstration of force in reply. And the criticisms were less than clear or consistent. Nostalgia for the loss of American power and prestige sometimes accompanied disapproval of current displays of force.

Now on the kidnapping Walter Lippmann, for example, in an editorial headed "Four Nations 'Dare' to Detain Captives" underlined "a sour note in the celebration of the Fourth of July."

> The captives are a sharp reminder that American power and prestige are no longer what they were in the days when, if Americans were held prisoner in time of peace, there would have been a thunderous demand for their release. What we have now at the present time is a loud declaration that we will not pay blackmail for them combined with silent admission that we shall not enforce their release.

He described the Cuban kidnappings as "a guerrilla version of military reprisal" and their purpose "to urge stoppage of military aid which the rebels believe is being given to the Batista government." He went on to speculate on the need to investigate the second military revolution of our time (the first being the increase in fire power of the great states), the new techniques of "poor people," from passive resistance to guerrilla terror. This association of guerrilla terror with the cause of the "poor" automatically enlists the sympathy of the reader for this particular use of force. It ignores the fact that guerrilla warfare is an announced and highly formalized weapon for the communist seizure of power. Today it also has it adherents in the right extreme as well: the "Minutemen."

Herbert Matthews agreed with Walter Lippmann. In his book, *The Cuban Story*,[59] he recalls the incident. While he was a leading champion of Castro, and had condoned his methods of fighting other Cubans, he was disturbed by the kidnappings because they affected Americans.

> There was no excuse for the kidnappings and for the first time I found myself impelled to write sharply critical editorials about the revolution.[60]

This use of force he deplored. On the other hand, when he considered what the United States might do to protest, he wrote:

> The dilemma is a serious one. At the time of the kidnappings, some high officers in the Pentagon and some senators wanted to send American Marines in to rescue the kidnapped men. Wiser counsels prevailed.[61]

He not only thinks it would have been wrong for the United States to

[59] George Braziller, 1961.
[60] Ibid. p. 73.
[61] Ibid.

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use force in order to protest or to get the kidnap victims away from the rebels; he also believes the use of force was not feasible.

> The incident was also prophetic in showing that there was nothing the United States could do about it. This is a fact of the modern world, as Egypt and Africa generally have been demonstrating. The Soviet Union could do something about Hungary in 1956 and get away with it, because this suited the methods and aims of totalitarian communism. For the United States to treat Cuba as Russia treated Hungary would mean the end of our democracy, our civilization, our way of life.[62]

Matthews makes analogous the provocation of the American government in such circumstances with the provocation and goals of Russia in Hungary. But it would seem that protecting American citizens kidnapped by a band of guerrillas who were not part of the government of Cuba is quite a different matter from suppressing an attempt to get out from under the dominance of totalitarian rule by the Soviet Union, in particular where this attempt at freedom was made by a legal government of Hungary under Nagy. However, the major point of Matthew's agreement with Lippmann and with an influential sector of American opinion today lies in his flat statement: "There was nothing the United States could do about it." It is interesting that Raul Castro's later account of the incident uses somewhat similar reasoning. He writes that in taking responsibility for executing the kidnapping without consulting Fidel, one risk he had to consider was that of Yankee military intervention. He concluded that world public opinion and above all "continental opinion" would not permit it, that the situation in 1958 was entirely different from that in 1898, that the United States would be forced to negotiate with the rebels.[63]

In fact, there were many things that the United States could do, and some it did. By 2 July the issues had been posed. There were several alternatives facing the United States government.

It could have used force directly or it could have supported the use of force by the Cuban government; or it could have simply threatened to do either of these things. It could have followed Senator Knowland's advice and cancelled the arms embargo. Or it could have gone further and thrown the full weight of military assistance in both men and arms to mopping up the rebel strongholds in Oriente Province. Militarily, this last alternative seems highly questionable today, in view of our failures in Vietnam. On the other hand it was not beyond the realm of feasibility, and it was an alternative actively considered by the U.S. Navy later in the month. We now know that the number of armed rebels was pitiably small, even in July 1958. Fidel's headquarters were known and vulnerable to air attack, because they had

[62] Ibid.
[63] "Operacion Anti-Aerea," op. cit.

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been stabilized. If bribery of Batista's officers was one of his most valuable tools, then counter-bribery was also open.

Another alternative would have been to enforce the Neutrality Act more strictly against the Castro supporters who were sending money and arms from Miami, or to interrupt aid to Castro from supporters in other countries.

At the other extreme, the United States government could have agreed to negotiate at the ambassadorial level with Raul Castro and thus recognize his government rather than Batista's. It could have used this incident as a final proof that Batista had lost control of his own forces, but this might have seemed a poor excuse in view of the total failure of Castro's call for a general strike in April.

The action the United States took was, in fact, a form of military aid to the rebel group. We chose the course of continuing to maintain official relations with the Cuban government, and kept negotiations at the consular level, in spite of rebel demands for recognition. But we were also patient with rebel delays and broken promises. Most important, we forced the Cuban Army to stop bombing the Sierra Cristal area in Oriente where the kidnapped men were believed to be. This was not, of course, an eschewal of the use of force or a complete abnegation of intervention or of interference in the battle. It was an aid to Castro's army in its use of force. It gave his forces a chance to consolidate their hazardous positions and to advance their lines. One report at the time says the truce freed other rebel groups for a series of sabotage raids through central Cuba, and this was later triumphantly affirmed by Raul Castro in his detailed rewriting of the history.[64]

There were, in short, a good many forms in which the United States might have employed or supported force or the threat of force, and the action it took in effect supported the rebel use of force. It is inaccurate to say that there is nothing we can do; still more inaccurate to represent the alternatives as doing nothing or behaving as the Russians did in their suppression of Hungary. The frequent statement that the major powers in the West are powerless seems to stem from a fear that they will use power unwisely or in excess; it is a way of exhorting them not to use it. This, of course, is not a conscious tactic on the part of those who use it. Rather it seems a half-conscious wish, or a rationalization for inaction. Matthews' type of statement is not unrelated to the view of the massive retaliations or the extremists of the right. They also represent the alternatives as the extreme ones of surrender or thermo-nuclear war. Matthews envisages only the brutal display of "sending in the Marines," as an alternative to inaction.

[64] "Operacion Anti-Aerea," op. cit.

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WHAT we have said about the incident so far limits the discussion rather sharply to the immediate technical objectives of getting the Americans out alive. However, in the context of U.S. relations with an oppressive dictatorship, the government faced a deeper political and moral problem. It wanted either to soften Batista's rule or dislodge him. However, it also wanted to discourage such things as kidnapping. Here is the most difficult problem of coercion: how to discourage this sort of violence without discouraging the opposition in its fight against a ruler like Batista. There is not always time in our government (or in any government for that matter) to weigh up the long term effects of an action, or all the subtleties and implications of the alternative courses of action. The U.S. deliberation, as reported in Robert Murphy's account, seems to have been rather coarse and swift. As he saw the alternatives, they were "diplomacy or force." By "force," the Navy recommended "immediate intervention in Cuba of divisional size, with whatever naval support would be required." Representatives of the State Department opposed the Navy project and "there followed a series of meetings with representatives of the Pentagon, including a lengthy night session at the residence of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. Together with Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and members of his staff, I [Murphy] represented the State Department at that meeting. . . . We reminded the military officers that the policy of the United States government is to keep out of the territory of our Latin American neighbours. We recalled our obligations as members of the Organization of American States. We explained that we were bound by the Charter of the UN. Furthermore, we contended that if the objective was to recover the Marines alive, this could be accomplished by negotiation." [65]

Murphy is correct in pointing out that military intervention might have caused the death of the marines, but beyond their rescue, the Navy's hope was that "an American intervention would stabilize the situation in Cuba, although none of our military officers had confidence in Batista. The Pentagon was aware that the dictator had failed to subdue Castro's forces when they began activities as a mere handful of rebels." [66] Murphy dwells briefly on the difficulties faced by the State Department which as a practical day-to-day matter must deal with governments in power, whether they are dictatorships or not; he notes that the Soviet Union and its satellites as well as the governments of many other countries outside the Communist world are all dictatorships.

Military intervention then was not automatically excluded, and its shadow, the threat of force, affected the outcome. Diplomacy won,

[65] Robert M. Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Doubleday & Co.: New York, 1964), p. 369.
[66] Ibid.

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but it was fear of intervention that caused Raul to release the marines. His explanation that the United States needed these marines for the Lebanese crisis has a dream-like implausibility and irrelevance like the resolution of a comic opera plot. He does not mention it in his article. In fact the story peters out at this point. As Raul puts it, in the language of *Götterdämmerung* which the Castro brothers enjoy,[67] his atom bomb was the discovery of documents in May implicating the United States in shipments of munitions to Batista, and he waited until the appropriate moment to use them. The excitement is all in this prelude, in the capture and the negotiations in which he is able to lord it over Consul Wollam. According to Ernesto Betancourt, then Castro's man in Washington, the release came after the urgent all-night meeting at Admiral Burke's home. Betancourt phoned Haydee Santamaria to let the Castro brothers know that alarm in government circles was serious, perhaps serious enough to cause special aid to be given to Batista, though not in so obvious a form as a marine landing. That this was no idle threat is evidenced by the rapid counter to Raul Castro's next attempt at kidnapping. He abducted two Americans and several Cuban employees from the Texaco Company. Ambassador Smith instructed Consul Wollam to get in touch with the rebels and tell them that unless the Americans were released at once, he would recommend to the State Department that we renew shipments of arms to Batista. The release came a few days later.[68]

The Legend of Raisuli Alive or: Speaking Loud with a Little Stick

To deter or counter kidnapping does present a delicate problem in the use of threats of force. But the problem is not defined by the now familiar paradox that the very magnitude of the nuclear force available today makes force unusable. It is not a problem peculiar to the modern world, as Matthews claimed, or as one might infer from the increasing frequency of headlined kidnappings in recent years. It was quite as difficult in the pre-nuclear days of Theodore Roosevelt, in spite of Senator Knowland's evocation of the speed and power of that President's response. The use of force to recover the victim is restrained by the goal to be attained: the preservation of his life and health. This perennial restraint confronts the police in dealing with kidnappers on the domestic scene: the execution of Hauptmann did not compensate the Lindberghs for the loss of their child. The purpose in such dealings is not primarily punitive, but to secure the hostages whole, and yet the matter is complicated by the law's desire

[67] See Castro's use of the imagery of atomic explosions in 1964 to describe his new sugar policy, which had, as its original aim, not the restoration of health to the Cuban economy, but the destruction of the world market. He called that policy his " atomic sugar bomb." In 1970—his language eroded under Russian tutelage—the 10 million ton harvest was conceived more vaguely as a " blow to U.S. imperialism."

[68] Earl E. T. Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, op. cit. pp. 146ff.

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to deter, rather than to encourage further kidnappings. The kidnapper's certain knowledge that he will be executed would leave him no incentive to save his hostage and considerable reason to destroy him. So far as any given kidnapping is concerned, the point is not to destroy the hostage in destroying the enemy who holds him. And the kidnapper's power stems from this.

The relations affecting the taking of hostages on the international scene are no less complex. A simple formula of sending in Marines or calling out battleships has never been quite adequate to this complicated situation. In the same way that nuclear weapons would exceed most targets, and are therefore inappropriate, as they would be for example in Cuba, the landing of Marines may very well result in death to the captives as well as to the forces holding them.

In view of these perennial restraints on the use of force in dealing with some guerrilla tactics, it might be useful to look at an earlier political kidnapping by the Moroccan bandit, Raisuli, which gave birth to the slogan, "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." What was it like in 1904 to kidnap or be kidnapped? How effective was kidnapping then as an instrument for bringing in an external power to put pressure on the local government? And what part did publicity play at that date?

On the evening of 18 May 1904, on the outskirts of Tangiers, a band of natives headed by the bandit Raisuli broke into a villa called the Place of the Nightingales and carried off two gentlemen who were drinking Turkish coffee in the garden with their wives. One of these gentlemen was Ion Perdicaris, a wealthy Greek who was believed to be an American citizen,[69] and the other his stepson, a British subject named Varley. Raisuli was having a quarrel with the Sultan and held the two prisoners in the hope that both Britain and the United States would force his demands to be granted.[70]

This in itself was a rather complicated international ploy. Britain had recently agreed to let France indulge in what was diplomatically known as "the pacific penetration" of Morocco; Britain thereby renounced any claim to Moroccan territory. When Raisuli selected an alleged American citizen as well as a Briton as his kidnap victims, he brought a third power, the United States, into the picture, along with the alarming possibility of an American official presence on Moroccan territory, and American and British joint pressure on France. The situation came to a crisis when both U.S. and British naval forces arrived on the scene, and the French then persuaded the

[69] Perdicaris had taken out Greek citizenship in 1862, but continued to pose as an American.

[70] The account which follows is taken from the *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President of December 6, 1904* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1905), pp. 496–504. A full and interesting account has been written by Barbara Tuchman, "Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead," *American Heritage*, Vol. X, No. 5 (Aug. 1959).

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Sultan to accede to Raisuli's demands. It was essential for the French to reassure the British and the Americans as well as their own citizens living in Morocco that the French government did indeed control the Sultan and would be responsible for law and order. It was French fear of American and British encroachments in Morocco that brought about the final release of Perdicaris and Varley.

The year before, Raisuli had made off with a British journalist, Walter Harris, a correspondent of *The Times* and of the *New York Times*. Harris' case never made news, in spite of the fact that Raisuli's ransom demands had been fully met by the release of a large number of political prisoners from the Bashaw's prison. For example, Harris' capture was given eleven lines in small print in *The Times* of 19 June 1903. Similar small items on 22, 23 and 29 June announced that negotiations for his release were proceeding. On 30 June we learn that the British legation had chartered a British steamer to pick up the prisoners to be released in exchange for Mr Harris, and this item was only nine and a half lines. Similar small notices followed in the first days of July until the prisoner exchange was accomplished.

In the case of Perdicaris and Varley the following year, the British coverage is somewhat fuller, but still a model of discretion in comparison to that in the *New York Times*. Mr Harris, still stationed in Morocco, sent long and detailed despatches to the *New York Times*, full of local colour, the reactions of alarm of the European inhabitants, speculations about whether the French would see to it that the streets were safe. These despatches are reduced to a few lines in the British newspaper: no personal nonsense, no reminiscences beginning "Raisuli was the brigand who captured me last year," which were appearing in the *New York Times* in full. It is probably safe to say that readers on the East Coast of the United States were aware of the headlines in the *New York Times*. But Raisuli was counting less on the British and American press than he was on the self-interest of the French to see to it that there would be no foreign intervention. He had no great humanitarian or ethical principles to broadcast to the world. He simply wanted money, land and power.

Raisuli's demands were made only on the Sultan, but they make Castro's look very modest and they put current Latin American capers in the shade. As reported by Mr Gummere, the United States Consul in Tangiers, they were:

1. The release of a large number of Moorish prisoners.
2. The dismissal of the governor of Tangiers.
3. The recalling to Fez of government troops which had been sent out to keep order.
4. The payment of a ransom of £11,000, to be obtained by the sale of the properties of the governors of Tangier and Fez. Money obtained from any other source would be refused.

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5. Two small districts to be ceded absolutely by the Sultan to Raisuli.
6. The demand for the arrest and imprisonment of two Sheikhs and the two sons of one of them.
7. Free ingress and egress to and from town markets for turbulent tribesmen, among which Raisuli was now.

"Raisuli would," Mr Gummere reports, "in order to save time, accept our guarantee that the Sultan would fulfil the conditions imposed. He will probably add to the above conditions immunity for the past. In rejecting our counter-proposals he declares that negotiations to reduce the conditions will be useless, as he has stated his minimum terms. . . ."

On 19 May, Washington cabled Mr Gummere the reassuring news that "a war vessel has been ordered to Tangier," but may not arrive for three or four days. On 22 May, Gummere reported that negotiations were under way and the captives well treated. But by 27 May, the picture was not so pleasant. Negotiations were "most unsatisfactory," and no intelligence has been received from the warship. On 29 May, Gummere reported that the lives of the captives have been threatened unless Raisuli's conditions were granted, and there was still no warship. Finally, on 30 May, the American man-of-war, *Brooklyn*, arrived, and on 1 June, Admiral Jewell with the Mediterranean squadron. But apparently the presence of the fleet had no visible effect on the negotiations. "No developments" continue to be reported. Finally, a British man-of-war arrived on the 7th, and the French went into action. (It is possible that the British had more of a reputation in those days for meaning business? What does that imply for American power and prestige, whose loss is lamented today?) None of this, of course, affected Raisuli adversely; it touched the Sultan, the hapless object of his threat, directly.

On 8 June, the Sultan agreed to some of the conditions: to pay money; to remove the governor of Tangier and send him to Fez; to appoint Raisuli over Zeenat and Briesh; to release certain prisoners; to guarantee the release of others; to attend as soon as possible to the arrest of certain chiefs.

The next day, 9 June, Mr Hay cabled Mr Gummere to make sure that the United States would not be put in the position of guaranteeing any of the concessions made by the Sultan. "It should be clearly understood that if Mr Perdicaris should be murdered, the life of the murderer shall be demanded, and in no case will the United States be a party to any promise of immunity for his crime. Anything which may be regarded as an encouragement to brigandage or blackmail should be avoided in the negotiations." Mr Gummere replied, "to accede to all the bandit's demands is the only means the Moorish government has to procure the release of the captives." (Apparently, the Sultan was in somewhat the same predicament as

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Batista). "The government has no authority, for the present at least, over these mountaineers. The bandit would never be caught and nothing could save the captives' lives, if negotiations were broken off."

On 11 June, Mr Perdicaris, who had fallen ill on the 8th, was reported to be in a serious condition. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sultan's government hastened to assure Mr Gummere that prisoners, money and everything were in readiness for exchange with the captives in the following morning.

The next news, on 15 June, indicated that the brigand had then raised his demands to include the release of additional prisoners, the turning over of four rather than two districts to his control, the arrest and imprisonment of certain Sheikhs immediately, and guarantees from the British and American governments.

The Sultan obligingly arrested the Sheikh in question and his two brothers and informed Raisuli that his other demands would be met when the captives were released. At this point, on 16 June, after a month of waiting, Mr Gummere reports, with rising irritation, that he is "now firmly convinced that the time has arrived when the brigand and his supporters should be plainly warned that they will be punished by the great powers to whom the captives belong, if they are injured or not immediately released." On 17 June, Mr Gummere was able to report that all the bandit's terms had been accepted and arrangements were being made for the money to change hands. The release of the captives, he thought, would come on 21 June. The road now seemed clear.

But on 20 June, new difficulties developed. Sheikh Zellal would not agree to allow his territory to be used for the exchange for fear of reprisals, and on the 21st, Gummere reports that his own "position is becoming humiliating." He urges that he be "empowered to present an ultimatum immediately claiming a large indemnity for each day's further delay and threatening to land marines and seize the customs." In reply, on 22 June, Secretary John Hay formulated the slogan which has become famous, that the United States government "wants Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." Further than this, he went on, the least possible complications with Morocco and the other powers are desired. Mr Gummere is most emphatically instructed *not* to arrange for landing marines or seizing the custom-house "without the Department's specific directions."

Finally, on 22 June, Sheikh Zellal is persuaded, and Mr Gummere confesses prospects are brighter, but he is still "not entirely confident." Perdicaris and Varley finally arrive shortly after midnight on 24 June, well but fatigued after a long journey. Hays congratulates Gummere on the 25th, and on the 26th, the warships withdraw. The story ends happily with Mr Perdicaris describing his captor as the "most interesting and kindly-hearted, intelligent gentleman it has been my good

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fortune to have known. . . ." The bandit prospered, lived on for many years, and in the early 1920s was made ruler of the Riffs by Spain as a counterweight to another desert warrior: Abdul Krim.

Then and now

This incident bears some interesting resemblances to the Cuban kidnapping, and it is not at all like what one would expect from recent references to diminution of our past glories. In the first place, the period from 18 May to 24 June is a pretty long one. It is a good deal longer (three quarters again as long), than the lapse of time between 26 June and 18 July for the Cuban hostages. And the arrival of the American warship had no magical effect in 1904. Apparently, they caused no developments in the negotiations until they were joined by a British man-of-war. The earlier negotiations were neither easy or quick. In both cases, the American negotiators were instructed not to do anything which could be regarded as paying blackmail. Just as Cuban rebel promises were broken, so Raisuli proved himself a slippery negotiator, upping his demands after the original set was granted. Talks had been in progress for one month, before John Hay cabled his either/or solution. At the time he considered it a "concise impropriety" because it was not true that both of these alternatives would have satisfied the United States government equally. We wanted Perdicaris alive, much more than we wanted Raisuli dead.

In both cases the position of the legal government was ineffective in controlling the kidnappers. While Mr Gummere and Admiral Ellis would each have liked to use the marines, neither of them was permitted to do so. And it is indeed worth asking in each case whether sending the marines from Tangiers into the mountains of Morocco or sending them into the Oriente mountains from Guantanamo would have resulted in the release of the captives. When the marines landed in Tangiers on 9 June—in order, apparently, to have something to guard (and with the French concerned that American marines influence nothing crucial)—they were sent to guard the Belgian legation (against what threat is not clear).

Perhaps negotiations in 1958 for the Cuban kidnap victims seemed much longer to the public, because the kidnappings continued for a week, and because they received wide publicity. Radio and press were reporting day-to-day developments, new kidnappings and new frustrations, amplifying the passage of time. Today's diplomatic kidnappings get even more attention with the benefit of constant television coverage. The Cuban situation was also further complicated by the fact that members of the Havana Embassy and the Santiago consulate who were talking with Raul Castro were aware of the degree to which Castro controlled Oriente Province, and were not unsympathetic to the struggle against the Batista dictatorship. They knew that the captives were being well-treated, whereas Mr Gummere and his

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British colleague did not. This knowledge may have increased their patience in waiting out the time that the press and radio were expending. However, it is true also that after the broken promise of the 14th to return the servicemen, Navy representatives in Washington were ready for action to help Batista's Army regain control of Oriente. It was clear to Betancourt, Castro's man in Washington, through sources in the Pentagon and CIA that the Navy might not wait, and he used a radio phone by way of Miami and Caracas to get his message through to the rebels. It was the threat of American naval action,[71] and not the homely but ridiculous reason offered by Raul, that we needed the 30 servicemen in the Lebanese crisis, that caused their release all at once on 18 July. U.S. power spoke quite as strongly in 1958 as it did in 1904, perhaps more so.

It was a later fashion to debunk the Perdicaris incident. However, debunking gets us no nearer to the truth than the heroic oversimplification. Pringle,[72] a biographer of Theodore Roosevelt, expresses the belief that the two captives were never in any danger and that Roosevelt issued his clarion call after the chieftain's demands had been met and he was preparing to release the prisoners. Pringle thinks of the slogan as a convenient tool in Roosevelt's hands to fire the " torporous " session of the Republican National Convention meeting in Chicago on 22 June. Anyone in Mr Gummere's shoes would have felt differently, and with justice. It is clearly false to say the men were in no danger. Perdicaris was ill (the fleet surgeon had to be sent in to him) and Raisuli threatened to kill him. He might have been killed even after a period of treating him kindly. And so far as the negotiators were concerned, there was no evidence whatsoever of Raisuli's courtesies.

Castro, of course, would not enjoy this comparison of himself with Raisuli, first of all because his own demands were so minimal, and secondly because Raisuli was no revolutionary. Revolutionaries, in general, find it important to distinguish themselves from bandits or outlaws, for bandits violate the law without calling into question the existing legal structure or the legitimacy of the government enforcing it. Revolutionaries on the other hand are quite noisy about it. They want to replace the current government, and will try to make clear in advance that they are already exercising new rules and laws of their own. They will simulate the forms of a legitimate government even before coming into power themselves. They may, in addition, announce as their goals justice, land, bread and peace, and they may even include these goals as part of the essential task of taking power. But the point is to take power.

Castro's initial efforts in Oriente were aimed at making clear the

[71] This is confirmed by Ruby Hart Phillips, *Cuba, Island of Paradox* (1961), p. 357; and by Robert M. Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, op. cit.

[72] Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt, A Biography* (Blue Ribbon Books, New York, 1931), pp. 388–89.

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difference between his July 26ers and the ordinary Cuban bandit, by holding a formal trial and execution of a large landowner. He was also active in exterminating or reforming the bandits themselves, as we have seen from Park Wollam's account, though he occasionally found the disguise of a bandit useful in deceiving or escaping from encounters with Batista's soldiers. Wollam and others, including Ché Guevara, have noted the formation of the miniature state in the Sierra Cristal and the Sierra Maestra, and Ambassador Smith protested strongly to the business community against its submission to Castro's system of taxation, which by the end of 1958 was very effective and recognized by both foreign and Cuban businessmen.

CASTRO in the Sierra Maestra was frequently compared in the American press to Robin Hood, a noble bandit who stole from the rich and gave to the poor. For that professional analyst of bandits, Eric Hobsbawm,[73] Robin Hood is a special type, the "social bandit" as distinct from the common or garden variety. Hobsbawm sees him as a kind of bridge between the ordinary thief and the true revolutionary since he tries only to right individual wrongs within the established society, without trying to change the society itself.

Carlos Marighella, on the other hand, says that all bandits are the common or garden variety. For him there are no social bandits and he sees the distinction between the bandit and the revolutionary in the selection of victim and of motive. The outlaw attacks anyone either rich or poor for personal gain and "benefits personally from the action." He "attacks indiscriminately without distinguishing between the exploited and the exploiters, which is why there are so many ordinary men and women among his victims. The urban guerrilla (that is, the true revolutionary) follows a political goal and attacks only the government, the big capitalists and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans." [74]

However, the romantic daring and generosity associated with the exploits of the social bandit can gain a good deal of public support for a revolutionary movement. And one finds a perpetual ambivalence among the true revolutionaries about their public image; whether to present themselves as warm-hearted, humane, human, even easy going, inspiring affection or sympathy, in sum, obviously "good guys"; or as cold, hard, efficient executors of the people's justice—only in the long run "good guys," and in the short run and in immediate appearance wearing black hats. Since they must try to persuade the people that they are capable of becoming a serious government in power, they must not downgrade the need to mete out revolutionary justice nor their ability

[73] *Bandits* (Delacorte Press: New York, 1969).

[74] Marighella, *The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, transl. by Robert Moss in Adelphi Paper No. 79, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare* (International Institute of Strategic Studies: London, 1971), p. 20.

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to wield a terrible swift sword against the oppressor. Castro solved the problem by keeping the "good guy" image for himself, and letting his brother Raul bear the burden of the "bad guy"—a job for which Raul apparently had some natural aptitude. Marighella's instructions and definitions on the other hand all come down on the severe side. Indeed, one is struck by the number of times Marighella finds it necessary to invoke the need for "cold blood." Guevara, as we have seen, had similar problems in justifying terror to the traditionally chivalrous and warm-hearted Cubans. And even current Latin American doctrines steer clear of mystical beliefs in purification by violence, so fashionable in recent years in Paris.

The Tupamaros of Uruguay have oscillated between "good guy" and "bad guy" publicity devices. They see the contrast between the mild beginning and the savage ending, but they feel the usual ambivalence. The savagery is a larger and more impressive threat, an indication of seriousness: they mean business. One of their girl guerrillas explained the torture and murder of their kidnap victim, Dan Mitrione, the American police officer, in a Havana television interview as follows:

> People who thought the movement was quite *simpatico*, a Robin Hood-type movement, are now convinced that it was not so. It is a revolutionary movement. It has to commit actions that may shock persons with Christian values.[75]

Mitrione, a symbol of U.S. imperialist repression, had to go. But there was a sudden drop in the popularity of the Tupamaros' cause when the press featured pictures of Mitrione's wife and children in mourning, and the Tupamaros had second thoughts. With a later foreign kidnap victim, the British Ambassador, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, they substituted an unusually long detention—eight months—for the "physical extermination of agents of repression," recommended by Carlos Marighella. Their latest kidnappings of Uruguayan government officials or prominent American businessmen have been partly for ransom and partly educational in aim, in an attempt to recapture the Robin Hood image they had enjoyed earlier. But apparently their exploits are not as newsworthy as before: a recent capture of Tupamaro documents in March 1972 revealed concern that their kidnappings and bank robberies were now accepted by the Uruguayans as on the order of the day. The Uruguayans have become accustomed (*accostombrado*) to this sort of thing.[76] As their athletes commented in Berlin on the Arab terror at the Olympics, "You know, we are so used to this at home."[77]

Still another obstacle has appeared to complicate the life of the true revolutionary. With the arts and techniques of communication as

[75] Havana Domestic Television, 2 October 1970.
[76] Robert Moss, "Marighella," Letter from South America in *Encounter*, Vol. 39 (July 1972), p. 43, citing *Marcha* (Montevideo), 5 May 1972.
[77] *Los Angeles Times*, 6 Sept. 1972.

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advanced as they are now, he must compete with the hijacker or assassin who commits the crime simply to get his name into the newspapers or television, in a last desperate effort to become someone, to become a famous personality. The Oswalds and Bremers fall into this category, as does the " social hijacker " like Chavez Ortiz whose first demand was full television time to tell the world about the plight of the Mexican Americans; for both violence and publicity have eroded the sensibility of the revolutionary's audience. His prospective following may then be tempted to turn to the right rather than to the left, to invocations of the slogan " law and order," and to the reinforcement of the traditional values on which ironically the political effectiveness of various forms of coercion depend: such things as diplomatic immunity and regard for the life of individual persons.

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A Conversation with Robert F. Byrnes

Cultural Exchange and its Prospects—II

George Urban

Urban—The Conference on European Security and Co-operation, and especially the third item on its agenda—" Basket Three "—has made the question of cultural exchange one of topical interest.

Do cultural contacts have a real influence on the course of political relations, or does an improvement in the political climate have to precede any thaw in the free flow of people and ideas. In what way can academic exchanges most profitably contribute to *détente* in the broadest sense of that word? Aren't " cultural relations " almost by definition another way of saying that each side is hoping to have some impact on the thinking, values, tastes and priorities—that is to say, on the domestic status quo—of the other? And shouldn't this be welcome both to the communist side because it is in perfect accord with their frequently proclaimed doctrine that in ideological matters there can be no suspension of hostilities with the bourgeois countries, and to us in the West because free democracies are natural cultural exporters? And how should we react to the communist assertion that in the cultural field peaceful coexistence is ruled out between us? Should we follow suit and look upon culture as an instrument in political warfare rather than an agent that might help us to cement over our differences?

And what if a better understanding of the other side leads us, or them, or both to conclude that our differences are indeed insoluble?

These are some of the questions relevant to the subject of this discussion.

One of the silent assumptions of the " cold war " has been that Soviet Russian culture, as well as Soviet Russian society, is very different from our own. Was this a concomitant of the " cold war " or is it still true that there are two different cultures facing each other—one closed, the other open? Your experiences with the development of academic exchange in the last few years may give us a lead to answering this question.

Byrnes—I'm afraid my answer will be entirely negative. I don't think the Soviet cultural milieu has fundamentally changed in the past 15 years. The changes we have seen are entirely on the surface—cosmetics in fact. The authoritarianism of the system has not gone away, the bureaucracy has not gone away, centralization has not gone away and the secretiveness of the *apparat*—and the vast majority's willingness to

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go along with it—are just as predominant as they have ever been. For the American exchange scholar the difficulties are the same. If anything, the first signs of *détente* have induced an apprehensive establishment to tighten down the screws on the cultural and intellectual life of the country, possibly to pre-empt any contamination, possibly, as a concession to the die-hards in the Politburo, and probably both. Eastern Europe is a different matter. It has a different history and different traditions. If one takes the same 15-year period one cannot say—with the natural exception of Czechoslovakia—that Russia's cultural grip has tightened on the client states. Some of these countries have been able to come culturally closer to us, but then, as I say, they started from a wholly different base which makes any comparison with the Soviet Union extremely tenuous.

Our principal problem with the Soviet Union is that the Soviet Government, and to some extent the Russian people, have a different attitude towards culture and intellectual life than the governments and people of the United States and Western Europe. The role which the Communist Party plays in Russia and Eastern Europe is not duplicated in the United States and the West European countries. The role of politics in culture is one that Americans do not accept and will not accept and that most Europeans (one has to make some exception here for the French who have always had a politically coloured attitude to culture) would also reject.

Of course this makes cultural co-operation slightly difficult because, on the one side, culture is seen as an aspect of a totalitarian political programme, while on the other, at least ideally, we should like to restrict the authority of political forces in the state and to have a completely free cultural life.

Urban—How, then, are these differences overcome in practice? I suppose there is no way of getting round formal agreements if you want to cultivate relations with the Soviet Union, and culture conducted in a bureaucratic framework is almost a contradiction in terms.

Byrnes—Well, cultural agreements are an evil but they are perhaps a necessary evil. American and other Western scholars would much prefer that there be no exchange agreements and that scholars be able to travel and work freely in the Soviet Union as they do within the West. The Soviet Union, however, will not allow Western scholars or Western artists or westerners in general into the Soviet Union unless the Soviets receive some reciprocal advantage which they deeply desire. So the formal cultural exchange programmes are the only way in which Western scholars can study for any period of time in Russia. We regret this and we are trapped by it. Moreover, we may be on the way towards taking this system for granted, allowing it even to spread to our relations with other countries and within our own society, and thereby

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nullifying our belief that men and women of all kinds should be able to travel freely and to have free access to information.

Culture conducted by bureaucrats is, indeed, a contradiction in terms. The Soviet Government is in fact one of the most conservative in the world: once you have an agreement which says that we will send one jazz group and receive one basketball team—once you get that fixed in writing in a two-year or three-year agreement, it becomes impossible to change it. These agreements tend to get cast in concrete and tend to become an albatross rather than an engine. Also, as an American, I dislike bureaucrats and I dislike the influence and control they may have over any kind of operation. I dislike in particular Soviet bureaucrats because they are even less efficient than our own. But exchange programmes tend to be controlled by bureaucrats who are part of a large government operation, who don't understand intellectual work, who have no knowledge of universities and will, therefore, spoil and hinder these programmes. Formal agreements are, as I say, an evil. We should drop them as quickly as possible, but my hopes are not very high that it will be possible to do so.

Urban—How do formal exchange agreements affect educational politics within the western countries?

Byrnes—Restricting myself to America for the moment, there is a disagreement—a perfectly candid one—between the American universities and American scholars on the one hand, and the American government on the other about the purpose of sending American scholars to the Soviet Union. Seen from the American scholars' point of view, the principal benefit derives to those men and women who are professionally interested in Soviet studies, particularly Soviet history, literature and government. It is of great advantage to them just to live in Russia briefly. Usually they also obtain access to materials and libraries which are not available in the Western countries; sometimes they are able to get into archives and have important conversations with the people in whom they are particularly interested. They return to America better-informed, better teachers and scholars than they had been; their books presumably reflect their improved knowledge and there is, thus, public benefit from time spent in the Soviet Union by these scholars because they raise our general understanding of the Soviet Union.

The interest of the American government in academic exchange programmes with the Soviet Union is different. Our government is, of course, in favour of increased knowledge and understanding of any country and it certainly applauds what our scholars learn in the Soviet Union. But that is a small part of its interest. The government's main concern is to persuade the Soviet government that we are peaceful people in America and to remove any misapprehensions which the Soviet leaders may have about American power and policy. In other words, we seek to inform them about us, believing that the more they

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understand us the less likely they will be to consider us to be aggressive, and the more likely they will be to accept peaceful positions.

The State Department sees the exchange programmes as a kind of barometer in its relations with the Soviet Union: when the Soviet government gives Soviet scholars a little more freedom to travel in the United States or expands an exchange programme or even (to be quite frank about it) honours an exchange programme, the State Department concludes from this that it reflects a particular line in foreign policy. This is, of course, an imperfect barometer but it gives the State Department some indication of Soviet foreign policy, much of which is usually concealed.

Urban—Is it, do you think, reasonable to assume that a trickle of American Slavists and ballet dancers, for example, will in fact change the Soviet leaders' rather fundamental view of what American capitalism is about? I think the intention of the gesture is wholly admirable but I wonder whether it is doing justice to the intelligence and determination of battle-hardened autocrats.

Byrnes—It requires, at best, a very long period of time for this kind of conception to filter through the minds of the Soviet leaders. Paradoxically, scholars are more likely to take seriously the influence of gestures and ideas than politicians or the general public—which is not surprising as scholars deal in and believe in the influence of ideas, especially their own. Most people are not much influenced in this fashion and I am sure you are right in saying that of all people the Soviet leaders would be about the least likely to be so influenced, especially on a cardinal point in their philosophy. But America is an optimistic country and this is the best hope we have.

Urban—If we look at the character of the exchange programmes, it strikes me that the benefits are somewhat unevenly divided. You have yourself shown in one of your lectures that 80 per cent of all Soviet exchange scholars are scientists and technologists whereas 80 per cent of American scholars and indeed of all Western scholar-teachers who have visited the Soviet Union have been specialists in " soft " subjects such as Russian studies, history, literature and political science. In other words, the Russians come over to exploit our industrial know-how while we study Old Slavonic syntax. Do you feel the advantages *are* more even-handed than would appear from this quick comparison?

Byrnes—That is a very good question. The western countries have, of course, given this matter a good deal of thought and concluded that these exchanges were to their advantage. Stupid as we sometimes are in negotiating with the Soviet Union, we would not be so stupid as to go on with a programme from which the Soviets would obviously benefit more than we do. The Soviets, on their part, clearly believe that *they* are the main beneficiaries, otherwise *they* would not continue these programmes.

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Urban—Both sides, then, regard themselves as winners which is as it should be in international relations.

Byrnes—Well, we use different standards. The Soviets get scientific, technical and economic information which enables them to strengthen their system at our expense; we get an understanding of their society and a number of opportunities to influence the future of their system.

Urban—How do we do that?

Byrnes—We have Western scholars and teachers living in Soviet hostels and dormitories. They meet and mingle with their Russian peers very effectively as Soviet society is a highly élitist society, infinitely more class-ridden than anything we have in America. Thus our scholars are getting to know and presumably influencing many of the future leaders of the Soviet Union, and the hope is that these young Russians will gain a better understanding of the West, that the biases which they have from their Marxist-Leninist classes, from their general educational background, from the denial of information and from misinformation, will gradually fall away.

Urban—Do the Russians reap any benefits at this kind of non-scientific open-horizons level?

Byrnes—I think they do. Their understanding of the United States is much better. Three years ago (the last time I made a count) 10 former Soviet exchange participants were at work in the United States either at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, at the United Nations or as correspondents of Tass or the Soviet radio and television services. It is a great advantage to them to have men who have lived in the American university community for a year. It is also of advantage to us because we would much prefer to have as their representatives men who know America and can report back to Moscow more accurately than they would otherwise.

Urban—I would have thought that, given the technocratic nature of Soviet society, even Soviet exchange participants drawn from science and technology might act as a leaven. The Soviet government obviously favours maximum know-how with minimum exposure to ideas (and minimum expenditure of hard currency, which is an important factor). But even on the most single-minded seeker of technological know-how a measure of ideas must surely rub off during a year spent in America—a love of pop music perhaps or something equally subversive.

Byrnes—Well, it goes deeper than that. When our exchange people—linguists, historians, musicians—return from the Soviet Union their chances of carrying great political weight in the American political arena are, to say the least, very limited. But in Soviet Russia where government and society are more and more controlled by technocrats and where scientists and technologists are greatly in demand to run the elaborate machinery of a planned and centralized economy, the

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exchange participants are coming to yield some influence, and it is quite possible that these men will judge the West as they found it and not as it is depicted in Communist propaganda. Of course, we can't be sure.

Urban—Do the American exchange visitors to the USSR return converted or at least more kindly disposed to the Soviet system than they were before?

Byrnes—The great majority of even those who went to Russia with a favourable view of the system return anti-Soviet. The others usually arrive back white with rage—seldom red.

Urban—What sort of numbers are we talking about in these academic exchanges?

Byrnes—The numbers are disappointingly low. In 1973 some 150,000 foreign students and scholars were studying in the USSR, but of these only a handful, about 200, were from the Western countries. The Fulbright Act of 1947 and the Fulbright-Hays Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 have together supported an exchange programme involving more than 100,000 students and scholars from over 100 countries. But of these less than 300 scholars from all Western countries spent a semester or more in Soviet institutions throughout this period. So our bridge to Soviet society has been very narrow and the trickle of men and women each way has been little more than symbolic. Nevertheless, the hope is that an increased access to information by Soviet and Western scholars will act as a liberalizing and moderating influence.

Urban—I'm always surprised by the poor foundations on which this hope is built, for our very recent experiences with Nazi Germany tell a different tale. (I am, you will notice, re-formulating a question I asked you a minute ago.) Here was a state slap in the middle of Europe. It had few, if any, restrictions on cultural exchanges, or indeed on exchanges of almost any kind. Ordinary people could travel in and out of the land as easily as orchestras, painters or clerics. Moreover, Germany was at the top of the world education league-table. It had the largest number of Ph.D.s per head of population and great traditions in almost every field of learning and the arts. Its industries were managed by highly trained scientists and technologists, with friends, colleagues and travel-experience throughout the world. Germany's basic cultural tradition was a Western tradition, with the Reformation, of course, standing out as a landmark.

None of this made it particularly difficult for Hitler to enlist the support not only of a very large part of the German nation, but also of the technical—and (with many honourable exceptions) of the non-technical intelligentsia. Nazi Germany became a totalitarian state and the world's leading power under the managerial guidance of a Western-educated, much travelled and sophisticated technocracy.

I realize the imperfections and dangers of analogies in history, but as

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the Nazi experience is the only comparable experience we have, I want to risk indulging in it and ask you: what reason, then, have we to suppose that a trickle of archivists, 'cellists and pop groups is likely to make any lasting impact on a country like Russia which even lacks the historical and educational advantages which Germany inherited in 1933?

Byrnes—I share your doubts—everything in Russian history and the Russian character speaks against a liberalization of this kind. However, Americans are slightly naïve people. They have seen that education in the United States has brought about such fundamental changes that they can't help feeling that it will do the same in the Soviet Union. They are optimistic about education throughout the world. Also, Americans have very much less knowledge of the long-term nature of history than Europeans. History is not a fashionable subject in the United States; to the young, Nazi Germany seems as distant and as irrelevant as the Thirty Years War or Napoleon. So I suspect most Americans have never considered the Hitlerian experience, relevant as it certainly is to many of our policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Then there is the American idea that wealth defuses ideology. Most Americans believe that if the Russians develop a " middle class " and acquire a taste for the same great panoply of goods and services that we have in the West—a large house, a second car, a cottage in the country, opportunities to travel and so forth—they will moderate and mellow, to use George Kennan's phrase.

As you know, there is no evidence at all that this is likely to happen. " Middle class manners do not a middle class make," as one of my colleagues put it. The Soviet Union, as it becomes more prosperous, is likely to become more aggressive, rather than less so. There is in social history no evidence that rich people are generally less vindictive than poor people.

Urban—The American misconception is shared by quite a few well-informed people on this side of the water. It was Sir Alec Douglas-Home who said some years ago that it was safer for us to have fat communists in Russia than lean communists.

Byrnes—This may be true in certain circumstances: if the fat communists did not have the same political philosophy as the lean communists, and if their military power were not increasing—and it is increasing enormously—Sir Alec might be right.

In the last 5 years, since our contacts with the Soviet Union have expanded and become more relaxed, the Western press has seldom missed an opportunity to tell us that our forces might bear cutting. I have never seen any references in the Soviet press or in the speeches of Soviet leaders of reducing the size of *their* armed power. *Détente* has not influenced Soviet military planning. While NATO is in disarray and the battle for decreasing stakes in our common defence continues, Russia is increasing her strength. What is their vast and cripplingly

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expensive force for? What are the Russians planning to do with us? At the very least, their superiority in conventional forces would provide a means for putting political pressure on Europe at the time and place of their choosing. A hot peace of this kind might make a shooting war, or even any openly war-like threat, quite unnecessary: individual NATO countries would be drawing their own conclusions from the disparity of conventional power.

Urban—To what extent is the knowledge which Soviet scientists and technologists are gaining in the United States actually helping to boost Russia's economic and military potential? There is, moreover, talk about vast contracts being signed between the two sides in highly sensitive fields. But whether these fields are sensitive or not, Western support of the Soviet economy in any area is bound to improve the productivity and sophistication of the Soviet economy as a whole, and this, in turn, would boost the Soviet armaments industry as well as lead to a general increase in Soviet power.

Byrnes—The impact of the knowledge gathered by Soviet exchange visitors in the United States tends to be exaggerated. The numbers are very small: in the last 15 years fewer than 3,000 Soviet scholars studied in all of the Western countries put together. It is true that more than 80 per cent of these were from the sciences and technology and presumably they take back to the Soviet Union knowledge and techniques in chemistry, biology, business management and so on. But by and large, the Western countries have denied these Soviet scholars access to developments of a distinctly military kind and to areas of knowledge where our superiority is so manifest that it would be the ultimate in stupidity to allow the Russian visitors to learn from them. So I don't think there has been a vast increment to their know-how.

I'm not sure whether Russia's formidable economic difficulties are fully understood by us in the West. We have consistently refused to exploit the leverage which we enjoy economically over the Soviet Union because the consequences would be too awesome. Nevertheless, we do have one great advantage which we need not do away with if we have our wits about us, and that is that the Soviet system basically does not work—economically, scientifically and technically. In fact the latest figures show that the Soviet economy is slowing down. In 1972, according to the best American estimates, the Soviet GNP grew by only 2 per cent and their productivity increase was practically zero. The Russians have no choice but to turn to the West for assistance to get their economy going. Their situation is precarious.

From our point of view, of course, the situation could be a lot worse. Imagine the fears we would have today if Russian size and Russian natural resources were combined with German efficiency or Japanese ingenuity for adopting the discoveries of others and making their own! The Russians have shown up very poorly in all this, and they are

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especially backward in the sciences that have developed in the last 20 years. In electronics, for instance, they started more or less level with the Japanese, yet in the use of computers the Russians are only ninth in the world whereas they should be second by virtue of their size. Some day the Russian people are going to ask questions: " How is it that the Japanese, just as badly destroyed as we were, have been able to achieve this miracle? Or the West Germans? "

Urban—One interesting line of argument, much favoured by a section of the " Sovietological " academic community in the United States, is in direct response to the fragility and backwardness of the Soviet system and strikes me as providing a highly original interpretation of *détente*. I shall quote Professor Vernon Aspaturian's formulation of it for it is especially telling.

Professor Aspaturian dismisses the Soviet view that no peaceful coexistence is possible in the realm of ideology as essentially defensive rather than aggressive in its function, and there is, he implies, no reason for us to worry about it. He then proceeds to show that the only way of reassuring the Soviet leaders of our own peaceful intentions is by actively supporting them to make the Soviet system work. We have already achieved nuclear parity (he says)—what is now required is to help the Soviet Union to achieve " system parity ":

> There are too many glaring weaknesses . . . in Soviet society for the Soviet leaders to risk the importation of competing ideas or to allow the expression of dissident and critical views on the part of its own citizens.
>
> What is more likely to open up the Soviet system is a policy not of challenging the system, but of assisting in its efficient operation. This would require the United States to help the Soviet system to work within the parameters of its own goals and objectives. It would result to some degree in subsidizing the Soviet social order . . . by providing help in such a way as to minimize the defects and malfunctioning of communism. Only when the Soviet leaders are convinced that the United States is not interested in undermining or weakening its domestic institutions will they give serious attention to the relaxation of ideological controls. . . . The Soviet Union might eventually wish to reciprocate, thus providing a more profound sense of security than that provided by a nuclear stalemate and mutual exhaustion. The Soviet leaders would have less to fear from foreign ideas or the dissident views of their own citizens, and the system could adapt and adjust to accord more faithfully with its own values and goals as expressed in the Soviet Constitution. In this manner, the Soviet Union might achieve " system parity " just as it has achieved nuclear parity, and thus provide a more durable basis for peace and cooperation (Paper presented at Stanford University, 1973).*

Byrnes—Good Lord! This seems to me the most utter nonsense one could possibly come up with, and it shows a complete inability to

* *Cf. Survey*, No. 87, 1973.

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understand the various historical factors that have gone into the making of Western and Soviet society.

Urban—It's my prize quotation.

Byrnes—Professor Aspaturian certainly leaves very little to the imagination—

Urban—which is *something* in his favour in an age of academic obfuscation and gobbledegook.

Byrnes—Well, I'm afraid Professor Aspaturian represents, *mutatis mutandis,* a rather typically American approach to social problems: many Americans believed—mercifully fewer now believe—that if we poured money over our slum-dwellings, our racial minorities, over illiteracy and so on, these problems would go away. For 20 years now we have been indulging this simple-minded, materialistic and sociologically quite unwarranted idea, and our problems have progressively got worse. We are discovering that the solution of certain problems just cannot be bought any more than a person's love can.

What the Soviets are suffering from is not just an economic problem (although it is, as I have just said, that too) and not just some misunderstanding of American motives. I'm appalled by the naïveté of this suggestion. The Soviet sources of hostility are much more deeply rooted than that. Even if the Soviet Union were a capitalist country, with the same political and economic system as our own, the problem would still be a very serious one because these two large countries have different national interests which tend to collide regardless of internal structure and ideology.

There was no real ideological hostility between Britain and Imperial Germany or France and Prussia, yet national interests collided on many crucial points. These could not be bought off any more than the conflict between Israel and the Arab states can be bought off today. The conflict between the USSR and China is, of course, an especially serious case for there you have national interest *and* ideology mutually reinforcing each other, which does not bode well for the peaceful future of these two countries.

In a sense Professor Aspaturian's suggestion is a tribute to the character of American society—its generosity, its willingness to go the extra mile, the sincere effort to persuade the other side that we mean no harm. But it is, to put it charitably, a little simple-minded: Aspaturian is acting like someone who is robbed at midnight offering to surrender not only everything he has on him to the robber, but taking him back home to give him his house as well.

Urban—But *is* there a collision of national interests between the Soviets and the United States? Those in Europe who look with apprehension at the present duopoly between the two super-powers have a special fear that the Soviet-American *détente* is on the point of turning into an *entente* of sorts precisely because Russia and America haven't, and

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never have had, an eye on each other's territories, raw materials or commercial interests and have therefore never gone to war with each other. This has not been the case between the European powers and Russia, so an inward-looking and *entente*-minded America might (so it is feared) leave a politically and militarily disunited Western Europe denuded and exposed to Soviet blackmail—all of which would make the irresponsible talk of a collusion rather than a collision of Soviet and American policies less fanciful than it sounds at the moment.

Byrnes—The traditional conception of national interest as one consisting of territorial claims, access to raw materials, etc. is, I think, no longer valid. America and the Soviet Union are natural rivals, because they alone possess the power to do irreparable damage, through their nuclear arsenal, to each other and the world. This prompts them to step into any power vacuum that may occur in the world. Soviet policy since the end of the war has been one of expansionism—defensive expansionism first, signified by the incorporation of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states in the Soviet sphere of hegemony, a more offensive expansionism now in the Mediterranean area, and a still more offensive expansionism to come, as I firmly believe it will come. For example, Mr. Gromyko's statement to the Supreme Soviet in June 1968 asserting the Soviet Union's right to intervene anywhere in the world represents a very different concept from Stalin's land-based, continental conception. " The Soviet Union," Gromyko said,

> is a great power situated on two continents, Europe and Asia, but the range of our country's international interests is not determined by its geographical position alone. . . . The Soviet people do not plead with anybody to be allowed to have their say in the solution of any question involving the maintenance of international peace, concerning the freedom and independence of the peoples and our country's extensive interests. This is our right, due to the Soviet Union's position as a great power. During any acute situation, however far away it appears from our country, the Soviet Union's reaction is expected in all the capitals of the world.

This is spelling out Soviet intentions with great clarity. And if any doubt remained as to what exactly Gromyko had meant, I have here a statement by Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, summarizing Russia's new policy quite unambiguously:

> In the past our ships and naval aircraft have operated primarily near our coasts . . . concerned mainly with operations and tactical co-ordination with ground troops. Now we must be prepared through broad offensive operations to deliver crushing strikes against sea and ground targets of the imperialists on any point of the world's oceans and adjacent territories.

So, while we may all welcome *détente* as a step towards a calmer international climate, I don't think Europeans have reason to worry

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that American policy is conceived in less global terms than Russian policy and that Europe would therefore be sacrificed to a Soviet-American understanding. I do not doubt that this is one of Moscow's objectives but there are formidable risks to be faced by the USSR between having such an objective and trying to achieve it, and I'm persuaded that Moscow is extremely conscious of these risks and anxious to avoid them.

Urban—While we discussed the merits and especially the de-merits of having formal cultural exchange agreements with the Soviet Union, you said that the habit of having such formal agreements tends to impose its restrictive logic on our own academic freedoms and our relations with other Western countries. How exactly does this spread-effect show itself in these two areas?

Byrnes—Well, official cultural agreements hoist the state in the driver's seat on both sides. That the Soviet government is in direct control over Soviet cultural policy is unfortunate but has long been accepted. Alas, they also give our own governments—in America the State Department—control over our part of these programmes. In the United States the State Department isn't very keen on having this control, but it does now wield some influence over scholars and universities and we resent that. We want to be free from the influence of any government.

Secondly, the American universities become involved in relationships with the Soviet Ministry of Education and, willy nilly, accept restrictions placed on them and their scholars in the Soviet Union. These have unfortunate repercussions on two fronts: they tend to undermine the United States universities' *Lehrfreiheit*—as bad but bureaucratically tidy examples often do—and they also tend to be applied to relationships between American scholars and their colleagues in all the other countries.

Urban—What you are implying is that American universities have to exercise a form of self-censorship in the choice of their subjects and the scholars they nominate, so as not to offend Soviet sensibilities. Some subjects are obviously more exchange-worthy than others, so the latter would tend to be neglected.

Byrnes—Indeed, and the best illustration of that is the simple fact that for American scholars the most interesting subject of study in the Soviet Union is Soviet political history—for example Stalin and Trotsky, the history of the Party, the relationship between Party and government, the purges of the 1930s, Soviet foreign policy, Soviet economic policy and so forth. We have never been able to send a single American scholar to the Soviet Union to look at any of these problems.

When the exchange visits first started there were applications on our side for the study of these areas, but the Russians resolutely refused to allow our applicants into their country. Then, realizing how

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applications in these fields of study would be treated by the Russians, our young scholars shifted their applications to the study of less sensitive questions, such as local government which hardly exists in the Soviet Union, or nineteenth century political history and problems of that kind. In other words, the Russians turned us away from the issues which are most central to us, and we are now doing their job for them, because our professors tell their young students not to bother with subjects that would prejudice their chances of being allowed into the Soviet Union. So we censor ourselves even more effectively than the Russians do as, to be on the safe side, we tend to exclude a much larger area from our studies than even the Russians might. I regard this as a grave and refined threat to the freedom of scholarship.

Urban—Doesn't the hope of an exchange visit immobilize some American scholars' moral sensibilities?

Byrnes—Yes, it often does, and this is an insidiously dangerous cost we are paying for the exchange programmes. Soviet control over opportunities for study in the USSR has so influenced some of our more timid colleagues interested in going or returning to Russia, that they will not join other intellectuals in protests against the Soviet treatment of dissidents, minorities, etc. and will even refuse to participate in conferences that may be distasteful to the Soviet government. The Soviet government has in fact acquired some influence both over the direction of Western scholarship and over Western political attitudes.

Urban—How are these facts reflected in the number of exchange-visits paid to the USSR by American students of Russian affairs?

Byrnes—Very sadly; I think between 1952 and 1965 only 12 per cent of young United States scholars who had been given fellowships for study of the Soviet Union on a national competitive basis sought to study *in* the Soviet Union. In 1964 only 20 per cent of those Americans who received PhD degrees in any field of Russian studies in the previous 5 years had even attempted to work in the Soviet Union. Our scholars have concluded that Soviet studies are infinitely more easily pursued in Western archives and libraries than in Soviet Russia. And this is, incidentally, also the conclusion of many Soviet scholars. Hence our knowledge of Soviet affairs is generally more thorough and sophisticated—and of course much more objective—than that of our opposite numbers in the USSR.

Even a Soviet scholar with a high security clearance, which gives him access to certain types of information in the Lenin Library, cannot obtain access to materials that are freely available at Harvard or Chicago or Indiana. Early issues of *Pravda,* for instance, are denied to the Soviet scholar unless he obtains special permission, and vast areas of Soviet literature are entirely closed to him for obvious reasons.

But secretiveness and compartmentalization are continuous throughout Soviet society, and this is one of the Russians' fatal

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weaknesses. Soviet scholars are blindfolded by their government and I suspect that the government leaders are largely blindfolded too. Above all, there is no impact from scholarship of a high quality on the upper levels of opinion in the government.

Urban—I would have thought this would be an almost automatic process in a technocratic society.

Byrnes—It isn't in the Soviet Union and the basic reason for it is very simple: the quality of Soviet scholarship is, by and large, very poor. You can't deny a chemist access to all the information he needs for his work and then expect him to come up with first-rate research. The one single factor which gives us the greatest advantage over the Russians in this field (as also in many others) is our openness—we have better information and we are better prepared to make reasoned judgments on it. And it is because the Soviet scientific system is like so many intellectual ghettos, each surrounded by barbed wire, that the Russians are turning to us for knowledge.

Urban—But wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that Russia's spectacular achievements in space technology and the armaments industry are due to a fairly efficient flow of information between research and its application, at least in these privileged fields of technology?

Byrnes—It is true only in this highly restricted sense. Elsewhere, curiously enough, the spread-effect is extremely limited. In Western countries scientific information is published very quickly and it spreads all through the system. Our scholars are also teachers so that the time-lag between a discovery in the laboratory and the teaching of that discovery first to graduate students and then to undergraduates, is short. Not so in Soviet Russia, where the great majority of scholars work in research institutes and have no teaching functions. This means a big time-lag, made all the more serious by the Russians' traditional secretiveness about publication even within their own country. Where our time-lag may be a year, theirs may be 25 years. So the Russians cripple themselves through the unfreedoms which their leaders have foisted upon them and about which they appear to be able to do very little.

Urban—Let us go into this a little further. We in the West think that the Russians have a marvellous system for translating Western publications.

Byrnes—This is, as far as I know, perfectly true but, for the reasons I have just mentioned, the translated information doesn't flow freely either. Or take the fashionable concept: "transfer of technology" which refers to cross-fertilization between sciences, technologies and cultures. Here too the Russians have their hands tied by this secretiveness, compartmentalization and straightforward muddle. For

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instance, a significant discovery in some branch of Soviet chemistry is not even allowed to flow freely through the whole tree of Soviet chemistry, let alone cross that thin barrier which separates chemistry from biology.

In the Western countries today there is a very strong interdependence between chemistry and biology from which both sciences benefit and so, of course, does the public in terms of new chemicals, medicines and treatments. The oneness of all things, which Heraclitus stressed more than 2,000 years ago, is practical policy in Western science. So long as the Russians are caught in their pigeon-holes, the left hand never quite knowing what the right hand is doing, there will be no transfer of technologies in the Soviet Union and Russian scientists will continue to have to come to us for advice.

A colleague of mine at Indiana University made a study of the transfer of Soviet military and space technologies to the consumer industries. In the United States and in Western Europe this kind of transfer is quick and efficient. In the United States we make a special effort to harness any technology we have invented or any new materials we have manufactured for the space programme to civilian industrial uses: for example, new kinds of rubber are immediately put into the manufacture of better umbrellas, etc. My colleague's findings show that in the Soviet Union there is no such transfer whatsoever, again because the Soviet military and space programmes are completely cut off from the rest of the country. So the Russians have blindfolded themselves in this field too, and it is, of course, the man in the street, footing as he must the bill for all this, who is deprived of all practical benefits. He can't turn a lunar module into an apartment.

Urban—Hasn't the Russians' recent interest in American management techniques improved their situation?

Byrnes—Well, it may help them in the very long run, and their willingness to learn is one of the more interesting developments in the last 5 years. The Russians *are* coming over to study business management, but my impression, based on a long study of Soviet institutions, is that these injections will never pass as freely into the Soviet system as they would in a Western country.

Urban—Let me take this problem on a wider ground: if the information-flows do not flow in the Soviet system, if pigeon-hole lives next to pigeon-hole without taking much notice what the other is doing, in other words, if there is suspicion and a grave lack of communication in the Soviet system itself, how can the West engage the Soviet Union in free cultural intercourse? One knows perfectly well that culture has to do with a meeting of minds, with mutual enlightenment, with the free circulation of thought and information. Exchanging bits of machinery, picking up a technique or exchanging a bass for a tenor are at best bastard substitutes.

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We are, then, back where we started this discussion: can we open the channels of communication with the Soviet Union without opening the Soviet system itself?

Russian history does not encourage us to think that the Russian system can be opened, or closed in so far as it has ever been properly opened, without enormous suffering. Peter the Great murdered, after hideous tortures, his intelligent but reactionary son because he feared that his westernizing policy might be reversed. Stalin and his henchmen used the same bestial means, only on a much larger scale, for fear that their Russocentric policies might be jeopardized in Eastern Europe.

Byrnes—Our experience in the last 50 years shows that we have, with minor ups and downs, made almost no progress in this field. " Basket Three " at the Geneva negotiations should give us a chance to make a dent in this situation. How large a dent it will be is another matter. But we should absolutely insist that the Soviet Union cease jamming Western broadcasts, allow the completely free sale and reading of Western books and newspapers, the free travel of Soviet citizens throughout the world and free contact between foreigners and Soviet citizens inside the Soviet Union, to say nothing, of course, of enforcing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various other United Nations documents which the Soviet government has signed, but fails to respect.

My general view is that the Soviet Party and government will simply have to make a vast effort to understand the West if our hope of arriving at any kind of a peaceful relationship is to be realized. We'll have to press very hard for this, pointing out to the Russians that both the United States and the USSR have immense military power, that rightly or wrongly the Western nations believe that the Soviet government is a dictatorial one, that for historical reasons we tend to be very suspicious of despotic governments with vast military power at their beck and call, and that until the Soviets reduce this suspicion by opening up their country and enabling their people to understand other peoples, we are inevitably going to remain suspicious and the " cold war "—which has never really ceased between us—will remain at a very high level.

Of course, even this isn't getting at the real problem which is Soviet military power combined with ideological aggressiveness. It is these that will have to be reduced before we can talk of a genuine *détente*. However, if we can press home our suggestions under " Basket Three " —and make sure that any agreement resulting from them is respected—we shall have made a step in the right direction.

Urban—My hopes of getting the Soviets to agree to your suggestions, and to respect them, are not very high. Wasn't the Soviet move against Czechoslovakia in 1968 a prophylactic move against " Basket Three " really—against the nightmare spectacle of civil liberties, a free press,

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free radio and television asserting themselves within the socialist commonwealth?

Byrnes—Oh, very much so. The Soviet leaders regarded the Czechoslovak reform movement as an internal process. What disturbed them most was the abolition of censorship by the Czech government in the Spring of 1968, because they believed that control of information is the core of dictatorship, as indeed it is. Worse, the Czechs began to allow what really amounted to a rudimentary, multi-party system to take root and that, too, was highly objectionable to the Soviet leaders. They could see quite clearly that the Czech example was an infection threatening to spread to the whole body of communist society—to Hungary, Poland, East Germany and then, through a restive Ukraine and the Baltic republics, to the Soviet Union itself. So the infection was removed and the doctrine of the limited sovereignty of the socialist states established.

My reason for thinking that, notwithstanding the Czech example, " Basket Three " is still worth trying, is the basic economic failure of the whole Soviet system to which I have already referred. To recapitulate in one sentence: the Russians have been left so far behind us in science, technology and economic management that they are having to turn to us for assistance, and we can and should tie that assistance to the satisfaction of certain confidence-building measures which we have worked into " Basket Three." We don't want to feel that we are helping a man who has his knife out for us. It is not asking for very much.

Urban—If a Soviet and an American cynic got together to discuss academic exchange programmes with no holds barred, my guess is that they would be saying something like this to each other:

> Exchange visits are intelligence work by another name—you're trying to get at our technology, we're trying to get at your system. We're both trying to let the other learn as little about what he wants to know most as we can decently get away with. " Basket Three " is padding. Why pretend that it can be otherwise?

Byrnes—This *is* taking a cynical view of cultural relations—it might correspond to what the Soviets have been thinking about it all the time but it certainly does not accord with our view. The point is, we're not expecting to have any intimate association with the Soviet Union. We needn't echo the warning of Demosthenes to the Athenians that " close alliances with despots are never safe for free states," for we aren't thinking of having an alliance. At the same time we can be entirely pragmatic about " Basket Three " and say to the Soviet leaders:

> If you want us to do certain things for you, we'd like to make sure that we are not being taken for a ride, but we cannot be convinced of this until you allow the two protagonists concerned in any

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genuine *détente*—your peoples and ours—the elementary freedom of talking to each other. This is surely reasonable.

What we must be very much on our guard against is any acceptance of the Soviet formula that a Security Treaty must rest on the "strict observance of the laws, customs and traditions of each other." This formula is already enshrined in the cultural exchange agreements (now, alas, extended by ex-President Nixon and Mr Brezhnev to 1979) and that is where all our troubles started. The last thing we want to write into a Security Treaty is the acceptance of Soviet customs and traditions. If the Western states accept Soviet definitions, that is to say, restrictions on the movement of people and ideas, they will be endorsing censorship and other controls familiar in Soviet society but detestable to ourselves.

Urban—We have noted that among the unwelcome side-effects of sending Western scholars to the Soviet Union is the fact that the Soviet government has acquired influence over some sections of our scholarship by discouraging certain fields of study and penalizing those who insist on pursuing them.

Patronage and the withholding of patronage are, of course, openly practised in the Soviet Union where the Soviet authorities are sole arbiters in deciding who is going to get a trip to a Western country and who is not. I should imagine this can lead to grave injustices, for the lure of the West is such that the vast majority of scholars and intellectuals will do their utmost to avoid earning a black mark against their names, for fear of weakening their eligibility for an exchange visit. This, in plain language, means that American institutions which finances some of these trips are indirectly helping the Soviet authorities to discourage support of the Russian civil rights movement. Is there no cause for concern here?

Byrnes—The ordinary Russian's loyalty to the system is not in doubt. He accepted the official line on the suppression of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and he is now behind his government's anxiety about a hostile China. But the main internal concern of the Soviet government has been the elite who have always been given special treatment, corrupted and bought off by a great variety of devices. To mention only one: the differentials in earnings between the Soviet intelligentsia and the workers are much greater than in any Western country. But there are two things the Soviet elite do not normally have and covet above all others: foreign travel and access to information. The opportunity to travel abroad, or the hope of an opportunity to travel abroad some time in the future, are the greatest inducements the Russian government can offer; it is therefore very much in the interest of the Soviet intelligentsia, the great majority of whom haven't the mettle of an Amalrik or a Sakharov, to conform and support the system. So, as you say, we are in fact destroying one of the roots of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union by enabling the Soviet government to offer this bonus, at our expense, to its most loyal citizens.

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Urban—To appreciate the human tragedy involved, one has to meet some of the people debarred from foreign travel. Take the case of a distinguished Czechoslovak university professor dismissed from his job after August 1968. His successor—a loyal hack—was recently put up, and duly selected, for an exchange visit to the United States. How does the new professor's now jobless, demoralized and impoverished (if indeed not imprisoned) predecessor feel about all this? Here is one reaction I've personally come across:

> Not only have I been thrown out of my job, not only has my wife been stigmatized and deprived of her part-time earnings, not only has my apartment been taken away from me and my son expelled from the university, not only do I live on a pittance as a hospital porter, but I now see that my successor, whose only claim to his post is his Party-card and his support of the hard-liners in 1968, is going to spend a year in America, on American money.

This is the sort of thing that provokes gut-reactions in Eastern Europe, and I should imagine Russian scholars in a similar position wouldn't respond very differently. If *détente* is to mean anything, we must, I think, make sure that the right to take up foreign invitations and to return home when they have expired is extended to the unapproved writers and intellectuals both within the exchange programmes and outside them.

Byrnes—The situation is quite scandalous, and the first thing we must do is to acquire a much greater role than we have now in choosing Soviet exchange scholars. But I doubt if we can redress the moral outrage perpetrated by the sort of case you have described.

Urban—How are the selections made?

Byrnes—In a typical case, say that between the British Council and the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education, each side sends fifteen to twenty scholars every year. The British Council chooses the British scholars through the regular fellowship process, paying due attention to achievement, character and seniority, and the Soviets do the selection on their side. Now this system has the (I almost hesitate to use the word) advantage that the Western countries at least retain the right to choose the men and women they want to send to the Soviet Union. True, this gives the Soviet government a reciprocal right to choose *their* people, but Western scholars believe this is the lesser of two evils, for the alternative would be to give the Soviet Ministry the additional right to choose the Western scholars they want to have in the Soviet Union too—a right they would dearly like to have and do, in fact, have to some extent, as the Soviet authorities are even now in a position to say that a Western scholar's suggested field of study does not promise to bear fruit or that research facilities cannot be provided.

Urban—This may be an even-handed arrangement but I would not like to offer it as an answer to my outraged Czechoslovak professor.

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Byrnes—Well, it is the better of the two options. If the Russians want to send us hacks, as they often do, the hacks get some personal pleasure out of their trip but the Soviet government does not get the advantage it would obtain if they sent us a competent scholar.

However, the rules of acceptance are being stiffened in the United States precisely because we want to avoid giving unwitting support to the Soviet and East European patronage system. Our policy now is that if the Soviets won't take our scholars as they are being put forward by us, we won't take theirs. There is also the consideration that when, out of politeness, we accept Party hacks from the Soviet Union, we lower our scholarly standards and put up with a lot of nonsense as though it represented genuine scholarship. This too must end.

Urban—You've said that our scholars have no access to subjects of primary interest to them in the Soviet Union—Communist Party history, population policy, nationalities policy, economic management and many others. I know that the Soviet censor works from a 300 page index of subjects which must not be mentioned without special permission. These include items like natural disasters and major accidents in the USSR, jamming of foreign broadcasts, incomes of Party and government officials, price increases or food shortages, the purchasing power of average incomes, the existence of censorship (Glavlit) itself, etc. It is a fair inference that the limitations on foreign scholarship in Soviet-Russian subjects inside the USSR would be at least as debilitating as the limitations imposed on the Soviet public itself.

Are we in the West restricting the work of Soviet scholars in comparable fields? Can they investigate our administration of justice, can they examine the purchasing power of the average American, can they look at unemployment, crime, prostitution, racial tensions, slum dwellings, the treatment of Indians in the United States?

Byrnes—They can, of course, do all these things and many more. We treat the Soviet scholar precisely as we would any other scholar. The Soviet scholar can travel anywhere he wishes in the United States, and he gets the same access to libraries, archives and laboratories as an American or British scholar. So he has a great advantage over the kind of access our people get to Soviet libraries and laboratories.

Urban—Supposing a Soviet scholar would want to probe into some really murky area of American life such as the Watergate affair or local government corruption—would he be allowed to do so?

Byrnes—Oh yes; in fact, in the last few years Soviet scholars have studied the student riots at our universities and high schools, the role of the blacks and other minorities, the negro liberation movement, inflation, unemployment, urban squalor, crime—anything they wished. The only restrictions on them are those also applying to American scholars, that is to say, studies which have to do with military technology in the narrow sense of the word.

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Urban—The Soviet visitors are, in fact, allowed to look into the weaknesses and breakdowns of Western society?

Byrnes—They are.

Urban—And they go home writing up what they have seen in scholarly works of high quality?

Byrnes—Their works are neither scholarly nor of high quality. Most of them are straightforward propaganda of a rather primitive kind. The Russians are now publishing one book of essays each year on American history and there is also a new journal in the field of American studies plus some more general writing on the American scene. I have been closely following this Soviet scholarship in recent years, and I can only conclude from what I have seen that the level is incredibly low. The work they do is not only propagandistic but also shows an inability to understand our culture. Some of this Soviet writing is not even *malicious—it simply displays a total lack of comprehension. There is, of* course, also a great deal of directly malicious propaganda but that, to my mind, is less surprising than the fact that even those Russians who have spent a year in America work on a mental frequency that will just not pick up American signals. This is both sad and extremely dangerous.

There was a conference recently in the Soviet Union which brought together all Soviet specialists in American affairs. The total number was 130 and of these only a handful had ever been in the United States. We in America have some 2,500 scholars and teachers dealing with Russian affairs at our universities and a great percentage of these have been to the Soviet Union, most of them a good number of times. We have, on our part, made an enormous effort to understand the Soviet system which was a closed book to us for many years, and I think we have made good progress. The contrast with the Soviet scholars' lack of understanding of what makes us tick is all the more striking, and I would assume that this low level of understanding pervades the whole system, including the very top.

Urban—My impression is that what puzzles Soviet visitors most is the American willingness to show them America no matter what crises might be shaking Washington, San Francisco State College or the negro ghettos. I'm sure the American predilection for looking into every nook and cranny of American public life and baring the American soul to the wide world with a zeal that borders on masochism must strike the Soviets as utterly incomprehensible.

I can see Soviet visitors reacting to this spectacle in two different ways. Some might be enormously impressed by the strength of a society which can afford to tear itself to pieces every two or three decades in full view, and to the obvious *Schadenfreude,* of its adversaries. Others, closer to the spirit of Potemkin, might think that a system stupid enough to allow itself to be pushed to the brink of self-destruction and

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thinks nothing of inviting a hostile world to cash in on its discomfiture, deserves everything that is coming to it. " Admirable! " would be the reaction of the first; " Idiots! " would say the second.

Byrnes—I don't think we know the answer to this very interesting question. It would, in fact, be one of the most important studies anyone could now make to find out how the Soviets see us—to depict the Soviet estimate of what is going to happen in the USA. If they have the same view I have, then our situation is even more desperate than it is now.

I have come across cases of both reactions you have mentioned, but I would hesitate to generalize about them. Most Soviet historians I have met in the United States were extraordinarily impressed by what they saw; it was quite clear to them that, with all our penchant for self-denigration, our social problems and our other weaknesses, we are an enormously powerful country. They could see that we are a land of outstanding vitality, enthusiasm and practical expertise and that we are making visible progress in giving equal opportunities to blacks, expanding education, helping the disadvantaged, undoing some of the environmental ravages of mindless industrialization, and in a thousand other ways. Soviet scholars realize that some of these problems are very much like their own, and I would assume that they return home with a better appreciation of our strength and our ability not only to plan for the solution of vast social and technical problems, but actually to do the job.

Now there are also Soviet scholars who fit into your second category. A lot of Russians worship power. They like a man who knows his mind and acts upon it. Visiting scholars of that psychological type return to the Soviet Union with a certain scorn for the United States because we have been so free in exposing our weaknesses.

I remember talking to one Soviet economist just as he was leaving the United States; I asked him what his impressions had been. He said, " Even worse than I thought they would be."

Urban—This brings up one of the points I made in my introductory statement: what if a better knowledge of the other side leads us, or them, to conclude that our problems are indeed beyond solution? I should imagine your Soviet economist went home with that sort of conclusion in his mind and your disenchanted American scholars returning home from Russia, as you said, white with rage but seldom red, may have arrived at a similar conclusion.

Byrnes—The mistake we often make—and American intellectuals make it more often than most—is to believe that cultural exchange is going to solve our problems. I don't think it will, for cultural exchange does not get at the basic issue which is (as I said earlier in this discussion) Soviet power combined with the political ambition of the Soviet Communist Party.

Urban—How, then, would you go about working for a *détente* with

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the Soviet Union? Would you make the satisfaction of "Basket Three" a condition of "Basket Two"? In other words, would you withhold aid, trade and investment from the Soviet Union, unless Russia opened itself up to us as envisaged in "Basket Three"?

Professor Peter Wiles has made the point that the West has two great weapons: high technology and cultural freedom. Both are highly exportable. The communists want the first and fear the second. We should not give away our technological advantage for an unproven economic hope—we must barter it away for a sure cultural thing. And as, Wiles insists, in the long run our security depends on concessions in the field of cultural freedom, our economic concessions to the Soviet Union should be against cutural concessions—against an irreversible ideological *détente*.

Byrnes—Well, I am very much in agreement with that view, only I would spell it out a little further.

First, at the Geneva discussions we are silly to accept any distinction between "Basket Two" and "Basket Three." We should point out to the Russians that in the modern world it is anachronistic to talk of the "sovereignty" and "independence" of states. Every state interferes with other states by whatever it does. The Soviet purchase of United States grain sent the price of bread up in the United States and contributed to inflation. The oil sanctions in the Middle East have deeply affected the American housewife and motorist and are threatening to cause a serious recession in Europe and elsewhere. A poor harvest in the United States could cause starvation in India and other parts of the world, not excluding—if it coincided with a drought in the Ukraine—the Soviet Union, and so on.

I would also tell the Russians that we have no intention of separating "Basket Two" from "Basket Three." The Soviet view is that *détente*—peaceful coexistence—is a higher form of the class struggle in the international arena and that our two societies are therefor in contention with each other. Fine—we should accept that; and precisely because we accept that interpretation of *détente* we should use our great economic, scientific and technological strength, and the strength of the spirit of free enquiry, which is the source of all the others, to exact those very modest concessions we have packed into "Basket Three." This would be taking the Russians at their word and they could have no grounds for complaint.

Urban—How would you monitor and police an agreement in which high technology were bartered away against cultural freedom? One danger I can foresee on our side of any barter is that we might, as individual countries, give the Soviet Union bilaterally what they may not be able to negotiate with us collectively under "Basket Three."

Would you say, as Wiles suggests, that our computer sales, for example, should be kept down to an annually renewable minimum, as a threat? If the cultural side of the agreement has been fully honoured

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in that period, the economic agreement is renewed. This means that culture would be openly and formally bargained against economics. Is this a practical proposition?

Byrnes—It is both a good and a practical idea. In fact the cultural agreements now in force are made up in precisely that way. For instance: Section A provides for the exchange of sports teams. Section B deals with artists and ballet dancers and Section C with orchestras. A, B, and C are negotiated (usually over a long and painful period), with Americans giving the Russians more in C than they would in A because they use A, B, and C to balance out each other. Bringing "Basket Two" and "Basket Three" into the same package would simply mean that the agreements would be more complicated, but also much more realistic.

As to your fear that we might grant the Soviets bilaterally what she cannot obtain under "Basket Two," this is a possibility; but unenlightened as we often are in the pursuit of narrow national interest, I don't think we are silly enough to pursue such a gratuitous and ultimately self-defeating policy.

Urban—Coming back to the idea of merging "Basket Two" with "Basket Three," would you, to take an example, check the export of Western oil-drilling machinery against the cessation of the jamming of Western broadcasts?

Byrnes—That is the sort of thing I have in mind. What we must remember is that we have very little, if anything, to lose by not having a cultural exchange agreement. In the field of Soviet-Russian studies (the only one where we have anything of importance to gain) we are in a very strong position. Our knowledge of all things Soviet is infinitely greater than it was even 15 years ago. We have so many educated Americans well versed in the field that we could go on for 10 years or more virtually without any loss if no more American scholars were admitted to the Soviet Union. We would, after a time, be simply back where we were during the first 35–40 years of Soviet rule.

We are, therefore, very well placed to say to the Russians in Geneva: although we would very much like to continue with these cultural exchanges, we regard the present arrangements as being highly unfair. We propose—I would say—ending all cultural exchange agreements unless, as a first step, you end the jamming of all Western broadcasts and allow our books and newspapers to circulate among those who wish to purchase them. We have never jammed your radios and we have never stopped your books and newspapers at our borders. There must be reciprocity, and if you can't provide reciprocity, let us forget all of this nonsense about cultural exchange programmes. Let me repeat: I regard the ending of jamming of all Western broadcasts as the *sine qua non* of any barter arrangement between "Basket Two" and "Basket Three" as well as a barometer of Soviet intentions.

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Urban—One has to be aware that "Basket Three," if it were to be fully put into effect, might undermine the whole Soviet system. That is certainly the view the Russians take of it.

Byrnes—I'm not at all convinced that this is so. "Basket Three" would certainly change the chemistry of the system, very probably to its long-term advantage. You see, if the Soviet leaders want to avoid trouble in the near or more distant future, they must resolve the very serious economic and technical problems which are eating away at the foundations of everything they have built since 1917. If these difficulties are not removed, the members of the Soviet intelligentsia—those who are very privileged and largely support the system—will become disillusioned and turn against the causes and perpetrators of their frustrations. And it is reasonable to assume that even the ordinary Russian, docile as he is, would be more and more unwilling to put up with the poverty, the overcrowding, the shortages and regimentation that would still be his lot 60 or 70 years after the October Revolution.

The Soviet leaders' choices are therefore very limited (if, that is, they want to exclude the possibility of going back to the double-edged weapon of a Stalin type of tyranny): in order to make their system work reasonably effectively they need a massive injection of capital and know-how from the West; so we should be simply saying to them: if you want to buy time for your system, you will have to pay a price for it. What the Soviets are now asking the West to provide is aid and very low-interest credits for which they would, in fact, not have to pay. If we are inane enough to fall in with their wishes, we deserve whatever happens to us in the future.

Urban—One may look at the Soviet-American conflict of interests as a conflict of two revolutionary traditions—that of the libertarian heritage of the French-American revolutions and the tradition of dictatorship impressed on the world by the October Revolution.

Byrnes—We can, I think safely agree with the Chinese Communists when they say that the Soviet leaders are betraying the October Revolution because *détente*, involving as it does the recognition of Western economic superiority, cooperation with capitalism and the joint management of international crises, is a revisionist policy dictated, to be sure, by necessity, but revisionist all the same. Brezhnev is, in fact, selling out the revolution.

My great concern is that we should not betray *our* revolution, the spirit of 1776, the idea that all men are created equal, that they are endowed with equal rights and that these rights cannot be restricted by frontiers and ideologies.

If we accept the Soviet position in Eastern Europe as unalterable, if we cease to be concerned with human suffering because it is convenient for us to do so, if we put our names to cultural agreements that are manifestly inequitable, if we sell an oppressive power sensitive

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machinery in return for promises written in water—or for sheer commercial gain—we may or may not get a *détente* with the Soviet Union, but we will be most certainly betraying our revolution.

So let us not be fuddled by loose talk that the Russians alone have a revolutionary tradition to uphold. *We* have our own, but while the tradition of despotism is as old as man's history, the idea of individual freedom, equality and democracy is new, totally revolutionary, and therefore as yet imperfectly realized. And *because* it is imperfectly realized, I hope that the conflict between the two will go on.

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The Franco-Soviet Rapprochement after de Gaulle*

Robert Legvold

SOVIET relations with France were much easier to describe a few years ago. They flourished then because each side had a common interest in transforming the same bloc—France because its president wished to enhance his nation's role within the Atlantic alliance, the Soviet Union because its leadership wished to see this alliance perish. And so were they limited by the same consideration, for de Gaulle challenged the nature of the Western alliance—not its existence. His determination to weaken Europe's subservience to American power gave Franco-Soviet relations their momentum, as Soviet interest in alienating American influence on the Continent imposed their limits. They attacked the same status quo, but one in order eventually to erode the status quo in Eastern Europe, the other in order to secure it.

Because in 1965–66 the mounting discord within the Western alliance posed a self-evident advantage for Soviet policy, the values Soviet leaders attached to the *rapprochement* with France possessed the starkest precision. Above all else, Khrushchev's successors seized the hand that de Gaulle extended because his struggle within the Atlantic alliance, a struggle they had never trusted before, was rapidly advancing toward an open break with NATO's military organization. The important contribution his behaviour made to the potential disintegration of the NATO structure always constituted for them the decisive assertion of French independence. A second crucial part of de Gaulle's attraction —his resolute opposition to British entry into the Common Market and to the promotion of supranational institutions—remained always its corollary. Viewing the EEC as an important economic auxiliary of the NATO alliance, Soviet leaders hesitated to endorse de Gaulle's defiant role within the Community until assured that it matched a genuine desire to undo the political and strategic organization of the Atlantic alliance, not merely to augment French influence within essentially the same framework. Not until 1965, therefore, did they begin praising his efforts to keep America's "Trojan horse" from penetrating the Continental economies and to prevent the reinforcement of "little Europe." From that point, however, it served as the other premise of the special relationship that Soviet leaders would work to form with de Gaulle's France.

Not that the refurbishing of France's historic friendship with Russia held no complexities. On the contrary, an intricate and constant source

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of paradox emerged from another prior special relationship between France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It was this portion of Europe's critical nexus—the intersection of Franco-Soviet-German relations—once the basis of the Soviet leadership's most serious reservations about de Gaulle, that now inspired its most extravagant expectations. But it was also this relationship that, having prompted de Gaulle to launch *détente* with the Soviet Union, became its most compelling restraint. And, ultimately, it was this relationship that faded as a major distraction in Soviet relations with France, when in 1969 the West Germans, applying the French lesson, fundamentally reordered the original triangle.

In January 1963, Soviet leaders were no doubt more impressed with the consolidation of Franco-German cooperation, symbolized in the new treaty, than they were by the stunning rupture that France, at the same moment, forced in the negotiations to expand the EEC. They were more impressed because, then and often after, they failed to understand France's relationship with West Germany. They, least of all, seemed to sense that de Gaulle's partnership with Adenauer—for in its most fulsome aspects that is what it was—represented the erosion of an ambition rather than its realization. The French foreign minister exaggerated, therefore, when he told the National Assembly in June 1963, "It is a secret to no one, here or elsewhere, that if Paris and Bonn have decided to organize *à deux* their cooperation in the areas of foreign policy, defence, education, and youth it is because it was not possible to do so *à six*." [1] Nor could they easily foresee that from the false vision of joining the Federal Republic to a French-led "*Europe des patries*" capable of renouncing American tutelage, de Gaulle would soon be pushed to secure the struggle he refused to interrupt by turning to the East. Men, astonished at any Frenchman's—let alone de Gaulle's—willingness to ally with Germany, naturally missed some of the subtlety of the French leader's calculation as well as its weaknesses.

Hence, after their *rapprochement*, Soviet leaders must have felt considerable frustration over de Gaulle's careful refusal to unite in pressing Bonn to accept Germany's postwar frontiers, to renounce the Munich accord, and to recognize the GDR. They knew that he favoured recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, for he had said so publicly, and that he was irreconcilably opposed to giving Germany access to nuclear weapons, as he had told Adenauer in 1958 and made plain in each defence of his own *force de frappe*. They surely sensed his impatience with Bonn's political activities in West Berlin and recalled Couve de Murville's conspicuous insistence on this city's independence of the Federal Republic at the 1959 Geneva foreign ministers' conference. They had every reason to doubt his commitment to the reunification of Germany and, on the contrary, every reason to suspect him of harbouring a concern over the power of even a fragmented Germany.

[1] See *le Monde*, 14 June 1963, p. 4.

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But, if they resented French reluctance ever to confess openly their common interests and to support Soviet initiatives against lingering German "revanchism," they misperceived the considerations that moved de Gaulle to seek Franco-Soviet cooperation. For him, an energetic dialogue with the Soviet Union presumably served to reduce the risk of isolation inherent in his growing confrontation with NATO and its dominant benefactor, to prove the autonomy of his policy, and to secure recognition for an independent French role in a European settlement. To understand his choice, however, Soviet leaders needed to remind themselves of two things: first, that he would rather have approached this dialogue with the support of a Western Europe responsive to French diplomatic leadership or, at least, as the senior member in a Franco-German partnership. Second, although his failure to achieve either paradoxically increased the attraction of an opening to the East, the *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union was still but a half-rounded recourse intended to strengthen his hand with his allies, a transcendence of the bloc he hoped thereby to refashion.

Despite an unmistakable impatience with Adenauer's successors, never could he have contemplated collaborating with the Soviet Union against the Federal Republic. Not only did the French worry even more than the Americans about the dangerous despair that might seize West Germany if outdistanced by allied diplomacy, and not only did they resist satisfying Soviet objectives vis-à-vis West Germany because fundamentally they mistrusted these objectives, but, more to the point, they knew perfectly well that choosing Soviet interests over West German interests was to confuse means with ends. What would it serve to promote France's freedom of movement if, in the process, France were estranged from its most powerful neighbour, deprived of the benefits of West European cooperation, and left a renegade within its own alliance system and a foil of the other? The viewpoint French leaders shared with Soviet leaders on many aspects of the German problem was, therefore, something of an abstraction. It mattered more that only one side found this adequate reason to concert their German policies.

Soviet leaders, however, operated at quite another level of consciousness, simultaneously inspired by developments within the Atlantic bloc and imposed by the impediments to Soviet influence over them. Better than anyone they knew that the Federal Republic stood as the primary obstacle to Western acceptance of the East European political order, and, wanting this more than anything else, they deliberately ignored the considerations restraining de Gaulle. Why should they not? [2] Besides, they had another, more immediate calculation in mind. Even if de Gaulle refused to embrace the German settlement Soviet leaders urged,

[2] Although de Gaulle never betrayed the least inclination to act against West German interests, he did, according to several accounts, accept Kosygin's invitation in December 1966 to encourage Bonn to reassess its position on the Oder-Neisse line and nuclear weapons.

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or, for that matter, to stray far from his often rugged partnership with the West Germans, his behaviour within NATO stimulated hopes of attacking the German problem in another way. Back they came to the fundamental notion (so alien to de Gaulle's own conceptions) that the deterioration of one alliance served to strengthen the other. Weaken NATO, they reasoned, and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe is twice reinforced. West Germany, adrift of its anchorage, becomes a less stable barrier to the legitimization of the Eastern status quo: Western Europe, thrown into disarray, becomes less of a stimulus to disintegrative forces in Europe's other half. Because German obstinacy depended heavily on American patronage and the Americans extended their support through the NATO framework (tying to it that of other European countries), anything that enfeebled this institution eroded the underpinning of German policy. Because a vibrant, cohesive Western Europe exerted a powerful allure in Eastern Europe, anything that menaced this unity reduced the stresses within the Soviet alliance system, and obversely, anything that accentuated Western Europe's insecurity increased the Soviet Union's relative power throughout the continent.

Soviet leaders, however, did not have easy access to the promising debate emerging within the Atlantic alliance. A futile appeal for an all-European security conference, transparently directed against the Federal Republic and the United States, and an impractical offer to dismantle NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization afforded them precious little leverage. More realistically, they were left dependent on factors over which they had but the most indirect control—that is, their ability to preserve a sense of security allowing NATO members to quarrel. Predictably, then, de Gaulle's revolt, despite itself, bore a good part of Soviet hopes for seeing American influence diminished in Europe and the inflexibility of German policy compromised.

CIRCUMSTANCES have changed a great deal since the mid-1960s. The context of Soviet relations with France is fundamentally transformed and, therefore, so are the calculations inspiring Soviet policy toward France. Instead of a rigidly divided Europe, with its introspective halves deeply mistrusting the other side's definition of *détente*, the environment is beginning to thaw. The *Ostpolitik* has surmounted the German problem—albeit largely on traditional Soviet terms—and launched a multilateral exploration of means to improve East-West cooperation that technically, at least, will finally impinge on the very structure of European security. As a result, Soviet leaders have less reason to regard the disintegration of the Western alliance as the surest way to consolidate their own. In the process, German policy has diverted the diplomatic flow within Europe's grand triangle from going through Paris alone; now it passes between all three points and, with particular portent, directly between Moscow and Bonn.

Simultaneously the tribulations of American foreign policy and,

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more recently, the second thoughts of American leaders, faced with a more cohesive Western Europe defending its interests against the United States, have stirred serious questions about the United States' continuing role in Europe. Watching these developments, Soviet leaders can no longer believe that the most formidable impulse toward change in the Western alliance comes from disaffected European members.

Finally, for all its impediments and pitfalls, the process of West European economic integration is crawling inexorably forward. British entry and the EEC's rocky, but unmistakable, transcendence of the 1971 monetary crisis presented the Soviet leadership with a reality they no longer cared to ignore. Despite the disruptions which serious challenges like that of October 1973 can still cause, Soviet leaders seem convinced that the point has passed of working to undo this organization or to retard its growth—better to influence the direction of its growth.

As a consequence, Soviet leaders want different things from their relationship with France. Because they are less intent on promoting the decomposition of the Atlantic alliance—at least, as a means of isolating the Federal Republic—and because, as they admit, West European integration is not going to be turned back, Soviet leaders no longer look upon France as a valuable wedge for widening the cracks within NATO nor as the principal obstacle to a stronger Common Market. True, as was apparent in Soviet enthusiasm for French Foreign Minister Jobert's opposition to the common energy front urged by Washington last February, they still find occasion when French independence serves their interest. But more often, in the last several years, Soviet leaders have appeared to value French behaviour and, in particular, Franco-Soviet relations as a useful example to other major Western powers of the most prudent and constructive approach to European *détente*. The attractiveness of that example slipped somewhat in Pompidou's last year, when a sensitive French leadership began to assail what it termed an emerging superpower condominium. Yet, when French voters turned from Gaullism in the first round of the May 1974 Presidential elections, no national leadership greeted the end of an era more wistfully than Brezhnev and his colleagues—their feelings no doubt reinforced by the nostalgic outburst against American ascendance over lesser Atlantic nations to which French leaders had treated them in Pompidou's last months.

THE character of Franco-Soviet relations, however, did not change simply because shifts in Europe's political environment altered the tasks and opportunities of Soviet foreign policy. Their character was also influenced by significant adjustments in French policy away from the assertive and self-confident directions charted by General

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de Gaulle in the mid-1960s. The enfeeblement of the domestic economic and political base for French policy, together with French fear of Soviet pre-eminence in a Europe deprived of a significant American military presence, have, as the French Communist Party frequently and loudly complains, pushed the French back towards "Atlanticism". Rather gladly Pompidou's government engineered the admission of the English "Trojan horse" into the Common Market, enlarged French cooperation with NATO, and openly sought to keep the Americans in Europe. At the root of these changes was a domestic policy no longer in the service of a foreign policy; in fact, for nearly five years, Soviet policymakers have been coming to terms with just the reverse.

In part, this article examines how well they have done and, in particular, the relationship this accommodation bears to the evolution of the purpose Soviet leaders assign to Franco-Soviet relations in the era of the new *Ostpolitik*. To highlight the notable stages by which this double process unfolded, I have divided events into six phases: first, from April 1968 to 1969, the last year of de Gaulle's power, when French policy began retreating on several important fronts; secondly, the first months of George Pompidou's presidency, in the summer of 1969, when Soviet spokesmen began to reflect noticeable anxiety over the apparent reorientation of French policy; thirdly, the year following Brandt's election and the Hague Summit of Common Market leaders, a period of ambivalence, while Soviet leaders struggled to reconcile a shifting French policy with a shifting European context; fourthly, the resolution of this ambivalence in the course of 1971; fifthly, the emergence of France as a distinct element in Soviet efforts to promote controlled *détente*; and finally the rather turbulent period in Franco-Soviet relations from Brezhnev's trip to Washington (and Paris) in June 1973 to Pompidou's death in April 1974.

SOVIET leaders were compelled to contemplate a turn in French policy some time before the impact of Brandt's new course softened its implications. The puzzle is, how long before? In retrospect, it is clear that several major considerations behind French policy collapsed months before de Gaulle abandoned leadership.

None fell more rudely than the notion of France's internal stability. The upheaval of May 1968 destroyed the myth that the French could be taken for granted while he, their link to eternal France, sought the nation's destiny abroad. De Gaulle had always said that the restoration of France's dignity and independence depended on a permanent break with the chaos of the Fourth Republic. The May events left his foreign policy initiative crippled by the same need to address internal shortcomings that had constrained other French regimes. A declining franc, accelerated by the economic disruption of the spring revolt, the November financial crisis, and the Federal Republic's ominous refusal to heed France's plight by revaluing the mark destroyed another prem-

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ise of French policy in belying de Gaulle's earlier boast that France no longer needed anyone—so stable were its money, finance, and balance of trade.[3] It also placed de Gaulle under the shadow of an economy far more dynamic than France's, whose future might well be secured without regard for, even, perhaps, against French interests. And between these two cruel realizations, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August dramatized the depressing obstacles still mocking his long struggle against Yalta.

The question, however, is whether Soviet leaders perceived the telltale shifts in accent and tone forced from de Gaulle by these disappointments as endangering the objectives they had been seeking through their relationship with France. Even more to the point, did they have reason to view their action in Czechoslovakia as decisively influential? At first glance, certain evidence suggested that it had been. It was after Czechoslovakia that France's relations with the United States warmed noticeably and that de Gaulle had his celebrated conversation with Ambassador Soames during which he supposedly talked of admitting Great Britain to a transformed Common Market. It was after Czechoslovakia that the French increased their cooperation with NATO's MARIMED and joined in the alliance's expressed concern over the expansion of Soviet power in this region. And it was after Czechoslovakia that the French openly communicated de Gaulle's long-held reservations over Soviet plans to convene an all-European security conference.[4]

But ultimately the evidence is inconclusive, and, had Soviet leaders wanted to pretend that Czechoslovakia really mattered little, the grounds were there. Taken at face value, Michel Debré's characterization of the Soviet action as an "*accident de parcours*" (an incident en route) seemed reassuring enough. Even had Soviet leaders understood that he meant that Czechoslovakia was a predictable, if tragic, illustration of the Soviet Union's unweakened will to hegemony, they would have also understood that, for the French, the only logical recourse was a patient long-term policy of *détente*. Any other reaction, the French assumed, would simply make Soviet leaders more obdurate. That was doubtlessly the reason why de Gaulle reaffirmed his promise of "*détente, entente*, and cooperation"—a formula employed since 1966 to describe the progression of the Franco-Soviet *rapprochement*—in his 9 September 1968 press conference. So Soviet policymakers could have concluded that the French president's first major response to the intervention constituted his ultimate response.

[3] Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages*, IV (Paris: Plon, 1970), p. 122.

[4] At the April 1969 NATO Council Meeting in Washington, a month after the Budapest session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee had featured a renewed appeal for a security conference, Foreign Minister Debré told the National Press Club: "It is almost certain that a conference would not enable one to overcome . . . obstacles and, consequently, that it would risk consolidating oppositions when we hope, on the contrary, that time will soften them. In these circumstances, I think I can say that the problem is not of current interest." See *le Monde*, 11 April 1969, p. 2.

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If they eventually accepted the comfortable conclusion that Czechoslovakia would cause no serious disruption of de Gaulle's Eastern policy, at the time, they also betrayed little fear that the May and November crises would significantly alter his Western policy. Only in retrospect did Soviet observers notice that Pompidou's repaired relations with the United States traced back to his predecessor.[5] An intriguing Soviet assessment of the Soames affair, attributing its inspiration to the old Gaullist notion of European Europe standing between the United States and the Soviet Union, appeared only after the April 1969 referendum.[6] It was, according to the author, the same ambition de Gaulle had "sought in vain" through the Franco-German "axis" of 1962–63; but was the author, a subtle and expert specialist on France, reflecting the perception of more official spokesmen? Perhaps Soviet policymakers sensed that an adjustment of French policy was afoot, but, if so, they chose to keep their suspicions to themselves.

POMPIDOU'S election removed their uncertainty. "De Gaulle," Brezhnev was once to have said, "is our enemy and we are well aware of it."[7] But because of him the position of the Americans in Europe is weakening, "and this weakening will continue." "He is a sly old fox," who "is aiming for mastery for himself in Europe and in opposition to us." (A rather harsh judgment. None of his Western critics charged him with wanting more than to share hegemony in Europe with the Soviet Union. Perhaps Brezhnev was simply showing Soviet sensitivity over de Gaulle's desire to see Soviet control reduced in Eastern Europe). His are, however, conceptions that "have no chance of succeeding because other, more powerful, West European countries will never allow them to succeed." Meanwhile, "the balance sheet, comrades . . . is it not favourable?" Soviet leaders may have thought little of de Gaulle's grand design but, as long as they dared believe that he remained faithful to it, they could hope to use the Franco-Soviet *détente* for their purposes better than he for his. The trouble with Pompidou was that he was not the kind to have a grand design.

Admittedly events in 1969 were not very conducive to any French leader's grand design. A weakening franc and a sullen polity had reduced even de Gaulle's freedom of manoeuvre. Together with the challenge of an increasingly self-willed German economy, these disabilities were also compelling a reappraisal of the disadvantages in bringing Great Britain into the Common Market. And, in turn, all of these factors, reinforced by the Soviet Union's advance toward nuclear

[5] See, for example, Yuri Bochkaryov, "France: Foreign Policy After De Gaulle," *New Times*, no. 3 (20 January 1970), p. 27.

[6] Yu. I. Rubinski, "Kuda idet Zapadnaya Evropa," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 6 (June 1969), pp. 113–14.

[7] Erwin Weit (Gomulka's former interpreter), *Dans l'ombre de Gomulka* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1971), p. 118, reporting a conversation between Brezhnev, Gomulka and Ulbricht in April 1967 at the VIIth SED Congress.

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parity with the United States (no longer was American strategic power the exclusive threat to French independence that de Gaulle judged it to be in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis [8]) would gradually dictate a less pugnacious attitude toward the leader of the Atlantic alliance. But Pompidou, lacking de Gaulle's magisterial capacity for minimizing the momentary urgencies of policy, seemed more vulnerable to these pressures than his predecessor. His campaign promise of "*l'ouverture*" with "*la continuité*" must have struck Soviet observers as inauspicious. They knew that the "opening" to the East had already been made. Obviously his favourable references during the electoral campaign to the possibility of enlarging the Common Market and his interest in Anglo-French nuclear cooperation better represented the opening that he had in mind.

With Brandt's far from inevitable election still four months away, it was small wonder that signs of uneasiness now began to creep into the Soviet press. "It is hard to see", worried one Soviet account of Pompidou's new government, "how the Gaullist foreign policy and the foreign policy conceptions of Giscard d'Estaing, and especially of Duhamel, can be reconciled, notably on the question of Britain's membership in the Common Market, the political union of Little Europe, relations with the German Federal Republic, and the Arab-Israeli conflict".[9]

Soviet writers, however, knew that Giscard's and Duhamel's—and the new foreign minister, Maurice Schumann's—presence in Pompidou's government testified to, rather than created the basis for, new policy departures. Far from being a hidden threat to a dedicated Gaullist line, their participation supplied the first significant evidence of Pompidou's preoccupation with domestic over foreign concerns. Pompidou's less than voluntary order of priorities linked *l'ouverture* at home with *l'ouverture* elsewhere—it was not shaped the other way around.

BY early 1970 the Soviets had much harder evidence that his election phrase meant important modifications of French foreign policy. At the Hague Summit Conference of the Six in December 1969, the French president emerged as a far more benevolent patron of Common Market progress than his predecessor. Not only had he publicly lowered the barrier to British entry, but, as the Community concluded the twelve-year transition period provided by the 1958 Rome Treaty, he clearly fancied himself the principal choreographer of a dynamic new stage in this organization's development. The Summit was his idea. It was he

[8] De Gaulle's original assessment of the implications of the missile crisis is nicely developed by Edward A. Kolodziej, *French Global Policy under the Fifth Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).

[9] Valery Giscard d'Estaing, leader of the Independent Republicans became Minister of Economics and Finance and Jacques Duhamel, leader of the Centrists, the Minister of Agriculture. See Yuri Bochkaryov, "France's Nineteenth President," *New Times*, No. 25 (25 June 1969), p. 18.

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who offered the most coherent and far-reaching vision of West European integration, although still within a confederal framework. And his insistence that a final accord on agricultural supports be achieved before the end of the year (and before negotiations with prospective new members), despite its obviously self-serving aspect, was nonetheless recognized by all partners as a critical step from a "transitional period" to the "definitive stage of the Community." In this spirit, Pompidou and his counterparts dedicated themselves to forming, within the coming year, a plan advancing the EEC to economic and monetary union.

Two months later the French president flew off to Washington. He had been preceded by François Ortoli, the French Minister of Industrial and Scientific Development, and Michel Fourquet, the French Chief of Staff, the first visit to the United States by a French military figure of this importance since 1966. Soviet writers had noticed these increasing contacts as well as the cordiality of Melvin Laird and William Rogers' unscheduled talks with French leaders after the NATO Council meeting early in December.[10] Presumably they also noticed that in Washington, Pompidou ranked the United States as "our oldest and our greatest friend and ally . . . the one to whom we are closest in our hearts," noted that his talks with President Nixon had occurred in "the best possible atmosphere," and went out of his way to celebrate the excellent turn in recent Franco-American relations. With a little effort, they may also have learned that he had appealed to the Americans to maintain a "substantial military presence" in Europe. From the Soviet point of view these two developments, the changing quality of France's relations with the United States and its altered policy within the EEC, intersected in a disturbing way.

Soviet observers cared less that French opposition to an American-dominated, politically integrated Common Market remained intact. They had always feared more the slow accumulation of factors favouring West European integration than a conscious decision to transform the EEC into a supranational entity. From their perspective, a crucial threshold had been crossed, beyond which France no longer stood as an obstacle to the expansion of this economic bloc nor to its internal reinforcement. An invaluable advantage had been conceded to those who wanted to promote supranational structures. Anyone reading Soviet accounts cannot help being stunned by the parade of extraordinary consequences envisaged: from an agreement to give the EEC's assembly control over less than 8 per cent of the Community's agricultural administrative expenditures to monetary union, from monetary union to a uniform commercial policy, and from a uniform commercial policy to a defence community with its own nuclear arm. No one was saying that French leaders wished this result, but they had launched a process whose implications they, unlike de Gaulle, underestimated. The naive

[10] See Yuri Bochkaryov, "France: Foreign Policy after De Gaulle," *New Times*, No. 3 (20 January 1970), p. 27.

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French, Yuri Zhukov noted two weeks after the Hague Summit, were arguing that the only way to balance German power and release Europe from American domination was to admit Great Britain to the EEC and build a stronger Western Europe around it.[11] In February, after the EEC ministers had settled on the powers the European Parliament would have over the supplementary administrative expenses of "green Europe," Zhukov bemoaned the lift this would give sponsors of a "United States of Western Europe" who viewed such small steps as a means of extending supranational control over important economic, political, and even defence questions.[12] French "ruling circles" would have forcefully resisted the threat during the "previous period," an unnamed French friend had told him, but since the Hague Summit the French evidently "occupy another position in favour of the political integration of 'little Europe.'"

Because in Soviet eyes the Common Market provides a vital economic underpinning for the Atlantic Alliance, this turn of events bore more than just the intrinsic danger of an increasingly powerful West European bloc. Similarly, France's mellowed approach to the United States and more flexible policy within the EEC represented for them a mutually reinforcing process. Together these trends implied that France was slipping back towards "Atlanticism", the direct opposite of the emphasis Soviet leaders appreciated in de Gaulle's policy.

A year or so earlier, this redressment, by detracting from the Soviet strategy for securing the division of Europe and menacing its dream of a stunted European Economic Community, would probably have stimulated some kind of explicit remonstrance. But already in the first months of 1970 these considerations were beginning to change and, as a result, the implications of a partial adjustment in French policy were significantly less distressing. Thus, while their nervousness and frustration over what they saw as the gathering momentum of the Common Market remained, this and the faint annoyance that they indicated over France's easier fraternization with Washington, tended to yield to the opportunity presented by Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. With the chance to have their dearest objective in Europe directly, Soviet leaders were not particularly interested in raising a clamour over the softer treatment Paris now accorded the Anglo-Saxons.

Thus, they left it to the French Communist Party to reproach Pompidou for compromising de Gaulle's intra-alliance policies. (Or did they? None of the PCF's criticisms ever appeared in the Soviet press). Beginning shortly before the Hague Summit of the Six, *l'Humanité* launched a series of denunciations of Pompidou's "Gaullist-centrist" government for retreating from his predecessor's position on the EEC, especially for "preparing to allow the British 'Trojan horse' to enter the Community."[13] Soon after, and at a time when Soviet commen-

[11] The first of an important two-part essay in *Pravda*, 19 December 1969, p. 4.
[12] Yuri Zhukov, *Pravda*, 11 February 1970, p. 4.
[13] See *l'Humanité*, 24 November 1969, p. 3.

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tators were writing of a sudden surge in official contact between Paris and Washington, Etienne Fajon, PCF politburo member and director of *l'Humanité*, went on to attack the "pro-Atlantic tendencies" of the current regime, accusing it of "working to reinforce its political and military alliance with the United States."[14] Fajon's article set the tone for a campaign of increasingly strident criticism which unfolded over the next several months. Although, even under de Gaulle, according to one representative contribution, the "regime of the monopolies" never renounced its allegiance to the imperialist camp and especially to the Atlantic bloc, "since 1969 this allegiance has been reaffirmed with more force," so that now Franco-Soviet relations, "on the whole excellent, constitute no more than a kind of positive 'island' subsisting within a general policy inflected toward Atlanticism."[15] In December 1970 the politburo of the Party formally condemned Pompidou's government for obstructing the evolution towards a European settlement and for tying its policy more closely to the Atlantic pact and Little Europe.[16]

Soviet commentary was more subtle (and hortatory). How do Frenchmen feel about this "modification in policy towards the US", one experienced correspondent asked. "French democratic opinion does not object in principle to improved relations, so long as it is not at the cost of restricting France's policymaking independence."[17]

The remark was characteristically discreet, but no less ambivalent for its discretion. Too much of the old context could possibly change in the near future to justify a full hue-and-cry against the betrayal of France's independent course; but in 1970, even after the August Soviet-German treaty, there were behind Soviet caution strong feelings over the retreat in French policy. During this period the Soviet press fretted considerably about the growing danger of West European integration and about efforts to beef up NATO's military resources.[18] The drift to French policy did little to take the Soviet mind off the shadows amidst a promising new set of developments.

Nor could French behaviour have been much more satisfying in those areas that directly related to the German *Ostpolitik*. Whatever genuine satisfaction French leaders took in the Federal Republic's emulation of their *rapprochement* with the Soviet bloc, the misgivings they shared with American leaders about the *Ostpolitik*'s most impetuous proponents moved them to patrol against any weakening of four-power rights in Berlin. Early on the French warned their German friends against a diplomacy that risked outpacing the four-power negotiations on Berlin. As Maurice Schumann told the French National Assembly in April, "the entry of the GDR onto the international scene" will

[14] *l'Humanité*, 11 December 1969, p. 1.
[15] Robert Bouvier, "Quelques caractéristiques de l'évolution des rapports franco-soviétiques," *Cahiers du Communisme*, No. 10 (1970), p. 102.
[16] *le Monde*, 12 December 1970, p. 9.
[17] Bochkaryov, "France," p. 27.
[18] As an important sampling, see Yuri Zhukov's articles in *Pravda*, 26 June 1970, p. 4; 3 July, p. 4; 23 July, p. 4; 25 July, p. 4; 29 July, p. 4; and 12 September, p. 4.

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render the "Berlin situation more exposed than ever."[19] The French had not liked the original proposed draft treaty between Bonn and Moscow, the so-called Bahr Paper of May, and French delegates to the Allied consultation group on Germany let the Germans know that in their view it jeopardized existing agreements.[20] Even more to the point, the French seemed to make their support for the Soviet Union's much desired European security conference conditional on a satisfactory Berlin settlement.

I write "seemed to," for the French response to Soviet efforts on behalf of the conference displays modestly, but tangibly, the awkwardness of applying *"l'ouverture avec la continuité"* to moving terrain. On the one hand, they cared little for a scheme manifestly intended to reinforce Europe's two blocs (one of them, at least). On the other hand, they were also concerned about safeguarding their Eastern policy while making their Atlantic and West European policies less rigid. They were determined to use the issue of the conference as a lever for achieving a more stable four-power regime in West Berlin, but they also feared that the Federal Republic might steal a march on their leadership of European *détente*. The result was vacillating and ambiguous conduct bordering on dissimulation. On 25 November, the Soviet Ambassador to France, Valerian Zorin, told the *Presse diplomatique française*, no doubt quite accurately, that in the course of conversations with his government, the French had never established a settlement of the Berlin problem, or, in general, any other matter as a precondition for the convocation of the conference.[21] Two days later in Warsaw, the then Prime Minister, Chaban-Delmas, characterized a "common agreement" on Berlin as a "condition for success" that must exist before "the actual preparations of a European security conference can begin."[22] Pompidou's efforts to square the circle during his January press conference fell somewhat short of his goal. He argued that Berlin was not technically a precondition for the conference, but that it was difficult to imagine the conference succeeding if progress had not been achieved on this problem. Still, it was the French Communist Party, not the Soviet Union, that condemned Pompidou's government for making "West Berlin a precondition for the convocation of a conference on collective security and European cooperation," thereby "retarding the concrete application of recent declarations and the Franco-Soviet protocol," (signed during Pompidou's October 1970 visit to the Soviet Union).[23]

BY the spring of 1971, however, a number of converging events depreciated the importance of the shift in French policy and opened the way to a fourth phase in recent Franco-Soviet relations, during which

[19] *le Monde*, 29 April 1970, p. 5
[20] *le Monde*, 3 July 1970, p. 1, article by Roland Delcour.
[21] See *le Monde*, 27 November 1970, p. 3.
[22] *le Monde*, 29 November 1970, p. 4.
[23] December 10 Politburo statement, see *l'Humanité*, 11 December 1970, p. 2.

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Soviet leaders apparently decided that the damage which the French retreat did to their interests was tolerable. This was an essential prelude to converting France into a prominent element in the current Soviet approach to European *détente*. In May circumstances changed on three fronts influencing Soviet expectations for Europe. The initial and most dramatic change was of their own making, because in yielding on the issue of access to West Berlin, the primary obstacle to a four-power accord, and by sacking Ulbricht to make it all possible, Soviet leaders enabled the process of *détente* to slide through a major bottleneck. The details of the accord still had to be worked out, arrangements between the two Germanies completed, and Bundestag ratification of the August 1970 treaties secured; but the Soviet Union had swallowed the price of Bonn's adjustment to the "postwar reality." A few weeks later, Soviet negotiators at SALT agreed to separate the problem of an ABM agreement from that of an offensive missile agreement, thus ensuring that Soviet attempts to launch a discussion of the Forward Based System would not, for the moment, cloud East-West contacts. Thirdly, in the same month, the Federal Republic's decision to float the mark engulfed the Western alliance in a long monetary crisis and, momentarily, paralyzed the progress of the Common Market.

This last development—something of a bonus for Soviet policy—had a double effect. It threw the Six into instant confusion, menaced the common agricultural policy, made a joke of their recent agreement to concert monetary policies, and, hence, temporarily assured Soviet observers that their apprehensions about West European integration were exaggerated. At the same time, it brought to a boil an old contentious issue between Paris and Washington, for Pompidou and his people had always rejected the notion that others could or should solve the American balance of payments problem and they blamed the United States' obstinate refusal to devalue the dollar for the current emergency.

While the rapid disintegration of the international monetary system softened the inconvenience of France's "opening" in the West, the breakthrough in the Berlin negotiations liberated its policy in the East. With Berlin out of the way, the French incentive to swing behind the Soviet proposal for a European security conference quickly overwhelmed their traditional hesitations. Not only had French conditions for the conference come down to one, now nearly satisfied in the four-power negotiations, but there were attractive reasons for becoming NATO's first major sponsor of the project: First, they reclaimed a part of the leadership of European *détente*, but, more important, they increased their chances—never very good—of influencing the next steps in that *détente*. The French had long resisted multilateral East-West convocations, not to mention Soviet-American talks on European problems—the first, because they would only reinforce Europe's two blocs, the second, because they risked sacrificing Europe's vital interests. But the French despaired even more that East and West European nations would indeed convene and in order to tamper with Europe's military

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balance, or, at least, the American part in it, France's active commitment to the European security conference, declared by Foreign Minister Schumann in Budapest and Sofia five days after the conclusion of the four-power Berlin negotiations, went hand in hand with its forceful opposition to American plans for mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations.[24]

The sharpening of the French position on these two questions, in turn, tended to break down the collaboration forced on France and its allies by the Berlin negotiations. France now went its own way on the security conference—precipitously, its allies doubtlessly felt, for the Federal Republic had yet to shepherd the inter-German talks to success and the United States, less eager than anyone to see a security conference held, had not yet exhausted the compensations it wished to exact for coming. Even the long-standing French opposition to MBFR acquired a different quality once the jockeying over a security conference was freed of other prior preconditions and the demand for MBFR negotiations became an item with which the Soviet Union had to come to terms.

If Brezhnev's two-week state visit late in October—his first to the West—implied that France had recaptured an important part of Soviet attention, it, however, was not because these positions recalled de Gaulle's defiant role within the opposing alliance. It was because the Soviet Union's reshaped field of opportunity in Europe could now be distinguished for the short term and France's place in it, though modified, was still special.

For the moment, Soviet leaders had their minds fixed on the real prospect that the Western powers led by the Federal Republic were finally to recognize the European status quo and a divided Germany. The 3 September Berlin accord had presumably removed the last obstacle to ratification of the German treaties, despite the nine anxious months Soviet leaders had yet to wait for Bundestag action, and opened the route to a grand gathering of European states where the results of the *Ostpolitik* might be formally sanctioned by Germany's allies and neighbours. But the fulfilment of this ancient, preliminary objective was also unfolding in a rapidly evolving environment-change, speeded up by the progress in Soviet-German relations, but shaped most fundamentally by trends in Western Europe, and certain to complicate assumptions basic to postwar Soviet European policy. An American presence in Europe that Soviet leaders had so long worked to prejudice was now, ironically, being prejudiced by the Americans themselves, specifically by American Senators determined to trim direct US military involvement in Germany together with an indifferent public ready to let them and equally by an American Administration determined to deal roughly with European partners who resisted concessions to US trade and balance of payments difficulties. At the same time, an expanding

[24] See *le Monde*, 10 September 1971, p. 4 and 14 September 1971, p. 6.

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Common Market that Soviet leaders had long feared was now nearly consummated with the addition of Great Britain and three others. So, in place of an increasingly formidable West European-American partnership in a basically uniaxial international system, Soviet leaders were facing the prospect of an increasingly potent and independent West European power in a more fragmented international system. Not that a pentagonal world was upon them. Too many asymmetries remained: China still industrializing, Japan still a military dependency, Western Europe still politically impotent, and the United States and the Soviet Union still exercising their nuclear duopoly. But the magnitude of challenge the EEC now presented as a trading bloc and China's sudden active interest in Western Europe's economic, political, and even military integration epitomized the sometimes disconcerting change transforming the familiar politics of the postwar period. Yet, at the same time, the decline of bipolarity offered Soviet leaders the opportunity to improve their relative power in Europe (by contributing to the withering of an American presence), to stabilize their European front (by easing the confrontation in Central Europe), and to promote East-West economic cooperation (by promoting *détente*). The task of policy was to protect these opportunities while cushioning against the other less beneficial effects of the change under way.

BREZHNEV chose France for his debut in the West because the French approach to European security—however different from the Soviet—ended by complementing better than anyone else's the Soviet Union's cautiously pressed stake in the *rapprochement* of East and West Europe. The Soviet Union wanted the economic advantages and diplomatic support *détente* would yield the Eastern status quo without the accompanying ideological and political contamination. It granted the sensibility of accepting the Common Market in order to better contain its development, of accepting a discussion of European force levels in order to better influence the forum and the manner of their adjustment, and of accepting a modest modification in their schemes for a European security conference or a nuclear disarmament conference in order to ensure their actual convocation. And it embraced multilateralism as the most ready means of promoting bilateralism, turning *détente's* interest in a generalized dialogue into a favourable setting for the bilateral negotiation of Europe's toughest and most sensitive problems.

French policy served these evolving interests in several ways. First, France's direct relationship with the Soviet Union exemplified the kind of relationship that Soviet leaders wish to foster with other important European countries. Thus, when the Soviet press and leadership identified Franco-Soviet relations as a "model for peaceful coexistence between nations with different social systems," they were speaking of more than merely the cordiality of their encounters, or the similarity in a

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number of their policy positions, or the common willingness to enlarge their scientific and economic cooperation.[25] They were featuring as well the increasing institutionalization of their co-operation. The Grand Commission, one of the results of de Gaulle's 1966 visits to the Soviet Union and a prominent device for promoting greater trade and joint scientific ventures, had become the prototype for similar arrangements with a number of Western countries, including the United States. In October 1970, Soviet leaders talked Pompidou into accepting a political counterpart to the Grand Commission—a Protocol providing both for regular consultations " on important international problems of common interest," in principle every six months, and for diplomatic contact whenever " situations arise which, in the opinion of the two parties, would create a threat to peace, a breach of peace or would cause international tension." [26] In October 1971 they persuaded the French, in order " to impart new scope to [their] fruitful cooperation," to codify the 13 principles on which this cooperation was founded. True, in the first instance, Soviet leaders had hoped for consultations directed toward the coordination of policy, rather than simply the informing of policy, and, in the second instance, for a more formal friendship treaty.[27] But they were moving the French towards a more continuous working diplomatic relationship, resembling in some ways the access the French have given to the Germans, the Italians, or any of their closest partners.

Beginning with Brandt's visit to Oreanda in September 1971, Soviet officials have gone out of their way to report to the French what transpires in their contacts with other Western powers.[28] In turn, the French were to allow themselves to be drawn into a kind of intercourse which is normally more the mark of communication between allies. Thus, every several months, the Secretary General of France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the French Foreign Minister goes to Moscow or Andrei Gromyko comes to Paris to exchange ideas on European and other major international questions. These meetings occur, the point is clearly meant to be understood, because cooperating governments do

[25] Podgorny made the point several times during Pompidou's October 1970 visit to the Soviet Union (see *Pravda*, 7 October 1970, p. 4 and 14 October, p. 2) and Soviet writers were even more emphatic on the eve of Brezhnev's trip to France. See, in particular Yu. Zhukov and V. Sedykh, *Pravda*, 25 October 1971, p. 3 and L. Volodin and S. Zykov, *Izvestiya*, 23 October 1971, p. 3.

[26] French-Soviet Protocol Issued at the Close of President Pompidou's State Visit in *La Politique Etrangère de la France* 2nd Semestre 1970.

[27] See *le Monde*, 13 October 1970, p. 2 and Michel Tatu in *le Monde*, 24–25 October 1971, p. 1.

[28] Earlier Pompidou had complained of inadequate communication: " The political concertation " de Gaulle had discussed with Soviet leaders in 1966 " has occurred at times very well, at times inadequately, and at times not at all." (From his last press conference in Moscow, see *le Monde*, 15 October 1970, p. 2.) Despite the October 1970 Protocol, matters did not significantly change until Brandt's Oreanda visit a month before Brezhnev was to arrive in France. Since then Soviet leaders have rather relished the role of keeping Paris better informed on Soviet-German or Soviet-American relations than either of France's two allies.

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not need to await the pressure of events or the formality of state visits to get together—even at the very top.[29] (Although Soviet leaders must have been annoyed that Pompidou would invite himself to the Soviet Union in January 1973 primarily to promote his party's electoral fortunes against the PCF). The more elaborate this feature of the relationship became, the more unlikely was France's submersion in counter groupings and the more clearly institutionalized ties emerged as a significant means of advancing "*détente* to *entente* to cooperation."

That objective—and setting the good example for bilateral East-West relations—was also aided by the parallels between French and Soviet positions on a range of international problems from South-East Asia to the Middle East. Not that there were not differences in the resolutions they sought, but the disruptive utility Soviet leaders once found in announcing at the close of an official visit, when France was the obstreperous Atlantic ally, attitudes amounting to a joint criticism of the Americans in Vietnam or the Israelis in the Middle East was to give political substance to the formal cooperation under construction.[30]

Thirdly, beyond the exemplary character of their direct relations, Soviet leaders preferred to fasten on the hopeful side of French ambivalences in critical European and Atlantic matters. Certainly they were uncomfortable with France's gradual drift toward participation in NATO's communication systems and naval manoeuvres in the Mediterranean as well as with France's renewed interest in a cohesive and assertive Common Market. But, for the moment, the French were far from committing everything to promoting these trends. The small measure of coordination launched with NATO in de Gaulle's last year gathered no momentum, forever struggling against the basic French determination to remain aloof from the Alliance's organization. France's refusal to mix with NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee, or Eurogroup, in turn, was spoiling the prospect of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation—even limited cooperation in research and development. Similarly, French insistence on making its approach to monetary and trade problems the Common Market's approach helped to impede measurable progress toward genuine unified EEC action. So, in this encumbered setting, Pompidou's assurances about French opposition to blocs (and, thus, permanent break with the NATO military organization) and his frequent emphasis on a Common Market open to the East seemed sufficient reason for Soviet leaders to give him the benefit of the doubt.

Finally, Soviet leaders must have more than approved France's conduct in that portion of the European dialogue in which the Euro-

[29] Presumably Soviet leaders find some small satisfaction in the fact that they have recently had more regular high-level contact with the French than the other superpower has.

[30] De Gaulle, however, never had any intention of appearing to collaborate with the Soviet Union on these problems. Whatever the implications of their common positions, he always carefully avoided making his sharpest criticism of American or Israeli policy in Soviet company.

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peans were being allowed to participate. The foremost occasion, of course, was the Conference on European Security and Cooperation and the virtue in French behaviour, in Soviet eyes, stemmed only in part from its earlier active promotion of the premilinary conference in Helsinki and now earliest possible convocation of the conference itself. For equally important reasons, the French were dealing gingerly, even deferentially, with the issues to be raised at the conference. Thus, if they were as eager as any other Western power to see the so-called Brezhnev doctrine undermined and Eastern Europe opened to Western ideas and travellers, French negotiators balked before schemes conspicuously directed against Soviet domination over this region. It was the French who fought for, as they themselves said, the less " provocative " formula, " cultural relations," when Western nations were preparing for the opening of the Helsinki negotiations and the Americans were recommending an agenda item promoting " the free movement of ideas and men." [31] When members of the Davignon Committee, the device for coordinating the diplomacy of the Nine, sought to make it plain that the proscription of interference in another country's affairs included " the doctrine of limited sovereignty," again the French demurred, and the Committee's political report appeared with a less precise formulation.[32]

But the most striking evidence of France's benign reconciliation of ends and means appeared once the Helsinki meeting got under way. Confronted with a startling Rumanian determination to use the conference to its own ends—including the negotiation of an international guarantee against all forcible interventions " whatever the form and whatever the pretext "—French diplomacy turned remarkably discreet. Back in Paris Schumann admitted to journalists, no doubt with satisfaction, that the CSCE would spread " the contagion of independence and liberty," but warned that any offensive against Soviet interests was undesirable because it would wreck the conference.[33] The message was clear: although we applaud the courage of the Rumanians, we cannot lend either diplomatic or political support to their efforts. At Helsinki the French were as good as their word.

Soviet leaders could not reasonably aspire to a more serviceable relationship with a Western nation—unless it be with a regime in which the Communist Party has a say. Even ultimately the discrepancies between French and Soviet policy offered them advantages, for France's reluctance to raise the subject of Europe's security balance was not so much an obstruction as it was an extension of the Soviet Union's own cautious approach to European arms control. On the surface, the French stance seemed to rest on reasons that were, at best, invidious, at worst, a practical inconvenience, but that may be misleading. Even if Soviet leaders realized—as surely they did—that the French oppose

[31] See *le Monde*, 25 October 1972, p. 1.
[32] See *le Monde*, 21 November 1972, p. 38.
[33] See *le Monde*, 14 December 1972, p. 9.

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MBFR only partly, because any negotiating framework is likely to reinforce the two blocs, only partly, because any weakening of the West's military position in Central Europe risks stimulating neutralist sentiments in the Federal Republic, that the real French apprehension is of the Soviet Union militarily ascendent in Europe, perhaps they rather appreciated the flexibility the French course allowed them. When the French argued that Europe's military balance must only be negotiated in the crowning stages of *détente*, not as its initial step, they increased Soviet flexibility in two ways: First, they helped shift discussion of strategic forces in Europe to SALT, where both superpowers appeared to want it (where no European power should want it, but France could neither veto MBFR nor control the SALT agenda); secondly, they added another brake on MBFR, should Soviet leaders decide to save themselves from any significant involvement in this process. On the other hand, as Brezhnev may have concluded in January 1973, when Pompidou's resolve against MBFR appeared to crack, the French could be brought around if the time came to go beyond token adjustments in force levels to serious thought of a scaled-down military balance.[34] Nothing suggested, therefore, that Soviet leaders viewed the French commitment to, in Michel Tatu's phrase, "armed *détente*" as compatible with their own commitment to controlled *détente*.

IN sum, until mid–1973, neo-Gaullism served well the Soviet Union's present European policy. Not knowing how far it dares expose its dominions to *détente* in order to promote *détente's* rewards, how far it dares sacrifice its own security system to the idea of European security, the Soviet leadership's first priority is in protecting its options. The chaotic swirl of short-term Soviet and American ambitions—that has left Europe with a multilateral conference largely unrelated to security despite its name, a SALT negotiation deeply involved in European security but from which Europe is excluded, and a discussion of MBFR allowing part of Europe to deal with a part of European security—makes it more difficult for Soviet leaders to formulate the long-term opportunities that they sense the dislodged diplomatic jam in Central Europe has opened to their policy.

In mid-1973, however, the tone of French public diplomacy changed sharply. To the distress of Soviet leaders, the change was not to improve their European options—rather the opposite. More importantly, it began to detract from the one option Soviet policy-makers have come to value over all others, that is, collaboration with Washington. All of France's conflicting feelings in the ambiguous circumstances of Europe's developing *détente* appeared now to be finding

[34] Pompidou said in Minsk, "It was not, of course, a question of modifying our position overnight. But I noted with interest both the detailed Soviet conception I had this time on the conference, on its procedures, and on its objectives and the Soviet reasons for wishing our participation, and we have agreed to talk about it further." See *le Monde*, 14–15 January 1973, p. 1.

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their focus in French apprehensions over the short-term implications of the developing Soviet–American *détente*. The sentiment was classically Gaullist: Europe cannot abandon itself to a *détente* whose infrastructure is built upon the collusion of the two superpowers. To do so means conceding Europe's rate to the whims of " outside arbitrators ". Nothing, the French were saying after summer 1973, is so disturbing as the emerging Soviet–American condominium; nothing, so foolish as *détente* based on anything but vigilance and strong defences. France, despite its careful dissociation, was beginning to argue along lines that Soviet leaders no doubt find annoyingly similar to the Chinese.

There is no way of telling how surprised Soviet leaders were by the new French Foreign Minister's rather sensationally sombre speech to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in July. Throughout the spring, the French had shown increasing uneasiness over the priority Soviet and American leaders were giving their bilateral relationship. But, when he stopped in Paris on his way home from the United States, perhaps Brezhnev, his mind on the accomplishments of the past week, failed to notice how much these accomplishments had convinced Pompidou that his basic reservations over cooperation between the superpowers were well-founded. Maybe Brezhnev thought it enough to assure the French—as the Americans were assuring the Chinese—that the treaty on the prevention of nuclear war was directed against no one; that neither side had tried to deal over the heads or behind the backs of the Europeans, that, indeed, the question of third countries had scarcely arisen; and that improved relations between the world's two most powerful countries could only benefit the entire international community. If so, he took too lightly the French concern over the agreement to prevent nuclear war (as a further weakening of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe and a further prejudicing of their own *force de frappe*), too lightly French irritation over Nixon's apparent readiness to concede a speedy European security conference and a concluding session " at the highest level " (as solid proof that the Americans were prepared to act without their European allies), and too lightly French disapproval of the conveniently ambiguous status given the B in MBFR (as a dismaying illustration of the ease with which Washington would sacrifice Europe's interests to the untested security of Soviet–American *détente*).[35]

That became apparent in Jobert's address to the Helsinki conference. Security, he said, can in essence be either real or apparent. The first is the dream of the weak and the oppressed, for it is " the freedom to think, to speak, and to act, to decide for oneself without pressures or threats," and, above all, it is " respect for the security of others." [36] The second is the illusion of those foolish enough to accept a " moral disarmament deadening the spirit of resistance, deceiving vigilance, and leading to servitude." His Soviet listeners could not have been very

[35] See *la Nation*, 27 June 1973.
[36] See *le Monde*, 5 July 1973, p. 1.

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happy with the general implication that the West, under American leadership, was in danger of settling for the second. Were the West careless, the CSCE would turn out to be "nothing more than a delusion for the masses, a strategem for the more adroit, for the others a mere mistake." Nor could they have been happy with his insistence that genuine security could only exist if each nation resolved to defend its own peace and security. Even less could they have appreciated his reaffirmation of France's determination to strengthen its national defence, since they knew that it was accompanied (the inconsistency did not matter to them) by an almost desperate appeal to the United States to maintain troop levels in Europe.

The Soviet Union reacted to French concern solicitously but also with a certain impatience. Nothing was to be gained by publicly condemning them or by trying to bring some other pressure to bear. In the first place, Soviet leaders hoped that France's disaffection would not last—that, if properly reassured, Pompidou's government would again throw itself behind East–West *détente*, including its central Soviet–American component. Second, not only were chances poor that Soviet pressure could do anything other than worsen matters, but the feelings of the French had their echo in many other parts of Europe and, therefore, represented a challenge that Soviet leaders needed to deal with more constructively. Third, in important respects the French did not deserve a critical reaction. They were still committed to *détente*, granted the distinction they now drew between *détente* "on paper" and "in reality."[37] Their quarrel was with a situation, not with the Soviet Union as such. Their objection to a superpower condominium was not, as Pompidou was careful to demonstrate on his trip to China in October 1973, to be turned into a campaign against Soviet interests. (One wonders if Soviet observers noticed the ironic similarity between Pompidou's restraint in China on things Soviet and de Gaulle's restraint in the Soviet Union on things American). Officially the French were as attached as ever to "*détente*, *entente* and cooperation".

Finally, French Gaullism had scarcely lost all of its advantages. The other side of the schizophrenia that moved the French to plead for a continuing American commitment to European security produced the most visceral sensitivity to the perpetuation of American influence in Europe. The fear of Western Europe's declining security had not overridden traditional Gaullist suspicions of schemes sponsoring the integration of national defences. And the French capacity to play the maverick's role among the Ten, in the Middle East, or in Southeast Asia had not been entirely destroyed.

So, at first, Soviet officials abstained from any public grumbling over the change in French demeanour and, in private, set themselves to

[37] The expression was Jobert's in a session with journalists at the United Nations. See *le Monde*, 12 October 1973, p. 4.

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easing their apprehensions. Well into August the Soviet press continued to praise Franco–Soviet relations, to present them as a "model for other countries," and to stress, as the French like to think, their "preferential nature." [38] To the French Foreign Minister, when he arrived in Moscow late in July (he and Premier Messmer had just returned from Budapest and Sofia where they had treated the Nixon–Brezhnev summit rather unflatteringly [39]), Brezhnev went out of his way to be reassuring. France, he emphasized, has nothing to fear from the *rapprochement* of the Soviet Union with the United States. He provided a lengthy accounting of the agreement on preventing nuclear war, of the course of the negotiations in SALT II, and of the Soviet position in the Vienna talks on European force reductions, and then stressed that no agreement did or would prevent the French from disposing of their own nuclear resources.[40]

But, at the same time, there were scattered hints of a growing impatience. The ostensible object of Soviet criticism was British obstructionism, but when the British Foreign Secretary was attacked for warning against being "too euphoric or optimistic" over the prospects of the CSCE, the parallel with Jobert's performance was obvious.[41] So was the target of the criticism of political circles "in some countries" who worried about the "future of Western Europe" and "a disruption of the 'balance of strength.'" [42] And so was the reason for denouncing attempts "to create the impression that without the U.S. nuclear umbrella Western Europe would be defenceless before the Warsaw Treaty countries."

Still, had there been no war in the Middle East, Soviet leaders would probably have left matters at that. Europe's helplessness in the Middle Eastern disaster, however, and its impotence before and dependence on Soviet–American intervention were more than the French could take. In a speech to the National Assembly on 12 November, Jobert angrily assailed the Soviet Union and the United States for treating Western Europe as "a nonperson," humiliating it "all along the line," while they continued to deliver vast arms supplies to their warring clients and to huddle together in arranging the ceasefire they would impose.[43] "The Middle East crisis," he said, "confirmed, and confirms every day, our doubts about the functioning and effects of the system of joint concertation between the United States and the USSR." [44]

[38] See, for example, A. Ilyin, "Soviet-French Cooperation Gains Strength," *International Affairs*, No. 9 (September 1973), pp. 74–79.

[39] See *le Monde*, 22–23 July 1973, p. 4.

[40] *Le Monde*, 29–30 July 1973, p. 2.

[41] L. Vidyasova, "The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 9 (September 1973), pp. 15–16.

[42] M. Kudrin, "An Important Step Toward Strengthening Peace," *International Affairs*, No. 10 (October 1973), p. 13.

[43] *The New York Times*, 13 November 1973, p. 1.

[44] Statement by Michel Jobert before the National Assembly, 12 November 1973, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information.

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When George Marchais came to Moscow a week later, the summary of his conversations with Brezhnev warned " the people " against lowering their guard before the attempts of imperialistic circles to obstruct the further development of *détente* and condemned those advancing " the fallacious theory that so-called ' superpowers ' were supposedly aspiring to establish their supremacy over the world." [45]

Over the next several weeks, Soviet criticism grew more pointed. Soviet leaders did not like the French foreign minister denouncing Soviet-American cooperation as superpower collusion against the interests of other important nations. They liked it even less when, in the aftermath of the October crisis of the Western alliance, he rallied to the idea of European defence. Soon after Jobert had urged the Assembly of the Western European Union to prepare Europe's defence and, in particular, for the coordination of arms procurement, a Soviet analyst openly criticized French action.[46] " However different the concepts of ' European defence ' may be," he wrote, " it can essentially only be an appendage to the Atlantic military machine directed by the Pentagon." He went on: " Those who think of ensuring ' sovereignty ' and ' independence ' through such ' defence ' indulge in illusions."

Watching French sensitivities boil over in the Autumn of 1973, the outsider had the feeling that he had seen it all before—say, ten years earlier in the Spring of 1963 when Khrushchev's and Kennedy's tentative search for mutual accommodation after the Cuban missile crisis stirred de Gaulle's suspicions. Perhaps Soviet leaders, too, had begun to wonder whether the pages were not turning back—back to 1963 when France was a noisy but unconvincing and even inconvenient dissonant voice within the other alliance.

They were, however, spared the need to decide. In the two months before Pompidou's death, French concern shifted from the dangers of superpower condominium to the dangers of one superpower's ascendancy over the Atlantic alliance, recalling another familiar but, from the Soviet perspective, far more satisfying French posture. The French effort to impede or disrupt the American proposal for a common front among major energy consumers more than compensated for the past month's unpleasantness. Thus, when Gromyko arrived in Paris in February 1974 a few days after the Washington energy conference, the old cordiality of Franco-Soviet relations had been almost completely restored. " If you hear from afar applause for your policy of independence," he told his French hosts, " know that this applause comes from us because we cannot but be satisfied with this policy." [47]

France's renewed struggle against US Atlantic policy, culminating in its repudiation of America's approach to the energy problem,

[45] *le Monde*, 29–30 July 1974, p. 2.
[46] V. Kuznetsov, " The Idea of ' West European Defence ' Again?" *New Times*, No. 49 (Dec. 1973), p. 19.
[47] *le Monde*, 16–17 Feb. 1974, p. 22.

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made it easier for the Soviet Union to choose among Pompidou's potential successors. Not that Soviet leaders were delighted with any of the three major contenders. Jacques Chaban-Delmas was scarcely in de Gaulle's mould or even in Pompidou's and, if under the General's successor Gaullism had been watered down to the point of becoming at times downright troublesome, what would happen to it under Chaban's less predictable leadership? But the other two posed even greater difficulties. Giscard d'Estaing seemed to Soviet leaders more favourably disposed toward European integration (Soviet commentary before the first round frequently noted his commitment to "Political Union by 1980") and more susceptible to pro-Atlantic pressures (the same commentary noted his dependence on Atlanticists such as Jean Lecanuet).[48] (His mere presence in the 1969 Government had contributed to Soviet reservation about Pompidou).

François Mitterrand, the candidate of the united left including the PCF, should theoretically have been the Soviet Union's first choice. For two reasons this does not seem to have been the case. First, the Soviet Union appears to mistrust a successful left alliance in which the Communist Party is not sufficiently influential to shape or veto basic policy. (Supporting a united left as a means of strengthening a communist party within a broader alliance is one thing. Putting it in power prematurely is another). Second, and more immediately, Soviet leaders were doubtless disturbed by how easily Mitterrand was tempted to put distance between himself and the PCF when he sensed possible victory. The Soviet press cited Mitterrand rather little; instead they concentrated on Marchais' speeches or at least those parts reminding Mitterrand of the promises in the Common Programme, including the promise of "national independence."

Thus, on 5 May, the Soviet Union's candidate lost in the first round. When Giscard triumphed two weeks later, the Soviet reaction was mildly reserved, showing more than a little anxious curiosity, coupled with a willingness to continue as much as possible as before. The new leader, *Izvestiya's* Paris correspondent began, promised that he would "adhere to the course laid down by General de Gaulle and continued by Georges Pompidou."[49] But how, he wonders in the next breath, can Giscard keep this promise when "it is common knowledge that this policy has been consistently resisted by Jean Lecanuet, the leader of the Democratic Centre, and his allies?" Worse still, Lecanuet was joined in the new government by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, major friend of the Americans, a "Zionist," and director of *l'Express*, one of the journals most attentive to the problems of Soviet dissidents.

Still, in a general policy review on 10 June, Gromyko continued

[48] *Pravda*, 2 May 1974, p. 5.
[49] Sergei Zykov, "No Smooth Voyage," *New Times*, No. 22 (June 1974), p. 7.

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to give Giscard the benefit of the doubt.[50] With France, he said, we have cooperated longest and in the best conditions. "There are reasons to believe," he went on, that under the new President these relations will "continue on the path of cooperation." A few days earlier, Yuri Rubinsky, the analyst who had explained the Soames affair, contributed a half-sanguine, half-hortatory column to *le Monde*, praising the prospects for Franco-Soviet friendship, calling it again a "model" of peaceful co-existence, and celebrating the fact that elections could at last be held in France without resorting to "anti-Sovietism."[51] Rubinsky's contribution provoked an agitated rejoinder in *l'Humanité*, commenting on the superficiality that had allowed the Soviet expert to miss Giscard's part in a massive propaganda campaign of the crudest slander against the Soviet Union and reminding Soviet leaders that "coexistence will not suffice to solve France's great economic and social problems."[52]

In July the new French Foreign Minister came to Moscow. He came early to reinforce the assurance to Soviet leaders of the continuity in French foreign policy. France would maintain its independent course and its commitment to the achievements of the *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union. Sauvagnargues' mission did not inspire his hosts to speak of the Soviet Union's "special relationship" with France, but they did respond cordially, encouragingly, and even a shade gratefully. Giscard was not, to their relief, likely to neglect his relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe nor to let the machinery of cooperation go to rust. Nor was he, if they wanted to think only about the bright side of Gaullism's decline, likely to lash out against the menace of superpower condominium.

Yet there could be little question that France's importance to Soviet policy in Europe had diminished considerably. Under Pompidou (and Brandt), Franco-Soviet relations ceased to be the primary instrument of this policy—i.e. the chief lever for prying apart NATO or jamming the works of the EEC. Under Giscard, they lost much of their significance as the perfect model of (controlled) *détente*. At best, advances in Franco-Soviet relations were now mere prototypes to be given their more significant application, as Gromyko implied during Sauvagnargues' July visit, in Soviet relations with the United States. In other respects the relationship with France has been reduced to an accessory of policy, useful not so much in deciding Europe's future as in chipping away at specific obstacles to policy. During the Foreign Minister's visit, the Soviet leadership's overriding concern was with mobilizing French support for breaking the impasse within the CSCE commissions.[53]

[50] See *Pravda*, 11 June 1974, p. 2.
[51] See *le Monde*, 8 June 1974, p. 6.
[52] See *l'Humanité*, 9 June 1974, p. 3.
[53] See Maurice Delarue's report from Moscow in *le Monde*, 13 July 1974, p. 2.

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Were France to revert to an actively anti-Atlanticist course, it would regain a more central place in Soviet calculations, for the Soviet Union has begun again to worry about the shadow of Adenauer, Monnet, and De Gasperi stalking the continent in the wake of the recent energy crisis and in the face of deepening economic difficulties.[54] However, since Giscard is moving in the opposite direction—reaffirming "political union" in Europe when, as Soviet analysts maintain, union can only be subordinated to Atlanticism—that is not likely to happen.

[54] See Rudolf Puchkov, *Pravda*, 30 July 1974, p. 5.

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Interview by Mervyn Matthews

Inside the CPSU Central Committee

A. Pravdin

Anyone who has looked at your many serious books and articles on sociological topics could have no doubt that you are primarily an academic. Perhaps I should begin by asking how you came to be employed as a responsible official of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus in Moscow in 1969, *and why you decided, after three years or so, to leave this post. I understand that for family reasons you do not wish to give much precise biographic detail.*

You are correct in saying that my professional background is academic. In 1969 I was engaged in academic work, and at the same time was head of the Information Sector of the Party Committee of a large town in one of the Union Republics. I had in fact joined the Party in 1963. I was evidently at that time the only sociologist with a doctorate in those parts, and as such attracted the attention of the First Secretary of the Republic. This comrade, who had legal connexions, had officially set himself the task of re-establishing in the Republic the norms of socialist legality which had been thoroughly trampled underfoot. In the summer of 1969 he invited me to become Head of the Information Sector of the republican Central Committee, and I decided to accept. At that time I still believed in the possibility of " improving " Soviet power, and hoped to take part in the local struggle against corruption and embezzlement.

Six months later, at the end of the year, the First Secretary recommended me for the same kind of post in the Central Committee in Moscow. His own transfer was being planned at the time. On Brezhnev's initiative he was supposed to be chosen as the CC cadres secretary, and he wished to have his " own man " in Moscow. But after arriving there, for reasons which I shall explain in a moment, I gradually found Party work more and more distasteful.

The chance to move out of it came in 1972. In accordance with a decision of the Politbureau, four special faculties were established in Baku, Leningrad, Kharkov and Novosibirsk for training high-level managers of industrial and construction enterprises. These faculties were designed for the supreme industrial élite of the USSR—the appointment of the deans had to be approved by the Politbureau. Our First Secretary, who had failed to get to Moscow after all, because of disagreements with Kirilenko, recommended me for work in one of these.

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It was, in its way, promotion, and allowed me to get out of Party work, but it meant that I still had to carry out the First Secretary's personal instructions—write books and articles for him, etc.

The structure of the Central Committee apparatus is something which is under constant review in the West. By following scattered Soviet sources we can gain a good idea of the main departments in existence at any time, but usually lack details on their size and exact function. Perhaps you could describe those parts of the apparatus with which you were personally acquainted.

As far as the CC apparatus as a whole was concerned, the main contingent consisted of just over nine hundred responsible staff workers. These were assisted by about 2,400 other personnel, that is, responsible non-staff workers and technical staff—secretaries, guards, messengers, catering workers, etc.[1] Most of the responsible non-staff workers were specialists in their field and were sometimes given staff appointments when the occasion arose. But they were anyway on par with the regular staff, having the same sort of pass and privileges as myself. These figures are fairly easy to work out, because all Central Committee personnel are in the CC Party organizations, and Party membership figures are announced from time to time at general meetings. With regard to the individual departments, however, I can only give you approximate figures. The most exact would be for the Departments of Science and Propaganda, to which our section was attached. There were 41–43 responsible staff posts in the first and 48–51 in the second. These workers were assisted in each case by about 35 responsible non-staff workers, with the usual technical support. Some departments were larger, some smaller.

The Organizational Department, which is concerned with staffing throughout the country, contained just under sixty staff and thirty non-staff members. The number of people in this department tended to vary; it was considered to be a good jumping-off point for promotion. The staffs of departments included a head (*zaveduyushchii*), four or five deputies, and the heads of sectors and groups. There were never fewer than three deputy heads in a department. The Administrative Department (which dealt with justice and the police) and the Organizational Department had six each. The Department of Science contained a sector for higher educational institutions, a sector for academic research, and the so-called Sector of Philosophy, headed by Doctor-Professor Nikolai Verfomoleevich Pelepenko. The Department of Propaganda, on the other hand, comprised sectors for the periodical press, lecture propaganda, publishing houses, and so on. All of these sectors carried out

[1] The distinction between " staff " and " non-staff " (*shtatny* and *vneshtatny*) posts is common in Soviet institutions. Staff posts include the basic complement of labour, whereas the others are created for the short or long term, as the need arises. The distinction between " responsible " and " technical " staff is also common. Only responsible posts would, of course, figure on the Party-controlled nomenclature lists.

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rather specific tasks, and the number of people in them depended on that. You say that a recent count of departments gave twenty-two. In fact there are twenty-three, if you include the little-known Special Department (*Osoby otdel*) which is the eyes and ears of the KGB in the organization.

At the top of the pyramid there are the CC Secretaries. Each has an assistant and a *referent* who are professional Party workers, and have got to get through an immense amount of work. The General Secretary has a special sector of advisors who provide him with such information as he requires. The four people working there in my time were Tsukanov, Aleksandrov, Golikov and Blatov. It seems that this office has a tendency to increase in size—Stalin had one advisor and Khrushchev three. Tsukanov handled international affairs, helped by a recent appointee called Buratov. Tsukanov was an elected member of the Central Committee itself, so he not only assisted Brezhnev but also enjoyed broad influence and authority in his own right. Aleksandrov was a specialist in American affairs and propaganda. Golikov was a former colonel and veteran of the last war, responsible for questions relating to the armed forces and the KGB. Blatov, I believe, specialized in industrial affairs. But the division of labour is not always clear, and people switch over.

Could you clear up the problem of Party membership for workers of the Central Committee apparatus and Party leaders, say, Brezhnev in particular?

The Central Committee, as I have mentioned, has its own Party organizations. There are two of them, one for responsible Party workers, and one for the supporting staff. The two Party committees (*partkoms*), which have four secretaries each, have the rights of territorial *raikoms*, in accordance with the Party statutes. The secretaries are usually middle-grade officials. The organizations are rather unusual. Having only *raikom* status, they cannot of course influence decision-making in the CC, in that sense they are purely formal. However, from the point of view of those working in the Central Committee, the *partkoms* are of real significance. They regulate relations between Party workers, watch their conduct inside the apparatus, organize propaganda (though this is mostly formal) and call Party meetings. The illusion is created that all members are equal, from the instructors to the secretaries of the Central Committee. The *partkom* is a useful instrument in the hands of the CC leadership for settling accounts with unsatisfactory colleagues. When this happens all the relevant paragraphs of the Party statutes can tumble on the head of the victim: he is trampled in the mud and thrown out of the Central Committee.

As to Brezhnev, he is formally a rank and file member of one of the Party organizations, like everybody else. But, as you can

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imagine, he does not involve himself much in its activities. He merely pays his Party contributions and may turn up once every couple of years for an election meeting.

Little, if anything, is known in the West about the Information Sector of the Central Committee. I think the readers of Survey *would be interested in this.*

The sector is a comparatively new one. After the death of Stalin the new leadership found much that was conservative and intolerable in the structure and work of the apparatus, even from its own narrow point of view. The apparatus at that time worked on a smooth system of formal reports. In order to know what was going on throughout the country in all spheres of activity, a system of notes, or *spravki*, was used. This was very old. The *raikom* got its *spravki* from the primary Party organizations, and would send them up, after processing, until they eventually reached the CC of the Party. The Central Committee was, as a rule, deprived of its own channels of information, and had to manage with the distorted material which eventually reached it. When the *raikom* officials wanted any information, they could ring someone directly at the enterprise, but the *gorkom* officials would ring only the *raikom*, and not the enterprise. The CC, of course, would approach the *gorkom*. The post-Stalin leadership realized the need to set up some sort of group or sector which would get its own information, process it, generalize it, and analyze it. Such a group was in fact established in 1956 in the CC Department of Science. In December 1962 it was turned into a sector, and in February 1966 changed so as to serve two departments, those of Science and Propaganda. It was small, with a staff of between three and five.

As far as the functions of this sector were concerned, it continued to analyze and generalize the information received through the traditional channels. However, it also collected information itself. We organized studies of public opinion inside the Party organizations, tried to evaluate the effectiveness of Party propaganda and advanced forms of Party work, and elucidate the optimum forms of ideological pressure. In 1968 the sector's functions were extended to provide analytical material directly to the advisers' sector of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This served as primary material for reports, the speeches of leading Party figures, etc.

The sector ran up against considerable difficulties in its work. The CC apparatus tended to pick out those bits of information which it liked to receive. The information sector had at times to distort the facts received to fit these proclivities. After the 1966 reorganization the sector tended to lose its powers of analysis. In November 1971, a special internal Party decree entitled " On the mistakes in the analysis and collection of facts by the Information Sector " was passed. In the following year its activities were further restricted. Its concrete

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social investigations were reduced in number and came to have a rather symbolic character. It was obliged to revert to greater use of materials from "traditional" channels, and could not use its own. We in the sector decided that the leadership thought we knew too much, yet could do too little. The Information Sector, as far as I know, still exists, but fulfils only a symbolic role.

May we now pass on to your own work in the Central Committee. You were, I believe, an "instructor," which, you say, is the lowest grade of responsible worker there. Nevertheless your position was generally considered to be one of some importance.

The instructors are the most junior responsible workers, and are subordinate to the sector heads. In one or two departments, such as the Organizational Department and the Department of Administrative Organs, there are also "inspectors," who perform the same kind of work but are slightly senior to instructors. The term "instructor" is a peculiar one, and I am not sure where it came from. Probably they were simply those Party workers who passed on instructions to non-Party bodies, although most Party workers have always done this.

In any case, a Party instructor is always right and, like the Party itself, he cannot make a mistake. (If he happens to do so, nobody talks about it). It is impossible to criticize him from below, because this would be like criticizing the Party; and the Party, like Julius Caesar's wife, is beyond suspicion. At the local level, in the *raikom*, an instructor can conduct himself like a local plenipotentiary, because he cannot be displaced from outside, nor restricted in his functions.

An instructor of the Central Committee can ring up the first secretary of the Central Committee of a Union Republic, and give him instructions. This is because people consider that it is not he, the instructor, who is giving instructions, but the Moscow Central Committee itself. If the instructions happen to be absurd they can be countermanded and criticized only from above. The apparatus of the KGB is to some extent at the disposal of an instructor of the Central Committee. He only has to ring up the KGB and suggest they deprive a certain person of their trust, for a case to be opened against him. An instructor might ring up the secretary of a union republic Central Committee and say, such and such a man is director of a factory in your republic, but you would do well to keep an eye on him. That is enough to compromise him.

The system is really a terrible form of oppression of the people, because the CC power is like an octopus, which cannot be resisted. Instructors are treated like little kings when they travel in the provinces, as local officials are anxious to have them write good reports. The finest scholars and scientists are insignificant in comparison to any Party worker, since they have to struggle not with an individual, but with the whole Party apparatus. Solidarity among officials excludes

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criticism from outside. There are many examples of this, but I would like to mention just one.

A. M. Rumyantsev was a member of the Central Committee, Director of the Moscow Institute of Sociology and, until recently, Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The Institute had, incidentally, some secret departments and was considered to be an institute of significance for national defence. Rumyantsev was thus at the spearhead of political, historical and philosophical thought in the Soviet Union. Some time ago, he set up, semi-officially, an Association of Social Prognosis attached to the Academy of Sciences. In the event, Rumyantsev was opposed by a CC *apparatchik* who was not even an elected member of the Central Committee, I mean N. V. Pelepenko, head of the Sector of Philosophy. Pelepenko was a provincial Party worker from Yaroslavl, a man insignificant in learning who had got into the Central Committee apparatus by chance. Rumyantsev did not even consider him a worthy opponent. He forgot, however, that Pelepenko was not an individual, but a representative of the apparatus, which is always right. When the trouble arose, Pelepenko went to S. P. Trapeznikov, head of his department, who was known for his conservatism. Trapeznikov went to Secretary P. N. Demichev, who thought that Rumyantsev, by then an elected member of the Central Committee, might eventually become strong enough to oust him. Rumyantsev lost his case.

If you had wanted to get promotion inside the CC apparatus, how would you have set about it?

Any advancement inside the CC takes place, in principle, with Brezhnev's sanction. However, you should not think that he handles these matters personally. If I had been anxious for promotion, the department I worked in would have trained me for it. A candidate for promotion is usually interviewed by the Secretaries of the Central Committee, or even Brezhnev's assistants. Brezhnev himself would interview someone himself only in the last instance, if the position were important, involving, for example, the headship of a department. And as a rule, in such cases, Brezhnev would look around for a candidate himself, helped by his assistants and the Secretaries.

What jobs would an official of the Central Committee consider as normal promotion outside the central Party apparatus? This would be another good way of judging his standing in society at large.

They would depend partly on the CC department in question. The Organizational Department, for example, is the brain and soul of the Central Committee apparatus, and is headed by I. V. Kapitonov, who is at present a Secretary of the CC. It has a card-index containing an entry for every single Party worker. Its inspectors and instructors cover all the major ministries and enterprises in the USSR. Well, an

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instructor from this department would expect to be appointed deputy minister in the branch he dealt with.

The same thing applies to the Departments of Industry and Construction. An instructor here would expect an appointment at the level of an all-union ministry, not at republic ministerial level. Promotion would be to get the deputy minister's job. He could also, incidentally, become second secretary of an *obkom*. This appointment would not necessarily be in the centre, but it would not be on the periphery either, for this would be considered to be demotion. The Party worker on the periphery might get a higher salary and a symbolic rise in his status, but the job is looked down upon. An instructor of the Central Committee of the CPSU has a status equal to that of a *raikom* secretary in the capital. It is worth noting, incidentally, that in the eyes of Party workers the Moscow *raions* vary greatly in standing. Those such as the Tsentralny, Frunzenski, Kalininski, Moskvaretski which contain large government offices, are more highly regarded.

An instructor in the Department of Propaganda would expect to be made chief or deputy editor of a newspaper. Instructors in the Department of Science of the Central Committee look to become heads of major institutes. When, for example, they were choosing a director for the Moscow Institute of Sociology the name of one Grigorii Kvasov was put forward, together with several others. Kvasov was quite unknown in science and a man of no principles, but he happened to be an instructor of the Central Committee who was interested. May I digress for a moment to tell you a few curious details about him?

When he was an *aspirant* (MA candidate) at Moscow University in 1965, he began to spread the rumour, just before defending his dissertation, that he was a distant relative of Brezhnev. He supposed, not without reason, that this item of information would help him get the dissertation through. Of course, there was no truth in it, but some people believed him, because both Kvasov and Brezhnev were from Moldavia. The rumour, in any case, reached the Central Committee. Kvasov was called in (with his degree in his pocket) and warned that he should not encourage such rumours. Kvasov, who was frightened, tried to claim that he had a distant aunt who either knew Brezhnev's wife's sister, or was somehow related to her. The people in the CC decided to bring the matter to Brezhnev's notice. Brezhnev was indignant . . . but then said he wanted to see the imposter. The impudent Kvasov, though by now scared to death, managed to produce a favourable impression. So they gave him a job in the Department of Philosophy. The strange thing was that in the CC Kvasov's real history was soon forgotten, and the story that he was a relative of Brezhnev began to circulate again!

The head of a sector of the Central Committee, who has three or four people under him, may be promoted to the post of second secretary of a Union Republican Party organization. Thus, the second secretary

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of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan, Kozlov, is a former sector head of the Central Committee. You would find the same thing in all the Union Republics. In some senses, of course, the second secretary at this level has more power than the first secretary, who tends to be of local nationality. A *natsmen* cannot get his second secretary dismissed, but a second secretary could write negative reports on the *natsmen* to Moscow, and might, with considerable effort, get him out. This happened in Azerbaidzhan, with the removal of V. Yu. Akhundov, and it has happened in Armenia. An instructor in a Union Republican Central Committee is, incidentally, considered to be equal to a *raikom* first secretary.

To do well in any organization you have to be not only competent, but also devoted to the aims and ideas of that organization. We often wonder what sort of person the responsible Party worker must be. Would you care to comment on this?

In the Soviet Union, as you well know, every citizen has to profess beliefs stipulated by the state—I mean, of course, the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. Many Party officials are not Marxists at all, and this promotes hypocrisy on a nationwide scale. Non-Marxists have to associate and work with other people, so they are obliged to conceal their views and real motivation. For this reason the first and most important quality a Party worker must have is the ability to indulge in sophistry and produce a well-argued lie.

There is another important element in the picture. The principle of the infallibility of the Central Committee of the Party was established in its earliest days, and this principle is still faithfully observed. This means that an official of the Central Committee is possessed of immense power, for to criticize him would be to question this principle. He has plenty of room for abusing his powers, at the expense either of the state or of individuals. In my experience there is a good deal of corruption amongst Party officials, but the actual nature of this varies. There is, in my view, a tendency in socialist systems for power to fall into the hands of people suffering from some psychological abnormality. It is precisely fanatics like Lenin and Mao, or paranoics like Stalin who are capable of the immense bursts of energy and emotionalism which are needed to get ahead in such circumstances. I suspect that the Party and state apparatuses in the USSR tend to attract people with a certain manic-depressive personality trait, whose basic characteristics are fear and a desire to conform.

In any case, there is no doubt that the thinking person in the Party apparatus constantly feels a sort of hopeless emptiness around him. This is inevitable if decent people are consistently driven out of it, or excluded from the positions of power. They are replaced by nonentities and ignoramuses. These remarks lie beyond verification, but I believe them to be accurate.

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I gather that you had a particular interest in the relationship between the Party apparatus and the world of learning in the USSR.

I would like to comment on that, again, from the narrow point of view of the Central Committee worker. The average CC official has a keen interest, if not in academics, then at least in academic titles. It is, if you like, very fashionable to have a candidate or a doctor's degree, and few officials who are in a position to organize this can resist the temptation. A Party career is often of fairly short duration, but the status of a scholar, or more exactly, possession of a research degree, provides some insurance against disaster. If the official runs into trouble, he can then always transfer to a " quiet " and highly-paid job in a university, institute or even the Academy of Sciences.

Many responsible Party officials, from instructors of the Central Committee up, have some unknown scholar—occasionally a very well-known one—not only to write speeches and articles for them, but also to put together and " push through " dissertations. Jews happen to be the most popular " white niggers " for this sort of thing. In fact the Soviet Jew is quite irreplaceable for this task. For all sorts of racial reasons he may find the normal paths of promotion closed to him. If he is young, he may have difficulty in making a name for himself; if he has already managed this he may not be able to consolidate a position which matches his ability. He may find it advantageous to have a well-placed Party boss who, after " milking " him for a few years, can use his influence to lower anti-semitic barriers. The Party official is often happy to do this when he has got his professorship, or become an academician.

The material benefits of a research degree are not inconsiderable. They include a higher standard of living, travel abroad, a car, and a job which is assured. It is thus not surprising that the Soviet Party and state apparatus are so well endowed with research degrees. To judge from the Central Committee of the CPSU, the figure among the Party élite reaches 63 per cent, and rises to no less than 73 per cent in the Central Committees of Union Republics. Among responsible officials of the state apparatus it is 56 per cent. This practice is very satisfactory from the point of view of the Party leadership, for it means that they have more of their own people in the world of learning, and these people can promote Party influence there. They select and surround themselves with their like. Seventy-two of the heads of academic institutes at the present time were former Party officials.

Unfortunately, this practice is detrimental to learning. It is not only that former Party officials are themselves as barren as old crones, they are also incapable of inspiring others. Protests against their presence are eloquent and frequent, but do little good. I well remember a conversation which I had with a very well known Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences. He was very unhappy because, as he

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said, "there are more Party sages than scholars in the Academy of Sciences." An intelligent and very active man, he has tried to protest against science being turned into "a bin for Party throw-outs." His views invoked the ire of M. V. Keldysh, the President of the Academy. "I am not pained by the fact," the Vice-President complained, "that Keldysh offended me. What is hurtful is the fact that Keldysh, a talented scholar, pawned his conscience for 'the stars' [i.e. official limelight]."

Such protests can often be heard, and resistance is in fact organized. For instance, Trapeznikov, the head of the Central Committee Department of Science, has not been able to get a post at the Academy for years, despite all his threats. D. M. Gvishiani, Deputy President of the Committee for Science and Technology, has been similarly unsuccessful. Many of the Party knights are still waiting.

Finally, perhaps you would care to say something about the privileges enjoyed by workers of the Central Committee apparatus in their day-to-day life.

Party workers enjoy many advantages, apart from high basic salaries, but let us take these first. As an instructor of the Central Committee, my basic wage ranged from 290 to 310 rubles a month, which is considerably above the national average for "employees" (white collar workers). The heads of sectors received just over 400 rubles, the heads of departments 500 to 550 rubles. All this was common knowledge, because the figures were listed together on a salary sheet, which everyone could inspect. This is normal in Soviet institutions. It is true that only the workers in our department figured on our salary sheet, but wage rates are unified, and all instructors, regardless of department, get the same amount. The same holds good for heads of sections and departments. Central Committee workers, by the way, have a great deal of free time, and one of their favourite subjects for discussion is how much their colleagues are earning. The salary of the General Secretary of the Party and Secretaries of the Central Committee were not, of course, on these sheets, but it was generally known that the General Secretary got 900 rubles and other secretaries 700–800 rubles.

Non-monetary benefits are rather an intricate topic, and I can do no more than mention them briefly here.

First, there is the so called "Kremlin ration," *Kremlevski paëk*. There are two categories. The first is worth 32 rubles, and the second 16 rubles. This does not seem much at first sight, but the important point is that they are paid in their gold equivalents. The actual value of the "ration" must, in my view, be increased fifteen to twenty times, if one is to have an idea of its present-day spending power. The rubles take the form of vouchers.

Secondly, all Central Committee apparatus workers get the equivalent of an extra month's wage in the form of what is known as a

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" recuperation benefit." This is sometimes called the " 13th month," and is supposed to cover holiday expenses.

Thirdly, they get free tickets to sanatoria and sometimes Central Committee rest homes. These institutions have a higher standard of food and medical attention than ordinary sanatoria, etc. and the tickets to them are probably worth 300 rubles apiece. No outsiders are allowed in. A Party worker's family has the right to accompany him at a reduced rate. Next there is the system of special shops, where goods in short supply may be purchased at very reasonable prices. Party workers have passes to these. This is in addition to the system of buffets and dining rooms inside the Central Committee itself, where good quality food is available at subsidized prices, and where groceries can also be purchased.

These Party workers also have access to the well-known Fourth Directorate of the Ministry of Health, which has a good standard of medical care and better drugs, and where there are no long waits for attention. Heads and deputy heads of departments, and the more senior officials have the right to use the system of state dachas. The dachas which are put at the disposal of Secretaries of the Central Committee are particularly luxurious, and have their own service personnel. Party business trips into the provinces may be regarded as another source of income, because workers of the Central Committee apparatus have all their expenses met by the local Party organs. They may " buy " things while travelling without having to pay for them. Finally, one must mention that many Party officials of the middle and higher range are members of Supreme Soviets of the Union or a Republic, and this exceedingly light duty brings in an extra 100 rubles a month. In material terms, the staff of the Central Committee apparatus do very well indeed—which is probably one of the reasons for the durability of Soviet power.

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The Quiet Expulsion

Francis Cunningham

WHILE the Soviet Union has been stepping up its campaign for international respectability, concentrating its efforts on improved relations with the United States and Western Europe, the methods it employs to silence that most undesirable of guests, the foreign correspondent, have not changed for the better.

The last time the Soviet authorities actually issued a formal expulsion order to a correspondent who was still in the country was in May 1972, when Mr David Bonavia of *The Times* was expelled for unspecified " activities incompatible with the status of a foreign correspondent." *

Since then, another four correspondents have been excluded from Moscow, while still holding valid accreditation, by quieter means which have often been unreported, leaving the Soviet Union untouched by unfavourable publicity in Western newspapers.

Another three are virtually assured of never being allowed back into Russia, although all of them, with the support of their employers, firmly resisted attempts to blackmail them into leaving. Yet one more journalist was subjected to unpleasant personal allegations after he had completed his Moscow assignment.

Charges used to secure the removal of a correspondent rarely concentrate solely on what that reporter may have written—for this would highlight Soviet sensitivities about foreign public opinion—but often involve damaging personal complaints, aimed at driving a wedge between the journalist and his employers and making it disagreeable for the individual concerned to publicize his case.

Sometimes a correspondent's head office is approached directly with a plea to remove a member of staff, frequently on the grounds that his continued presence in Moscow will damage relations between the Soviet Union and his homeland.

The first such " quiet expulsion " to take place after the Bonavia affair was applied to a Japanese correspondent who had written a book about his experiences in Moscow, which displeased the Soviet authorities. The correspondent, Mr Kimura, of the *Asahi Shimbun,* was withdrawn by his head office after the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo presented his newspaper with an ultimatum: he should either be removed quickly or steps would be taken to expel him.

The only feasible reason why the Soviet authorities should issue such an ultimatum rather than just expel Mr Kimura was to avoid the furore which an expulsion usually produces, sometimes with similar action being taken against a Russian journalist abroad, and to leave

* Cf. David Bonavia, " The Technology of an Expulsion," *Survey* (Autumn 1972), Vol. 18, No. 4 (85).

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the impression that all was calm among Moscow's foreign community. Indeed, if the *Asahi Shimbun* had ignored the Soviet approach, it is quite likely that no action would have been taken against Mr Kimura, since the Russians were at such pains to avoid publicity.

Mr Kimura's case would have remained unreported were it not for one of his Japanese colleagues, who, feeling that Mr Kimura was being badly treated, telephoned an American correspondent with the news. But the Japanese journalist, evidently fearing for his own position vis-à-vis the Soviet authorities, refused to identify himself on the tapped telephone wire and introduced himself simply as " Japanese sources."

MOST cases of correspondents being eased out of Russia can be directly attributed to their active coverage of dissident affairs. Many correspondents write about dissent, but only a few actually have the necessary contacts and collect the material. It is the latter journalists who arouse the most anger from the Kremlin.

The correspondents who are *actively* involved in the dissident story are usually those who speak good Russian or who are simply popular with Russians—an invaluable quality for any foreign correspondent. The journalists who do collect dissident or Jewish material usually pool it with other colleagues to ensure a certain measure of self-protection by giving it wide publicity, sometimes even by rival organizations.

One recent instance which was publicized involved a Swedish radio and television correspondent, Mr Olle Stenholm, whose re-entry visa into the Soviet Union was cancelled while he was abroad. Mr Stenholm was accused of unleashing an " anti-Soviet campaign " in the West. The charge was a clear reference to a tape-recorded interview with nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov, which Mr Stenholm smuggled out in the summer of 1973. After this interview Dr Sakharov opened his door to more foreign correspondents and gave two on-the-record press conferences in his Moscow home that year.

While the Stenholm case was reported, the Soviet tactics ensured that it did not arouse as much attention as a formal expulsion. If a correspondent, or any other westerner, is forced to leave Moscow, the spectacle of him packing up his household somehow appeals more to the imagination of newspaper-men reporting the story and therefore receives more coverage than if he is simply told he cannot return when he is temporarily out of the country.

A similar case followed later in 1973 when the correspondent for Italian radio and television (RAI) lost his driving licence for an unsubstantiated drunken driving charge.

The correspondent, Signor Francesco Mateoli, was stopped near his home by Moscow traffic police, who confiscated his driving licence on the spot. A subsequent telephone call from the Foreign Ministry revealed that his licence had been cancelled indefinitely. No formal

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charges were brought against Sr Mateoli, nor was he subjected to any breath or blood test to determine the amount of alcohol he was supposed to have consumed. But RAI withdrew him without fuss or protest because they considered that his loss of mobility restricted his effectiveness as a journalist—a consideration which had evidently not escaped the planners' minds in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Sr Mateoli's "crime" was that he had managed to smuggle a filmed interview with Dr Sakharov out of the country.

The latest in the series of "quiet expulsions" occurred in June 1974, when the chief correspondent of Reuters, Mr Vincent Buist, called at the Soviet Foreign Ministry at his own request to discuss the accreditation of a new correspondent. A Ministry Press Department official replied that the authorities found reporting by three Reuters correspondents "inaccurate and slanderous." The correspondents named were Messrs Robert Evans, Julian Nundy and Richard Wallis. In addition, the official said the Foreign Ministry had evidence that Mr Nundy and Mr Wallis, both bachelors in their twenties, had had homosexual relations with a Soviet citizen. The "evidence" had come in the form of a letter to the KGB in which a young Russian claimed he had had an affair with the two men. Quite why any Soviet citizen should admit to an offence which carries a five-year labour camp sentence is unclear and it is likely that any such statement, if it existed, was extracted under pressure.

It was made plain to Mr Buist that the Soviet authorities could not consider accrediting another Reuters correspondent unless Mr Nundy left the country. Mr Wallis had already completed his assignment some time before and was working in London. Reuters apparently worried by an implied threat that the Soviet government was considering taking action against Mr Nundy, withdrew him and the new correspondent quickly received his visa. The message was clear. The Russians wanted to rid themselves of Mr Nundy, one of the most active reporters of the dissident scene, while ensuring that neither he nor Mr Wallis, who worked closely with him on many sensitive stories and had been active in his own right in collecting dissident material, would ever return.

The allegations of homosexuality were no doubt also intended to make sure that the long arm of Soviet revenge would affect the two men for some time to come and suggest to Reuters that two of their best Russian speakers had been, at the very least, indiscreet in a difficult posting. Another motive in specifying such a charge was almost certainly to guarantee that the matter would not be reported. The Russians, applying the same logic they would use in Omsk or Leningrad, probably thought that charges of homosexuality would mortify both Mr Nundy and Mr Wallis into silence.

If this was part of the Soviet plan, it failed. Some ten days after the allegations were made, Reuters handed a statement to the Soviet

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Foreign Ministry rejecting both the professional and personal complaints against its correspondents. An accompanying story issued by the news agency specifically mentioned the homosexuality angle and made it clear that Reuters did not accept this charge, indicating to the Soviet authorities that they had failed to discredit the two journalists with their employers.

THE method employed by Reuters of publishing charges against members of its staff, however damaging, was a good one which should always be applied by all news organizations when confronted with Soviet blackmail.

A better technique still is to resist such attempts at removing a correspondent from the outset. Early in 1973, the Associated Press chief correspondent in Moscow, Mr David Mason, was told that one of his staff, Mr James Peipert, also an active reporter of dissident activities, was an "Israeli spy" and therefore his accreditation could not be renewed. After the Foreign Ministry refused to produce its evidence for Mr Mason's inspection, the Associated Press replied with a protest, backed by the State Department and a personal representation by a *New York Times* editor to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and the Soviets quickly backed down. Mr Peipert's accreditation was renewed and he remained at his post for a further year.

Later in 1973, the Associated Press was subjected to another obvious attempt to force it to remove a correspondent. This time the target was Mr Roger Leddington, a close contact of the dissident, Vladimir Bukovsky, who was jailed for anti-Soviet activities in 1972.

The Foreign Ministry charged that Mr Leddington had organized a Jewish demonstration, an accusation which his employers immediately rejected, and this was followed by an article in a November issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* the Writers' Union weekly, which is a favourite vehicle for attacks on foreign journalists. The newspaper said Mr Leddington, who had married about 18 months earlier, had had several affairs with Soviet girls and, to add spice to a familiar story, accused him of deliberately spilling soup on the table of a Tbilisi restaurant while on a visit to Georgia.

Other correspondents with Mr Leddington at the time of his only visit to Tbilisi agreed that a Western journalist had deliberately spilled soup, but were firm in their assurance that the correspondent concerned was not even American, let alone Mr Leddington. The Associated Press took no action to appease the Soviet authorities and Mr Leddington remained in Moscow.

The other American news agency, United Press International, came under fire in the autumn of 1973. A UPI correspondent, Mr Gordon Joseloff, was stopped by plain-clothes police on the street after he had visited some Soviet Jews and was forced to hand over his notes. Later, at the Foreign Ministry, his chief correspondent,

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Mr Ray Mosley, was told that Mr Joseloff had been helping Jews prepare their tactics. The "evidence" was in the confiscated notes. Mr Mosley asked to see them, but this was refused. In other words, papers which had earlier been in Mr Joseloff's pocket, were withheld from his own boss and had apparently become a secret document in the Foreign Ministry archives.

More sinister blackmail was applied against an Italian correspondent, Signor Giuseppe Josca of the *Corriere della Sera.* In his case, the Soviet Foreign Ministry told no less a person than the Italian ambassador that a Russian translator formerly employed by Sr Josca had lodged charges of rape against him. Sr Josca made it known that he was willing to face charges. The initial Soviet allegation was then followed by threats against Sr Josca's wife and children, who returned to Italy for their own safety, but no action was taken against Sr Josca himself, who remained to finish his assignment. To stay in Moscow in such circumstances requires considerable courage on the part of both the journalist and his employers.

Another affair, dating back to 1971, demonstrates the vindictive lengths to which the Soviet authorities are prepared to go to ruin a correspondent's reputation both personally and professionally.

This time, charges were made personally to a British correspondent. This journalist, while not an active reporter of dissident affairs, had close social contacts with Russians. His predecessor in Moscow was engaged to a Russian girl and had, understandably, asked him to keep in touch with his fiancée until he could return to marry her. A few days before the marriage took place, the correspondent was approached at home by two men, who openly admitted to being KGB employees.

The KGB agents produced the proof of a newspaper article which asserted that the journalist, a married man, whose family was not with him in Moscow, had been having an affair with his predecessor's fiancée. The article would not be published, if the correspondent "cooperated." It was explained that the KGB needed him to report back on other Westerners and cocktail party gossip. When the journalist scoffed at the idea of working for the KGB, one of his uninvited guests replied drily: "It is a great honour to work for the KGB."

The proposed article was never published, the marriage took place as planned, but the KGB did not forget. Some days after the wedding, the same two agents returned to repeat their demands. This time their attitude was more threatening. They pointed out to the correspondent that he could be involved in an accident, a clear warning that they were not above using physical violence. The correspondent was quickly withdrawn and his post was left vacant for several months.

The correspondent's employers did not protest, perhaps understandably: the Russian girl had to remain in the Soviet Union for four

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months until she received permission to join her husband in England and there may have been fears that official action by the British could exacerbate her position.

But in general terms, the policy of silence is a bad one. Any apparent reluctance to give open expression to feelings of disgust or to take reciprocal action merely gives the KGB the impression that it has *carte blanche* to continue using the same tactics. And given the chance, the KGB will continue.

THE position of Western news organizations has never been stronger than it is now, but few of these organizations feel ready to exploit this position.

The Russians are desperately anxious to ensure that the European Security Conference, designed to keep peace in the West, while the Chinese glower over the Eastern frontier, is a success, but the capitalist participants have made it known that they are only interested in having good-neighbourly relations with neighbours who behave decently.

One proposal on the agenda at the Conference specifically deals with the treatment of journalists in Eastern Europe and this is a powerful weapon in the hands of newspapers with correspondents in Moscow. Only repeated publicity and protests about underhand treatment of correspondents and, indeed, any Western citizens in communist countries, will bring home the feelings of Western governments.

But, while the Soviet Union pays lip-service to *détente* and closer relations with capitalist countries, it has still made it clear that it regards journalists as being in a special category.

A senior editor of the *New York Times* complained to Foreign Ministry officials during a recent visit to Moscow about the treatment meted out to American and other Western journalists.

The Soviet reply was illuminating. The American was told that while the Kremlin recognized that the risk of armed war with the West was slight, the "ideological war" remained. And journalists were in the vanguard of this war.

The Soviet Union is not used to treating its "ideological" enemies well and certainly not with compassion. A Foreign Ministry reception for U.S. journalists before President Nixon's latest Moscow summit illustrated this point. One correspondent complained about visa arrangements under which foreign journalists have to give at least 48 hours' notice before they can obtain a visa to leave the country. The journalist explained that he was worried about the health of his elderly father who lives in Chicago and said that visa rules could delay him seriously if he needed to return home. The head of the Ministry Press Department, Mr Vsevolod Sofinsky, answered: "I wish your family good health."

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SO while the present Soviet attitude to Western journalists remains, what choices face the Moscow correspondents and the organizations which employ them?

One solution is to cut down on reporting of dissident stories or to soften angles which could offend the Soviet government. To any reputable journalist, such a solution would mean simply that he must write *dishonestly*.

The alternative, to report in complete honesty and preserve professional integrity, will almost certainly end in some form of expulsion, perhaps involving an unpleasant personal smear which will be the subject of gossip at cocktail parties for years to come.

To reduce the likelihood of such action, Western newspapers must give wide publicity, however disagreeable this may be for the individuals concerned, every time it occurs.

Unfortunately, the only language the Soviet Union appears to understand, after more than fifty years in international politics, is the language of reciprocity—sanctions against Soviet officials abroad every time a Westerner is maltreated in Russia.

Failing this, maximum publicity about Soviet methods of dealing with people who displease the authorities will bring home to some, at least, exactly what kind of people are sitting in the Kremlin.

Soviet Union : Document

Statement by Academician Sakharov

On the eve of the visit of the U.S. President Nixon, a Reuters News Agency correspondent, Julian Nundy, was recalled from Moscow. I knew Nundy personally and knew about his activities as a correspondent. I can testify that he is a very efficient, responsive journalist who, in contrast to certain of his colleagues, paid a lot of attention to information about human rights, such as the right to freedom of speech and the right to live in the country of one's choice. There is no need to dwell on how important it is that such basic rights should be fully realised in the interests of international trust and *détente*, and how important it is to support any activities directed to this end.

Julian was always ready, at any time of the day or night, regardless of how tired he was or how busy with other things, to come and receive information at first hand. And he always did his journalistic duty with integrity and accuracy. One could rely on him.

Precisely for this reason, Nundy turned out to be undesirable to the Soviet authorities, and they asked for his withdrawal. A representative

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of the [Soviet] Foreign Ministry referred to the allegedly tendentious reports by Nundy about the priest [Dmitri] Dudko, who was removed from his parish, and the political prisoner [Igor] Ogurtsov, who, after seven years in prison, is now threatened with internment in a prison psychiatric hospital. I am well informed on both these cases and can only confirm the accuracy of Nundy's reports. To strengthen his demands, the Foreign Ministry representative produced an obviously fabricated letter accusing Nundy and another English journalist of homosexuality. The spokesman also declared this other journalist, who had already departed, guilty of tendentiousness in his reporting. There was also the additional threat that if Nundy did not leave immediately, his successor would not receive a visa.

Unfortunately, this undisguised blackmail was successful. I think that this case should be carefully studied and should be a lesson to many. And one more thing—surely it is not too late to revoke the decision to recall Nundy and return him to the place where he was so useful.

Andrei Sakharov, Academician
Moscow, 2 August 1974.

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The Tale of the Torch—Scientists-entrepreneurs in the Soviet Union*

John Löwenhardt

WHEN speaking at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, the then President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, A. N. Nesmeianov, complained about "incorrect understanding of the tasks that face the USSR Academy of Sciences" and told his audience this story:

> The USSR Ministry of Trade turned to the Academy of Sciences with a request that it work out automatic equipment for the doors of the Prague Restaurant [in Moscow, J.L.], since "wishes had been expressed that the restaurant's doors open automatically as guests approach them" (Laughter).[1]

His story was amusing to the Party officials, because the Ministry of Trade had obviously not taken into consideration the lines of waiting customers, which at that time used to form in front of the scarce restaurants; that, however, was not Nesmeianov's point. What he was inveighing against was the amount of applied research that the Academy of Sciences had had to undertake since the early 1930s.

In the two centuries prior to the Soviet industrialization effort, the learned Academy had increasingly concentrated on pure, i.e. theoretical research in the natural sciences and broad, descriptive studies in the life sciences.[2] Whether it was due to the campaign of Nesmeianov, to a concerted effort of more scientists, or to the initiative of Khrushchev himself does not matter here, but it is a fact that in 1961 the Academy of Sciences was relieved of several of its technical institutes and was allowed, for the first time since its "sovietization" in 1929, to concentrate on theoretical research.

In the early 1960s the Academy thus appeared to have come full circle, returning to the situation that had existed prior to its infiltration

* This article is part of a research project made possible by a grant from the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research, ZWO.

1 *Pravda*, 19 Feb. 1956.

2 On the history of the USSR Academy of Sciences, see Loren R. Graham, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932* (Princeton U.P., 1967), and "The Reorganization of the Academy of Sciences" in Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton (eds.), *Soviet Policy Making: Studies of Communism in Transition* (New York, 1967), pp. 133–62; Nicholas DeWitt, "Reorganization of Science and Research in the USSR," *Science*, 23 June 1961; *Survey*, 52 (July 1964); Linda Lubrano Greenberg, "Soviet Science Policy and the Scientific Establishment," *Survey*, No. 81 (Autumn 1971) and No. 82 (Winter 1972), and by the same author "Policy making in the USSR Academy of Sciences," *Journal of Contemporary History* (Oct. 1973), pp. 67–80.

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by communist scientists, when it concentrated on basic research and was more than happy to leave applied research to the few scientific research institutes of economic councils, peoples' commissariats and individual enterprises. Establishments such as the Mining Institute, Metallurgy Institute, Combustible Minerals and Mechanics Institutes that had been created by the Academy in the early 1930s, were removed from its jurisdiction in 1961 and 1962.

In the late 1960s, however, the Academy again came under pressure to spend more of its energy and resources on applied research. Several of the technical institutes that had been removed to state committees and to the State Planning Bureau were transferred back to its jurisdiction. Moreover, whereas in the period 1964–66 the USSR and the Republican Academies were still financed for 91·7 per cent by the State budget,[3] since 1968 at least some of the Academy institutes have seen this percentage lowered to about 83 per cent. The remaining 17 per cent now has to be earned by the institutes themselves in the form of contract work for industry, i.e. by way of applied research.

Not all scientists are happy with this reversal; some are trying to find ways to convince the Party leadership that this is an unwise policy. They assert that applied research can much more profitably and efficiently be done by other institutions.

Science-Industrial Associations

At the same time, recent publications in the Soviet press give reason to believe that several high-ranking scientists have taken fresh initiatives and are trying to promote a new type of applied research institution. This is the so-called Science-Industrial Association (*Nauchno-proizvodstvennoe Obedinenie,* or NPO) which can best be described as a profit-maximizing engineering or management consultant firm, originating at the academic grassroots. In the way these firms work, they hardly differ from their Western counterparts. During the late sixties and early seventies at least thirteen of these firms have sprung up in university towns and academic centres all over the Soviet Union. Examples are " Novator " (Innovator) and " Khikmet " (Wisdom) in Baku, " Neva " in Leningrad and " Iskra " (The Spark) in Tomsk.[4] Some of them were soon forced to close their doors, others lead a semi-legal life. The Innovator firm, for example, was created in 1967 and when it came under attack from central government officials in 1971, it was preserved by the leading organs of the Azerbaidzhan Republic, which placed it under the jurisdiction of the Republican Trade Union Council.

The " NPO Fakel " (The Torch) of Novosibirsk in Siberia was the firm that attracted most attention in the Soviet press and is the one

[3] *Science Policy in the USSR* (OECD: Paris, 1969), p. 263.
[4] *Literaturnaia Gazeta* (hereafter: *LG*), 24 June 1970 and 9 June 1971.

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which we know most about. The Torch was lit by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences' Siberian Branch in 1966, but formally it was carried by the the local Young Communist League (*Komsomol*) Bureau.[5] Four years and many successful research projects later, the Torch came under attack and scientists were struggling to save it from being extinguished. On 13 February 1970, the prestigious Presidium of the Academy of Sciences' Siberian Branch adopted a resolution saying that the activities of the Torch were " necessary and useful." [6] Hardly a month later Academicians A. A. Trofimuk and P. Danilovtsev, both members of the Siberian Branch Presidium and celebrated scientists, spoke out for the Torch in the official newspaper, *Izvestia.* Pointing to the successes of the similar " Positron " association of Leningrad, they wrote:

> A great diversity of forms of associations and structural subdivisions " have a right to existence " in the complex process of introduction [of new technology, J.L.]. The Torch firm, which accumulates all sorts of ideas and transmits them to the enterprises . . . operates under the Komsomol District Committee, under the guidance of leading scientists. Experience has shown that the Torch helps to draw young people into the sphere of production management and teaches them to be managers.[7]

By emphasizing the educational functions of the Torch, the Academicians apparently expected to make the institution more acceptable in ideological terms and less vulnerable to attack. In May of the same year, merely a fortnight after the Novosibirsk District Committee of the Komsomol had adopted a resolution that defended the Torch and was similar to the one accepted by the Siberian Branch Presidium, another Academician reiterated the theme in an enthusiastic article in *Komsomolskaia Pravda,* the Young Communist League's official organ. Academician G. I. Marchuk, celebrated mathematician and director of the Computer Centre of the Siberian Branch, again tried to obscure the importance that the scientists attached to the Torch for transferring at least part of the load of applied research from the institutes of the Academy to the Torch. He not only suggested that the firm had come into being on the initiative of the Komsomol (only in 1972 did he disclose that the Siberian Branch Presidium was the real initiator), but he also characterized the Torch primarily as a means of promoting science education, an instrument for teaching young scientists " to apply the fruits of science to industry."

Although the operations of the Torch were suspended at the time when *Komsomolskaia Pravda* printed this article, Marchuk did not yet hint at any trouble. But a month later, on 24 June 1970, the controversy finally disrupted in public, with *Literaturnaia Gazeta's*

[5] *Pravda*, 18 July 1972.
[6] *LG*, 26 Jan. 1972.
[7] *Izvestia*, 11 Mar. 1970.

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disclosure, "Why the Torch is fading." At the same time the habit of over-emphasizing the Torch's educational functions was abandoned. Once the facts had been disclosed by correspondents Ilia Foniakov and P. Volin, hardly anyone resorted to the argument of the Torch's educational use, and the discussion centred about its functions for the economy and for science.

WHY were firms like the Torch so attractive to the scientists of the Academy of Sciences? And why did they offend the government officials? How exactly did they operate and what was the position of the Communist Party on these Science-Industrial Associations?

Arno Kioiorna, the Director of the Estonian Academy's Institute of Economics, told his interviewer, P. Volin, why academicians were interested in preserving the "economic accountability firms," as the Torch-type firms were sometimes called. His own Institute, Dr Kioiorna stated, was faced with three tasks, in order of importance: pure, theoretical research, work for the Estonian Republic's Planning Bureau, and the solution of problems that arose in the industrial enterprises of the Republic. The Institute's plan prescribed that 16·6 per cent of its budgeted income should come from contract work for industry, i.e. from applied research contracts that had, in the scientist's view, the lowest priority.

> Of course we fulfil orders for these 60,000 rubles. Certainly not because we're interested in doing so, but because we have to; if we don't do this our staff will be cut. . . . It would be different if we were allowed to do what the universities have recently been doing. They create economic accountability problem laboratories that do contract work and receive a certain amount of money for this. At the Institute we would create a firm that would operate under our guidance, but would have its own independent budget. In the event of us being asked to do some kind of work, the firm would negotiate a contract and form a group of experts, who would be paid from the money received under the contract.[8]

Thus, the scientific workers of the Institute, as well as other scientists, engineers and students, would work as part-time consultants for the financially independent firm. They would carry out their assignments after finishing their regular working day at the Institute of Economics or other scientific establishments.

The forced 17 per cent of contract work was apparently felt as a burden not only by the Estonian Institute of Economics, but also at other places in the Academy system. As early as June 1968 M. Belousov, the chief planning administrator of the Academy's Siberian Branch, had criticized both the USSR Ministry of Finance and the State Committee for Science and Technology for planning an unjusti-

[8] *LG*, 24 June 1970.

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fiably high proportion of income for academic research institutes from fulfilment of contract work for industry. He wrote in the *Economic Gazette* that in order to carry out this instruction the institutes of the Academy of Sciences' Siberian Branch would have to take "profitable" orders on the side, diverting their attention from fundamental research. If the institutes refused to do so, they would not receive sufficient funds for financing their main, theoretical work.[9] Academician Marchuk, who was at that time Vice-President of the Siberian Branch, testified in *Pravda* that the "specific weight" of contract work in relation to all the work of the Siberian Branch had risen from 6 per cent in 1965 to 16 per cent in 1970.[10]

From the words of Arno Kioiorna it would seem that the Science-Industrial Associations were promoted by scientists not as a means of executing applied research in addition to that which was already and grudgingly done in the Academic Institutes, but as a substitute for applied research in establishments of the Academy. His description of the type of firm he would like to see created made it clear that he had in mind exactly the type of firms that already existed all over the country and of which the Torch of Novosibirsk was a good example.

What, then, were the details of the Torch's operation? At the time it was set up by a few scientists-entrepeneurs it had no budget at all, no material supplies, not one paid staff member and no office space. A small group of young scientists simply compiled a file of prospective consultants and their specialties, set up headquarters in a few rooms in a dormitory of the University of Novosibirsk and started to solicit for contracts. They could draw their consultants from a multitude of outstanding scientists who resided and worked in the area: not only scientists of the University of Novosibirsk, but also specialists working at the many renowned institutes of the Academy of Sciences' Siberian Branch in nearby Akademgorodok. After concluding a contract with an industrial enterprise, a construction organization or an industrial branch ministry's research and development bureau, a group of consultants would be selected to work on the problem in their spare time.

Contracts poured in and the results were overwhelming. In the period up to June 1970 the Torch received 3·5 million rubles from 263 contracts. The firm claimed that these contracts ultimately resulted in a saving of 35 million rubles for the Soviet economy, through the introduction into industry of the innovations developed by the Torch.[11] For example, it was estimated that the introduction of an "optimal plan for forest exploitation" in the Novosibirsk Province, developed by Torch consultants, resulted in yearly savings of 2·7

[9] *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta*, No. 24 (June 1968), as quoted in Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure, and Vladimir Prokofieff, *Science and Technology as an instrument of Soviet Policy* (Miami: 1972), pp. 44–45 and 181.
[10] *Pravda*, 18 July 1972.
[11] *LG*, 24 June 1970.

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million rubles. The system of computer analysis of seismic materials that Torch developed for a geological expedition was said to allow savings of up to 5·8 million rubles per annum, while 1·9 million rubles a year were saved by using an experimental model of a Torch-built swamp vehicle (*bolotokhod*) for oil exploration in the Western regions of Siberia.[12] Other Torch projects were in such fields as gold extraction, the use of manure, development of new colouring substances and of control devices for the Novosibirsk Power Station.

Bureaucratic Resistance

No one ever doubted that the Science-Industrial Associations of the Torch type were very efficient and successful, probably considerably more efficient than the established and official research and development organizations of industrial branch ministries, economic councils and enterprises. Neither the scientists, administrators, financial officials, factory directors nor even Party officials questioned the Torch's efficiency. Moreover, the Communist Party, campaigning as it did both for the speeding up of innovation processes and for devising adequate institutional mechanisms and financial incentives to this end, could hardly refrain from publicly endorsing these firms. The position of the Party was to praise and preserve, but preserve in such a way that the foundation of the firms, their spontaneity and independence, would be destroyed. "Above all, 'Torch' is valued for its attracting the attention of our youth to the solution of the vital problems of industry," said the Secretary of the Novosibirsk Provincial Party Committee:

> The results of its work definitely do contribute to technical progress. Therefore, we must preserve the Torch, while at the same time working on a more accurate definition of its "place in society." . . . Regarding the financial and economic aspect, we have to search for possibilities of transferring the Torch to a state organization, without losing the advantages that it has proved to have. . . . A special way of financing will have to be found. . . .[13]

Academician Marchuk expressed a similar view in the Party organ *Pravda*, whereas P. Volin suggested that these firms might find shelter under the wings of the State Committee for Science and Technology. There was, however, no easy way out of the dilemma. On the one hand, the Communist Party favoured and promoted institutional innovations that would contribute to the badly-needed speeding-up of technological innovation processes. "Science must be brought closer to life" had been a recurring slogan for several decades. On the other hand, the institutional innovation that proved to be highly efficient interfered with the authority and power of both Party and

[12] *LG*, 26 Jan. 1972.
[13] *LG*. 24 June 1970.

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government officials. To raise efficiency, the Party would have to give up a significant portion of its authority over scientific-technological research. Financial and operational autonomy would have to be granted to independent firms.

The objections of officials to the Torch reflected this dilemma. Since they are not part of the planned economy, some argued, there is no institution to guard against abuses of the firms; no one can guarantee that the work of the consultants is not done during their regular working hours at their institutes; no official institution decides on whether the percentage of the fees which is set aside for the use of a research institute's equipment actually covers the amortization costs. What sense is there in creating small firms at a time when the government is out to liquidate small firms?

Several of these arguments were put forward in conjunction with the one objection that seemed to be the main stumbling-block for the USSR State Bank and the Ministry of Finance: the absence of bank controls over these firms. Since the firms were not part of the state-economic system, the usual financial regulations and restrictions did not apply to them. In the case of a regular research institute, most financial transactions were planned, including the total amount and distribution of wages and bonuses to be received by the scientists, engineers, laboratory workers and administrators. The Torch, however, did not have a plan; it was not subject to *the* national economic plan. The product of private entrepreneurship, it existed outside the planned economy. It found shelter under the wings of the provincial Komsomol organization, so that for all practical purposes it was to be considered an activity of the Young Communist League. The money earned by the Torch was transferred from the account of the institutions for which it did contract work, to that of the Komsomol. Money in the Komsomol account with the State Bank is hard money, since this account is not subject to the many regulations that govern the accounts of factories, trade organizations and even official research institutions. Therefore, it can readily be cashed, and herein lies the main objection of financial officials.

They explain that quite a large amount of money is transferred from factory accounts to the accounts of the Torch-type firms and on into the wallets of the scientists-consultants. The total amount of cash in circulation, they argue, is planned in relation to the expected rise in labour productivity and production of consumer goods. The unplanned income of the Science-industrial associations thus upsets the consumer goods market.[14]

A devastating critique against this line of reasoning was made by the economist, Kioiorna, and later by his interviewer, Volin. Kioiorna suggested that his opponents wilfully neglected the fact that both

[14] Ibid. This objection was raised by Nikolai Mikhailovich Sentiakov, Director of the Novosibirsk Province Branch of the USSR State Bank.

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labour productivity and the quantity of consumer goods produced were raised by the activities of the innovation firms. He said that the consultants would never receive any income if their projects did not result in "real economic savings" for the contracting enterprises. And Volin added:

> Doesn't my opponent [one "responsible financial official," J.L.] agree that such extra income [as is earned by the consultants, J.L.] disturbs the market proportions much less than the regular payment of wages to the workers at a regular research institute that for years on end doesn't produce anything and, consequently, "eats up" a portion of the social wealth produced not by itself but by others? [15]

The implications of Kioiorna's remarks and Volin's rhetorical question were clear: an independent firm that offers its consultants a direct financial interest in the results of their work is more apt to contribute to achieving the goals of the Party and government than an established research institute that pays its scientists a fixed wage. If a research worker receives a fixed wage, he may idle, doze off, but if his income is fully dependent on the results of his work, he will produce such results. Moreover, he will only receive an income if his work results in savings for the national economy through the introduction of new technology that raises labour productivity, which cannot be said of workers at the established research institutions. If he is paid a fixed wage, savings for the national economy may or may not result from his work. That is how it should be with regard to theoretical research, to be sustained by society as an investment in the future, but not in the case of innovation research and development projects.

Entrepreneurship and *Élan Vital*

"The Central Planning Economy," Egon Neuberger wrote some time ago in a RAND paper on the legacies of this system,

> turns the individual into an object of manipulation and changes initiative and enthusiasm into apathy and indifference. . . . One of the most significant, although seldom mentioned, legacies of the central planned economy is the destruction of *élan vital*, a production input of which there is no close substitute.[16]

It was precisely this *élan vital* that represented the essential innovation of these Soviet firms, created as they were out of the spontaneous initiative of young scientists (backed, it should be conceded, by concerned Academicians who feared ever-increasing impingement on theoretical research). Interestingly, the discussion on the Torch-

[15] *LG*, 9 June 1971.

[16] Egon Neuberger, *The Legacies of Central Planning*, RAND Memorandum RM-5530-PR (June 1968), p. 32. The idea was borrowed from Vaclav Holesovsky.

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firms substantiated Neuberger's claims, as a high ranking financial official lamented:

> Initiative! . . . Permanent infringements on the instructions, statuses and regulations, that is their initiative! [17]

For the time being, the discussion on the efficient and unconventional Science-industrial associations seems unresolved, although the Torch was forced to close down on 14 May 1971. Recurrently, however, scientists have been, and are still, pushing for its revitalization and legitimization, hoping to ease the pressure for applied research put on the Academy of Sciences. Three weeks after he was forced by the State Bank to take part in the closing down of the Torch, Academician Trofimuk succeeded in having a letter published on the front page of *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, in which he complained that

> As soon as the Novosibirsk firm " Torch " stopped its activities, the paper grew silent. It's a pity: those economic accountability organizations are very useful. . . .[18]

After allowing Trofimuk once again to defend the extinguished Torch and to testify on his own interest in its resuscitation, the editors of the paper agreed with him that the discussion started earlier in the paper should be continued. Thereupon they dedicated a full page to the defence of these firms against their powerful opponents. A year later, they took up the same issue again, this time by printing a multitude of favourable documents from firms that had done business with the Torch.

So the scientists have not yet given up. Several of them still hope to persuade the Communist Party and the Soviet government that it would be much wiser and more effective to have applied research and development done by independent and profit-seeking Science-Industrial Associations than by the institutes of the Academy of Science. The learned Academy should once again become the repository of pure, theoretical research.

[17] *LG*, 9 June 1971.
[18] Ibid.

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A Recent Trend on the Historical Front

George M. Enteen

THE Soviet public has been told at many times and in many ways that the official version of modern Russian history is false. Since 1956, historians have been attempting to create a new synthesis; but by the time its outline was perceptible, the enterprise itself was deemed inexpedient by political authorities. This paradoxical situation—widespread scepticism regarding official historiography, combined with the inability to create a new scheme—underlies present Soviet historical writing.

Three books [1] embodying the new synthesis have recently been censured. They are collections of articles which developed from discussions which began in the 1950s. The papers were read in the 1960s: that they were published only in 1969 and 1970 is an indication of the conflict between historians and their censors in the higher bodies of the Academy of Sciences and on the staff of the Party Central Committee. *Rossiiskii proletariat* and *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia* were censured in a resolution of the Historical Division of the Academy of Sciences.[2] The background to the resolution is the chief concern of this article: the current campaign against political dissenters coincides with an attack upon historians.

ISTORICHESKAIA NAUKA consists of 12 articles on modern Russian history, on current Western history (British, Italian, and American historiography), and on the philosophy of history. It also contains transcribed discussions: 42 statements in all.

I. S. Smirnov's article, "The Leninist Concept of Cultural Revolution and the Criticism of the Proletcult," is one of the best essays in the collection. Smirnov uses not only Lenin's works, but the Proletcult's own publications and material in the Central Party Archives. He takes the reader into the Politburo, to a four-day meeting enlarged to include the Party Secretaries, Krestinskii and Preobrazhenskii, and representatives of the Commissariat of Education, Prokrovskii and Krupskaia. He even brings Bukharin and Bogdanov

[1] *Istoricheskaia nauka i nekotorye problemy sovremennosti* (Moscow, 1969); *Rossiiskii proletariat: oblik, borba, gegemoniia'* (Moscow, 1970); *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia* (Moscow, 1970).

[2] " V otdelenii istorii AN SSSR: POSTANOVLENIE BIURO OTDELENIIA ISTORII AN SSSR—Ob itogakh obsuzhdeniia v institute istorii SSSR izdannykh v 1970 god v sbornikov ' Rossiiskii proletariat: oblik, borba, gegemoniia ' i ' Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia.' " *Voprosy istorii*, Vol. 8 (1972), pp. 141–45. The Historical Division is the administrative unit within which the Academy's historical institutes, commissions, etc. function.

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into his account, portraying them as men, not as demons embodying this or that deviation. Smirnov shows Lenin making up his mind and implementing his decision about proletarian culture and suggests that Lenin's decision to subvert the Proletcult exemplified his abandonment of War Communism and his anticipation of NEP. Smirnov works within a polemical framework which presumes the correctness of Lenin's decision as a step towards building a socialist society; but he gives a persuasively objective description of an actual phenomenon, and then creates a hypothesis to explain it.[3]

Istoricheskaia nauka is above all the work of its chief editor, M. Ia. Gefter,[4] who wrote the preface and an introductory article, and participated in three of the four discussions. Gefter's most important suggestions concern the history of Marxism. He notes the diverse tendencies of Marxism—towards universalism, on the one hand, and towards particularism and sectarianism on the other. This is expressed in the discrepancy between Marxism as embodied in Marx's own writing and as embodied in Soviet textbooks. The latter (and the events that led to their creation) cannot be dismissed as accidental and external to Marxism. They (and the cult of personality) must be comprehended as an aspect of the history of Marxism and as affecting its content.[5] Gefter is unwilling to view Stalinism as accidental and inconsequential.

In Marxist terms, Gefter treats the same problems that are also faced by Western scholars—the tension between the general and the particular, between the abstract and the specific, between determination and freedom for both the historical actor and the investigator. The theme of moral judgment and foreign policy, recognition of the fact that a socialist society (supposedly unblemished by national egoism and aggressive economic motives) is ensnared in traditional international conflicts, has special poignancy after the Prague Spring. In the discussion, Gefter, of course, raised no question as to the morality of Soviet foreign policy; but he criticized blanket justification of Imperial Russian expansionism, and noted that national as well as social considerations must be evaluated before one can decide whether a conquest is justified.[6] Like those Western scholars who are concerned with the moral consequences of social science, Gefter seems to be combating both dogmatists and technocrats.

[3] *Istoricheskaia nauka*, pp. 73, 76–79, 83.

[4] Gefter's present status is unclear, but he has been a prominent member of the Institute of World History. He was one of the historians' representatives at the important conference published under the title, *Istoriia i Sotsiologiia* (Moscow, 1964), and he spoke sharply against the cult of personality. He is a former student of A. L. Sidorov; like his mentor, he has written extensively about the economic preconditions of the Russian Revolution, especially about the problem of Russian imperialism. A statement of his that remains unpublished in the Soviet Union has been reproduced in the West by Roy Medvedev. It is a criticism of Stalinist historiography that at the same time constitutes a definition of whiggism and as such is of interest to all students of historical methodology. It is as elegant as Herbert Butterfield's definition and even more concise. *Let History Judge* (New York, 1971), pp. 516–18.

[5] *Istoricheskaia nauka*, pp. 354–56.

[6] Ibid. p. 426.

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Gefter's understanding of revolution displeased his censors. For him, if history is the story of inevitable progress, the instruments of progress vary; even such an instrument of progress as revolution plays a changing role. Gefter suggests that revolution is historical in the precise sense that, like the state, it is born in time and will eventually disappear. At present, not only the classical Marxist bourgeois (anti-feudal)-democratic revolution and the proletarian (anti-capitalist)-socialist revolution exist, but the peoples-democratic revolution has come into being. The Soviet model of the socialist revolution is so rich and suggestive that it can inspire revolutions where there are few workers, but where there exists an organization of people who understand Soviet history.[7] Despite extensive revolutionary activism and the power of Marxist-Leninist theory, according to Gefter, the transition from capitalism to socialism is not occurring in the form envisaged by Marx. The European proletariat has something to lose in existing society. Is revolution still an instrument of progress, or has it become outmoded? Gefter answers that it is by no means obsolete.[8] Probably, Gefter's censors assume that his question will continue to impress the reader's mind long after his answer is forgotten and the reader may ask: are capitalism and socialism, as is assumed by Marxism-Leninism, sequential social forms, or are they in fact divergent forms of industrialized society? It would be unfair to attribute this question to Gefter; but his censor is not, perhaps, so scrupulous.

Istoricheskaia nauka does not contradict the official view that Soviet history is the story of building socialism under the leadership of the Communist Party, and may even be seen as an attempt to give this view a reasonable and up-to-date basis. It does, however, contain much to offend a view embracing specifically Stalinist formulations and Stalinist norms of investigation.

THE Bureau of the Historical Division of the Academy of Sciences censured *Istoricheskaia nauka* on 10 February 1971.[9] Representatives from other institutions, including the Party's scholarly institutes, attended the meeting, which opened with reports by Academician I. I. Mints [10] and Corresponding Member M. P. Kim.[11] Then other Academicians and Doctors of History and Philosophy

[7] Ibid. pp. 254–55, 260.

[8] Ibid. pp. 259–60.

[9] "Obsuzhdenie nekotorykh problem metodologii istorii," *Voprosy istorii*, Vol. 10 (1971), pp. 159–66.

[10] A veteran of the Civil War, he has played a guiding role in the historical profession since the 1920s. His best known writings are on the Russian Revolution. He is the head of an Academic Council which supervises research on the October Revolution on a national scale.

[11] Head of the Academy's Sector on the History of Soviet Culture and of a newly formed Council on the History of Socialist and Communist Construction. At the conference on History and Sociology, he, like, Gefter, spoke against the cult of personality; now he is a champion of orthodox opinion. He is a strong candidate for Directorship of the Institute of History of the USSR, when the office becomes vacant.

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spoke. Opinions ranged from those which considered the book ill-conceived and wicked altogether, to those which thought it sound but regretted that it had not been edited more carefully. Finally Academician P. N. Pospelov,[12] Academician V. M. Khvostov [13] and Academician E. M. Zhukov [14] delivered the *coup de grâce,* or, rather, attempted to do so; but the book's authors resisted the implicit call for self-criticism. V. P. Volobuev, Director of the Institute of History of the USSR, conceded only that his remarks in the book contained "inexact formulations." [15] He defended Gefter's right to raise the questions he had discussed in the book, but he disassociated himself from Gefter's opinions.

The replies of Gefter and his collaborators, senior historians Ia. S. Drabkin and A. A. Galkin, and K. L. Maidanik, their junior colleague, are not recorded in the transcript; it notes, however, that they "adopted an extremely negative attitude to all the critical observations directed at them (K. L. Maidanik recognized some terminological shortcomings in his article, i.e. the use of "democratic and socialist" and "proletarian" as synonyms with regard to revolution) . . . Drabkin and Gefter insisted on the right of scientific investigation, and discussion, even though no one in the discussion denied this right." [16] The transcript also notes that "E. N. Gorodetskii . . . preferred not to mention any of the book's shortcomings." [17] Gorodetskii is a former

[12] At the time, Academic Secretary of the Historical Division of the Academy of Sciences. A Party member since World War I, he has been involved in the writing of Party history since the 1930s. Since 1939, he has been a Central Committee member and has served at various times as Chief Editor of *Pravda,* Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Secretary of the Central Committee and, from 1957–61, Candidate Member of the Party Presidium. His scholarly achievements are much less impressive than his Party credentials. It is unlikely that the historical profession considered itself promoted by his appointment and it is unlikely also that he viewed the assignment as a promotion. On Pospelov's seventy-fifth birthday in June 1973, he was awarded the Order of Friendship of the Peoples, and he resigned his leadership of the Historical Division. B. A. Rybakov, Director of the Institute of Archeology, who is a genuine scholar, but who seems to share Pospelov's general outlook, replaced him. *Izvestia* (24 June 1973).

[13] Before the Revolution his father had been a Professor of Ancient History at Kazan University. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, he himself studied in the semi-Marxist Institute of History of RANION (Russian Association of Social Science Institutes). In 1959, he became Director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences. With the division of the latter in 1968 into the Institute of World History and Institute of History of the USSR, Khvostov became Director of the former. He died in March 1972, at which time he was Learned Secretary of the Historical Division, head of the Social-Science Sector and a member of the Academy's Presidium. He is best known for his writings on European diplomatic history. His obituary in *Pravda* (11 Mar. 1972) notes that for some years he was a member of the professional staff of the Party Central Committee.

[14] He held long tenure in the Higher Party School. As a staff member of the Party Central Committee, he devoted himself to the study of contemporary Japan. Institute for the Study of the USSR, *Prominent Personalities in the U.S.S.R.* (Metuchen: New Jersey, 1968), p. 723. In 1957 he became Learned Secretary of the Historical Division. He was removed in 1971 (replaced by Khvostov) and became Director of the Institute of World History. He also remains head of the State Committee of Historians.

[15] *Voprosy istorii,* Vol. 10 (1971), p. 163.

[16] Ibid. pp. 165–66.

[17] Ibid. p. 166.

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student and close associate of Mints. Before this meeting he was a potential candidate for election to the Academy of Sciences. The transcripts records dryly an emotional high point, that Gorodetskii " carried on polemics with Mints and Kim . . . " [18]

SVERZHENIE SAMODERZHAVIIA and *Rossiiskii proletariat,* like *Istoricheskaia nauka,* were produced chiefly by historians who had been associated with A. L. Sidorov. In general, the authors were the best students of historians trained in the Institute of Red Professors in the 1920s—Sidorov, Pankratova, Mints, and Nechkina. They had been increasingly influential prior to the current dispute.

Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia and *Rossiiskii proletariat* consist of source studies, historiographical analysis, and monographic research which have as a common theme the pre-conditions of the October Revolution. The resolution of the Historical Division censured by name Volobuev and Iu. I. Kirianov, a research specialist in the Institute of History of the USSR, and a former student of L. M. Ivanov,[19] whose contributions are the most informative and thoughtful. In his article in *Rossiiskii proletariat,* Kir'ianov did not reach definite conclusions about the manners and morals of the Russian proletariat, but he successfully explored the terrain with the help of methods of social psychology. In the resolution, he was accused of striving for innovation, which resulted in " ' depoliticization ' (or ' deideologicalization ') of the role of the Russian proletariat . . . " [20]

Volobuev's essay in *Rossiiskii proletariat* is dry and ceremonious; his contribution to *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia* is, in contrast, thoughtful and learned. Here he attempts to show how Lenin's interpretation of Russian history was validated by the Russian Revolution—that the

[18] Ibid.

[19] L. M. Ivanov, until his death two years ago, was an influential, though relatively unknown, leader of the historical profession. A student of A. M. Pankratova in the 1930s, he served for some years after World War II as Learned Secretary of the Institute of History and as Deputy Director of the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He served on the editorial boards of numerous important books, of such journals as *Istoricheskie zapiske* and *Voprosy istorii,* and as head of the Institute of History of the USSR's Sector on Russian history in the period of capitalism, which is a subdivision of Mints' Council on the study of the Great October Revolution. Ivanov was Chief Editor of *Rossiiskii proletariat* and Deputy Chief Editor of *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia.* Though Mints was Chief Editor of the latter work, there are grounds for thinking that Ivanov played a more active role in preparing the volume. He seems to have become associated with the former students of A. L. Sidorov: Volobuev, Gefter, and others. Ivanov frequently served as a member of the Party Bureau of the Institute of History of the USSR. He died in January 1972, on the eve of the discussion of *Rossiiskii proletariat* and *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia,* and shortly before Khvostov's death and Pospelov's return to an active role in historical scholarship. Ivanov's death deprived his associates of a voice well known and influential in the Central Committee apparatus. *Istoriia SSSR,* Vol. 2 (1972), p. 199; *Voprosy istorii,* Vol. 2 (1972), p. 221; A. I. Alatortseva and G. D. Alekseeva (eds.), *50 let istoricheskoi nauki: khronika nauchnoi zhizni 1917–1967* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 287, 305, 442, 494, 502, 504.

[20] *Voprosy istorii,* Vol. 8 (1972), p. 142.

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October Revolution was a necessary outcome of Russian and European history. Volobuev discusses anew the paradox of a socialist revolution occurring in a nation just completing the transition from feudalism to capitalism. He takes issue with the view, best expressed by Alexander Gershenkron, that Russia was becoming more stable and less prone to revolution after 1906.[21] The Stolypin reform was a failure, he argues; it merely increased the number of unresolved problems. Even one who disagrees with this conclusion and who feels that the article is marred by *lacunae,* and even by instances of dogmatism, can admire the work as a criticism of Western models of modernization.[22]

One can see why Kirianov's essay disturbed members of the Bureau of the Historical Division; it discussed ideas which were outside the limits of official approval. What they disliked about Volobuev's articles is less evident: his remarks fit into the official framework and even tend to uphold it. It was probably not Volobuev's scholarship, but his leadership, that was disapproved of—his management of his Institute and his willingness to tolerate people like Gefter and Kirianov.

THE initial discussion of *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia* and *Rossiiskii proletariat* was held in March 1972 at a joint session of the Sectors for the Pre-October and Soviet Periods of the Learned Council of the Institute of History of the USSR. It was reviewed by the Bureau of the Historical Division and a commission (composed of Academicians Mints, B. G. Gafurov, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Corresponding Members Kim and P. A. Zhilin, a Specialist in Military History, and D. N. Kukin, Deputy Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism; and Iu. A. Poliakov, a specialist in the Soviet period and Chief Editor of the journal *Istoriia SSSR*), was formed to prepare a draft resolution. The draft was discussed and a final resolution adopted at a meeting of the Bureau on 4 July 1972.[23] That meeting was chaired by Pospelov, and Volobuev was the centre of attention. Parodies of his ideas were bandied about, and his statements refuted. A. L. Narochnitskii, who was himself elected to the Academy of Sciences just a few months after the discussion, "emphasized the need to heighten the sense of responsibility of members of the editorial boards" of the two volumes under discussion. According to V. I. Bovykin, also a former associate of Sidorov, one of the contributors to *Istoricheskaia nauka*, and an editor of *Voprosy istorii*,

> the fact that P. V. Volobuev, one of the authors of the books being discussed, is at the same time Director of the Institute complicates the entire matter. That circumstance places a special responsibility

[21] *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 133–42.
[22] *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia,* pp. 24–38.
[23] "V biuro otdeleniia istorii AN SSSR: Obsuzhdenie knig 'Rossiiskii proletariat: oblik, borba, gegemoniia' i 'Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia,'" *Istoriia SSSR*, Vol. 1 (1973), pp. 211–19.

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> on him . . . The Institute of the USSR is responsible for the appearance of the collections being criticized, and one must draw a lesson from this and implement the corresponding conclusions.[24]

Volobuev accepted responsibility for the publication and ideological-theoretical content of *Rossiiskii proletariat* and *Sverzhenia samoderzhaviia*, conceding that they contained errors. He defended his interpretation of the Russian Revolution, including his understanding of the outbreak of the February Revolution: " the events of 23 February," were a " spontaneous explosion." Also, he pointed out that some of the ideas attributed to him in the course of discussion were not his own.[25] Pospelov seemed unwilling to accommodate the findings of scholars at all. The February Revolution began when it did, because that is the way the Party planned it, " and this is noted in Party documents." He was displeased by Volobuev's defence. Volobuev had earlier admitted " serious methodological errors," Pospelov alleged, but in discussion conceded only the presence of " inexact formulations." " This is formal recognition of error. It is not a matter of ' inexact formulations ' but, in essence, of assertions against some important propositions of Marxism-Leninism."

The resolution adopted " at the initiative of P. N. Pospelov " [26] can be summarized briefly: the Bureau of the Historical Division, " taking into account the decision of the Directorship of the Party Bureau of the Institute of History of the USSR," proposes to the Directors of the Institute that they " work out measures designed to remove serious shortcomings . . . " and in intensifying efforts to prepare for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the formation of the USSR that they " be guided unfailingly by the ideas and evaluations formulated " in the resolution of the Central Committee regarding the Fiftieth Anniversary celebration. " Considering the serious shortcomings " in the depiction of the history of the Russian proletariat, " it is recommended " that the Directors " examine the matter of replenishing the leadership of the Sector of the History of the USSR in the period of imperialism." The historical journals should publish " detailed information " about the discussions that led to this resolution and about " the problems which were the subject of the discussion."

BEFORE the end of 1972, *Istoricheskaia nauka* had been criticized in *Pravda*,[27] and Gefter had been admonished by name in *Kommunist*.[28] Hopefully he has suffered only embarrassment and, like E. N. Burdzhalov, who played a similar role a decade and a half ago, continues to be an active historian.

[24] Ibid. p. 213.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid. p. 214.
[27] A. Kosulnikov, A. Pedosov, " Ovladevat' bogatym opytom leninskoi partii " (13 Oct. 1972).
[28] A. Smirnov, " Za stroguiu nauchnost', dostovernost' i istoricheskuiu pravdu," 16 (1972), pp. 120–24.

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Pressure on Volobuev mounted: in September, he was attacked viciously in *Voprosy istorii KPSS*.[29] The authors of the polemic had no qualms about misquoting him in order to make him appear a renegade. The main point of Volobuev's work on the Russian Revolution is that the Revolution was inevitable and foreseeable, a part of the historical process. His critics sought to show that he viewed the Revolution itself, not just its outbreak, as a spontaneous occurrence. They quoted the following passage of Volobuev: "The spontaneous revolutionary explosion, which occurred on 23 February and which marked the beginning of the Revolution, was planned by no one and no one could have foreseen it (that is, when it would occur)."[30] They made the passage support their view by simply dropping the parenthetical expression from the quotation.[31] In short, they reverted to Stalinist falsification. They also likened Volobuev to a Menshevik and alleged that he idealized Socialist Revolutionary leaders.[32]

Volobuev attended a conference of Soviet and Czechoslovak historians held near Bratislava late in September, but he was absent from the series of conferences held later to celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the formation of the USSR. At the conference of the Academy of Sciences, his detractors, Pospelov, Kim, and Poliakov spoke in his stead. Iu. I. Korablev, Volobuev's deputy, presided over a conference at the Institute of History of the USSR. The chronicles of the major historical journals continued, however, in reporting his past activities, to refer to him as Director of the Institute of History of the USSR and as Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences.[33] For some time, his status was indeterminate. Early in January, *Pravda* reported that Volobuev had acknowledged as justified criticism of him and his Institute.[34] Then, in March, he was included in a panel which addressed a major gathering of historians.[35]

The body addressed by Volobuev consisted of directors of historical institutes, ministries and departments, and prominent historians. As noteworthy as Volobuev's presence is the fact that the group was also addressed by S. P. Trapeznikov, Head of the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the Party Central Committee.[36] Since

[29] P. A. Golub, V. Ia. Laverychev, P. N. Sobolev, "O knige, 'Rossiiskii proletariat: oblik, borba, gegemoniia,'" *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, Vol. 9 (1972), pp. 120–32.
[30] *Sverzhenie samoderzhaviia*, p. 33.
[31] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, Vol. 9 (1972), p. 126.
[32] Ibid. pp. 126, 127.
[33] For example, see *Voprosy istorii*, Vol. 12 (1972), p. 192; *Istoriia SSSR*, Vol. 6 (1972), pp. 226–27, and Vol. 1 (1973), p. 220.
[34] "Vyvody sdelany" (6 Jan. 1973).
[35] "Neotlozhnye zadachi istorikov" (29 Mar. 1973).
[36] According to A. D. Sakharov: "It is imperative that we restrict in every possible way the influence of neo-Stalinists in our political life. Here we are compelled to mention a specific person. One of the most influential representatives of neo-Stalinism at the present time is the director of the Science Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee, Sergei P. Trapeznikov. The leadership of our country and our people should know that the views of this unquestionably intelligent, shrewd, and

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March the campaign has not abated. Trapeznikov and Zhukov have published articles in *Kommunist*,[37] which, though circumspect in tone, narrow the range of tolerated opinion. *Voprosy istorii KPSS*[38] published an editorial that renewed the call for historians to acknowledge their errors, and urged those who had done so only formally to strive to correct them. It also complained that favouritism and subjectivism sometimes prevail. The editorial added a fourth title to the list of proscribed books.[39] An editorial in *Voprosy istorii*[40] conveyed in milder terms similar messages. Academicians Mints, Nechkina, and Cherepnin in an article in *Istoriia SSSR* returned to an array of interpretations which had been abandoned over the last two decades.[41] The most important institutional change to emerge so far from the campaign is a transfer of responsibilities within the institutes. Zhukov publicly acknowledged as justified public criticism of the Institute of World History. As was the case with Volobuev's apology in January, the letter was counter-signed by the Secretary of the Institute's Party bureau.[42] In addition, a Joint Scientific Council has been set up to improve and co-ordinate research on Party History. It is governed by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of Social Sciences and the Higher Party School. The historical institutes of the Academy of Sciences are not represented in the Council but presumably are subject to its authority.[43]

According to the Central Committee resolution on Party propaganda which accompanied the publication in 1938 of Stalin's *Short Course* on Party history:

> It was necessary to give the Party uniform guidance with respect to the history of the Party, guidance which provides an official interpretation of the history of the VKP(b) and of Marxism-Leninism, verified by the TsK VKP (b), [and] which precludes all arbitrary interpretations. The publication of the " Course on the History of the VKP(b), approved by the TsK VKP (b) " will put an end to arbitrariness and confusion in the depiction of the history of the Party, to the proliferation of viewpoints and interpretations of the major questions of Party theory and Party history . . .[44]

highly consistent man are basically Stalinist. . . ." *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (New York, 1968), pp. 56–57. See also the note by Harrison Salisbury, pp. 125–26.

37 Trapeznikov, " Sovetskaia istoricheskaia nauka i perspectivy ee razvitiia," 11 (1973), pp. 68–86; Zhukov, " Nekotorye voprosy teorii sotsialno-ekonomicheskikh formatsii," 11 (1973), pp. 87–97.

38 " Vazhnye zadachi istoricheskoi nauki," Vol. 5 (1973), pp. 3–23.

39 *Voprosy istorii kapitalisticheskoi Rossii. Problemy mnogoukladnosti* (Sverdlovsk, 1972).

40 " Sovetskaia istoricheskaia nauka na sovremennom etape," Vol. 5 (1973), pp. 3–14.

41 " Zadachi sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauki na sovremennom etape ee razvitiia," Vol. 5 (1973), pp. 3–16.

42 *Kommunist*, Vol. 7 (1973), p. 127, counter-signed by A. S. Kucherenko. See n. 34 for reference to Volobuev's apology counter-signed by V. Neupokoev.

43 Trapeznikov, *Kommunist*, Vol. 11 (1973), p. 35.

44 " O postanovke partiinoi propogandy v sviazy s vypuskom ' kratkogo kursa istorii VKP (b) ' POSTANOVLENIE TsK VKP (b)," *Bolshevik*, Vols. 21–22 (1938), p. 2.

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An official and objectively true version of the past—a single past—and an end to interpretation: this seems to be the definition of history employed by Pospelov even now. Are we entitled to speak of a pogrom on the historical front? On the one hand, some historians are unable to publish their findings,[45] while others presumably must compromise on substantive matters. On the other hand, Pospelov does not seem to have had personnel matters completely in his charge and was unable to make his definition of scholarship prevail. In sum, the resolutions repudiate some ideas that will surely crop up again, and call for minor changes in the leadership of the Institute of History of the USSR. Perhaps the most important fact about the resolutions of the Historical Division is that the disputes were adjudicated at so high a level and in so formal a manner. It remains to be seen how much the enhanced authority of the Party bureaus will affect the work of the institutes. Do the new arrangements affect historians on a day-to-day basis and do they afford satisfaction to the authorities? It is also unclear whether the arrangements devised for historians will have repercussions in other disciplines. As with respect to so many areas of Soviet life, it is difficult to decide whether stalemate still prevails, or whether dissent has been effectively silenced. Has the balance arrived at inadvertently under Khrushchev been tipped in favour of an up-to-date, relatively efficient form of Stalinism? [46]

[45] Readers still await the fifth volume of *Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR*; volume IV appeared in 1966. The follow-up promised in *Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv* (Moscow, 1968) has not yet appeared.

[46] At the annual meeting of Historical Department of the Academy of Sciences, 4 Mar. 1974, P. V. Volobuev was relieved of his duties as Director of the Institute of History of the USSR and replaced by Academician N. L. Narochnitskii (*Voprosy istorii*, Vol. 5 (1974), p. 137). Narochnitskii was made a member of the Academy at the general meeting of 28 Nov. 1972. He is now 67 years old. Curiously, he is a specialist in world history, not the history of the USSR. His chief specialty is international relations, with special emphasis on the Far East and he is Chief Editor of *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*.

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Background to the 11th Party Congress

Political Innovation in Rumania

Kenneth Jowitt

IN retrospect, the period 1972–74 may be as consequential for Rumania as the period 1962–64. While nothing comparable to the April 1964 Declaration has yet appeared, there are reasons for believing that major developments are in the making. To a significant extent, these developments must be seen as a defensive and preemptive response to the Soviet Union's increasing attempts at greater ideological, economic, and political coordination in Eastern Europe, and to the possibility of a new international meeting of communist parties.[1]

In response to this Soviet-inspired move towards closure and standardization in Eastern Europe and in defence of its own conception of development, the Rumanian regime appears ready to engage in a series of organizational, policy and theoretical innovations at both the domestic and international levels. Given the Soviet commitment to greater standardization of regime organization and policy in Eastern Europe and the Rumanian commitment to an independent, authoritative theoretical definition of their way to communism, there exists the probability of a major crisis in Soviet-Rumanian relations.

The first indication that the Rumanian Party was embarking on a course of organizational and theoretical innovation was at the National Party Conference of July 1972. Ceauşescu argued that Rumania was at a historic point in its development; that the next 10 to 15 years would decide whether Rumania would become a developed nation or not.[2] One detects in that speech a sense of urgency similar in some respects to that of Stalin in his 1928 speech on " Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation," in which he remarked on the need rapidly to overcome Russia's underdevelopment.[3] Rumania in 1974 is not the Soviet Union of 1928, and hasty analogies should be avoided. However, Ceauşescu's statement that Rumania is at a crucial developmental point has to be taken seriously if one is to gauge his intentions and the probable direction the regime will be taking.

At this 1972 Conference the notion of Rumania as a developing socialist country appeared, having significant implications and by no means devised simply to secure more favourable international

[1] For a discussion of the current Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe see J. F. Brown, " *Détente* and Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe," *Survey* (Spring/Summer 1974), pp. 46–59.

[2] Nicolae Ceauşescu, " Raportul cu privire la dezvoltarea economico-sociala a Romaniei . . . ," in *Conferinta Nationala Partidului Comunist Roman, 19–21 iulie* (Bucuresti: Editura Politica, 1972), p. 56.

[3] Joseph Stalin, " Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation," in Nicolas Spulber, ed., *Foundations of Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth* (Indiana: Bloomington, 1964), p. 269.

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economic treatment. The formulation of such a concept was an implicit assertion of the Party's right to theoretical and conceptual innovation while the concept itself (of Rumania as a *tara in curs de dezvoltare* [4]) is the linchpin of its view of domestic and international relations.

THE background of the changes that have occurred since 1971–72 is complex. First there was the displeasure of Ceauşescu and others such as Leonte Rautu [5] with domestic developments between 1965–70. There was dissatisfaction within the Party as to what its role was—salaried activists (*apparatchiki*) in both the Party and Youth (UTC) organizations were confused and annoyed over their implicit downgrading and the lack of effective guidelines. In connexion with the latter there was a great deal of uncertainty about the meaning of the slogans and strategy adopted at the Party's tenth congress in 1969. This uncertainty was revealed by a part of Ceauşescu's speech to the National Party Conference in 1972 in which he addressed himself to a series of requests by Party members for clarification of basic principles.[6] The feeling was also growing within the leadership that the strategy of 1965–70 did not give the Party a positive enough role, did not adequately check the growing influence of managerial-intellectual elements, " protect " the workers' interests, or provide the leadership and its supporters with an adequate conceptual and strategic " map." [7]

This overall dissatisfaction was in part crystallized by Ceauşescu's visit to a number of Asian socialist countries in the summer of 1971. The exact relation of this experience to the succeeding changes in Rumania is not known. It has been suggested that the July and November (1971) Party meetings where demands were made for greater ideological consciousness were modelled on the Chinese pattern of cultural revolution. It is difficult to find any support for this argument. The demands for greater ideological consciousness were and continue to be defined as a " protestant ethic " approach to work and interpersonal relations and an upgrading of technical knowledge. If any impression was made on the Rumanian leader during his Asian trip, a more likely candidate than China is North Korea. In the absence of hard evidence one must be cautious in seeing too much here, but not so cautious as possibly to overlook an important relationship between the Rumanian and North Korean regimes.

There are some reasons for thinking that the North Korean regime

[4] " Rumania as a developing country."

[5] See " Cuvintul Tovarasului Leonte Rautu," at the *Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman, 3–5 noiembrie 1971* (Bucuresti: Editura Politica, 1971), pp. 449–60. Rautu was the regime's chief ideologist after 1957. Since 1965 he has continued to exercise wide responsibility in the educational and ideological fields though he was replaced as the regime's foremost ideologist first by Niculescu-Mizil and now it seems by Cornel Burtica.

[6] Ceauşescu, pp. 67–72.

[7] This concern within the Party for a more focused ideological statement became evident to the author in the course of a number of interviews carried out in 1970.

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is a very salient one for the Rumanians in terms of both its organization and its international policy. In North Korea, Ceauşescu found a country and regime whose scale, ethos and organization he could be expected to appreciate: a regime focused on and seemingly unified around one man; a regime in which the hierarchic-organizational principle was not challenged by the populist, guerrilla, or "wall-poster" strains found in China; a regime that simultaneously emphasized economic self-reliance, national independence, and the right to innovate in the realm of theory. In contrast to post-Cultural Revolution China, where there has been a relative de-emphasis on the role of the leader, a recognizable distinction of Party and government, continued turbulence within the Party and some constraint on nepotism as a major factor at the highest levels, Kim's regime is a model of hierarchical unification and organizational compression: precisely the direction in which Ceauşescu has been moving the Rumanian regime.

Admittedly, to rule China out as something of a model is not to demonstrate that North Korea has a special relationship with Rumania. Furthermore, it is impossible on the basis of what is currently known to establish to what extent the example of North Korea has stimulated or simply reinforced the evolving pattern of Rumanian developments. However, apart from the formal considerations noted above, two other types of information must be examined. There is, to begin with, Ceauşescu's evaluation of relations with North Korea. During his visit there he arrived at a "full unity of views" with his "beloved friend" Kim Il-sung (in China Ceauşescu found "identical or similar views."[8]) One is also drawn to Ceauşescu's statement that in spite of the distance between the two countries, "nobody in the world will be able to prevent the development and strengthening of the lasting friendship between the Rumanian communists and the Korean communists."[9] It may well be that the Soviets are only too well aware of the rapport between the two. Certainly in recent months there have been a number of "exchanges of experience" between the two regimes. On 9 May a North Korean governmental delegation led by Kim Il-song's younger brother, Kim Yong-ju (reputedly the number-two man in the North Korean hierarchy) visited Bucharest. During the visit, both national and international topics were discussed and Korean praise for Rumanian policy and Ceauşescu's leadership was quite evident. On the same day, a delegation of the Rumanian youth organization left for North Korea. In the delegation was Ceauşescu's daughter. On 5 June another North Korean delegation arrived, this time a party delegation, headed by Iong Hiang Sap. Discussions were held with Ceauşescu and Stefan Andrei, the Party secretary responsible

[8] Nicolae Ceauşescu, *Rumania on the Way of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society* (Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House, 1972), v. 6, pp. 100, 69.
[9] Ibid. p. 91.

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for inter-Party relations. It appears that both international and organizational questions were discussed. Andrei's presence indicates the former while Iong's responsibility for ideological and educational affairs suggests the latter (as does the presence of Kim Yong-nam).[10] More recently, a North Korean delegation made up of leaders of the youth organization had discussions with their Rumanian counterparts and Cornel Burtica, the regime's leading ideologist. All of this suggests something of a special relationship between the North Koreans and the Rumanians, a relationship which in some respects challenges recent Soviet attempts to bind Eastern Europe more closely to the Soviet Union by standardizing and limiting the references, experiences, and formulations that might be used in the definition and resolution of policy issues.

A third element possibly reinforcing the Rumanian shift in line has been the recent example of third world countries unifying around the energy issue.[11] The apparent increase in the capacity of such regimes to organize politically has probably added to the Rumanian regime's tendency to identify with non-aligned developing countries, by way of corroborating to some extent the Rumanian leadership's view that such regimes must increasingly be seen as effective, though not decisive actors in the international arena.

SINCE 1971 the Rumanian ideological and organizational position has been changing both domestically and internationally, but recently the pace has been accelerating. In March of this year Ceauşescu was made the first President of the Republic and abolished the Party's Permanent Presidium (in violation of the Party Statutes) in favour of a new Permanent Bureau to be filled mainly by *ex officio* members responsible to the Party's Executive Committee, not its Central Committee.[12] Ceauşescu's wife, Elena, has had her role continually upgraded,[13] while personalities like Maurer have had theirs downgraded. In fact, the shift in the regime's line over the last five years can be marked by three personnel changes. First came the removal of Alexandru Birladeanu from the former Permanent Presidium, a man who was an architect of the policies expounded in the April 1964 Declaration and at the ninth Party congress in 1965. Next, Ion Iliescu, the head of the UTC, the Party's youth organization, was removed after accompanying Ceauşescu on his Asian tour in 1971. Most recently, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, previously one of Ceauşescu's

[10] Biographical information on the Korean cadres as well as a comprehensive analysis of the North Korean regime is to be found in Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

[11] For Ceauşescu's positive appraisal of "third world" action in the winter of 1973–74 see *Scinteia*, 23 May 1974.

[12] For details of the recent changes see *Radio Free Europe Research*, 11 Apr. 1974.

[13] The most recent example of this is an attempt to establish revolutionary credentials for her by associating her with the anti-fascist demonstration of May 1939. See *Anale de istorie*, 3 (1974), p. 141.

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major supporters among the Party's older cadres, has been downgraded.[14] From their writings, it is evident that each of these men is sophisticated, willing to criticize Ceauşescu and prefers a more open and public approach to political, economic, and cultural life.

The " cult of personality " has been growing, with two men appearing to be its most vocal exponents, Manea Manescu, the new head of government,[15] and Gh. Cioara, the first secretary of the Bucharest Party organisation. The entire apparatus of the press has been reorganized, with new and more political staffs recently introduced (a good example is the appointment of Nicolae Dragos, former assistant editor of the Party newspaper, *Scinteia*, as editor of *Luceafarul*, which was until now the only " left "-oriented review in Bucharest).[16] The tone of the regime has shifted, and the terms *fermitatea* (firmness) and *disciplina* appear almost as frequently as pictures of Ceauşescu. There is, if anything, an even greater emphasis on intense economic development (and, it appears, a corresponding increase in the number of industrial accidents), and thousands have recently been fired from ministerial staffs, journals and research institutes. The latter is part of an intense campaign against what is seen (correctly to some extent) as the persistence of Ottoman bureaucratic and cultural orientations.[17] This anti-bureaucratic move is closely allied to the ideological emphasis on a productive work ethic, expressed most vividly in the phrase *cultul muncii* (the cult of work), and it is intended to provide more educated personnel for enterprises equipped with highly sophisticated machines and large numbers of unsophisticated workers.

The common theme of the other changes, beginning with the creation of the new office of President of the Republic, is a marked

[14] Maurer's removal from the office of Prime Minister occurred at the 25–26 Mar. 1974 plenum.

[15] In line with the new emphasis on hierarchical unification, the status of the Council of Ministers has been lowered. The head of that body is now referred to as the first minister of government with the clear implication (recognized by every Rumanian I encountered) that the Council and its head are hierarchically subordinated to the President of the Republic.

[16] The weeklies, *Saptamina* edited by Eugen Barbu and *Flacara* edited by Adrian Paunescu, have not as yet had changes in their editorial leadership. These are the most popular publications in Bucharest. The fact that both tend towards the sensational accounts for their popularity, as does their nationalist tone. It is not the attention to national themes but the ethnic emphasis wih its integral nationalist overtones that is significant. Although these emphases are not official they are obviously tolerated by the regime as something of a diversion. Certainly the character of these publications hardly corresponds to the Party's demand in November 1971 for a more ethical and socialist posture. In addition, for a leadership that stresses foreseeing the consequences of actions, the Party appears thus far short-sighted in gauging the consequences of stimulating traditional ethnic nationalism even if indirectly and for instrumental reasons. Recently, *Flacara* and its editor were critically reviewed by the Central Committee and *Flacara* is now under the direct tutelage of the Socialist Unity Front. It remains to be seen whether this will affect the journal's tone.

[17] For an anlysis of the interaction between traditional Rumanian culture and Leninist-Stalinist organization see the author's, " An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems . . . ", *The American Political Science Review* (Sept. 1974).

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emphasis on unity. This emphasis is expressed in the new strategy of combining Party and state functions (*impletire*), stressing the role of the Socialist Unity Front, displaying the Orthodox Church's membership in the Front, and stressing the role of the peasant—Ceauşescu's 28 February speech on agriculture, the recent attention given to Dr Petru Groza [18] and the directive to the socialist front to become more active in the villages are all moves in this particular direction. Beginning with the Conference in 1972 there has also been a growing attention to the position of women in the regime, largely as a response to the increasingly strategic place occupied by women throughout the economy.[19] Similarly, Ceauşescu has made a point of the regime's particular concern with upgrading the wage levels and symbolic recognition of young workers, another increasingly strategic and volatile element in the work force, whose performance is directly linked to the success of the regime's developmental efforts.[20] Finally, as part of the growing emphasis on unity within the country, popular unity around the Party, and Party unity around Ceauşescu, there have been recent attempts to reassure the minorities that their rights and position in Rumanian society are to be protected and developed.[21] What some Western observers regard as being an anomaly at the elite level, namely, that after being made President of the Grand National Assembly, Miron Constantinescu continues (as of early July 1974) to hold the position of secretary of the Central Committee, may be related to his apparently having responsibility in the Secretariat for minority relations. At a time when national unity is being stressed, his rapport with minority intellectuals is an important consideration.

All these moves signify something more than Ceauşescu's desire for personal power. It may be an important element, but it is by no means the only or even most important element. The Party is currently girding its loins and the increasingly central and hierarchical role played by Ceauşescu (both in political and symbolic terms) is a significant expression of this development.[22]

[18] Petru Groza was the leader of a peasant political organization, the Ploughman's Front, during the inter-war period. His nationalist commitments, rapport with the Hungarian minority and ties with the peasantry explain his current symbolic value.

[19] Recently, there has been a growing number of articles emphasizing the vital role of women in industry. See for example that by the Minister of Labour, Petre Lupu in *Scinteia*, 29 Jan. 1974.

[20] See Nicolae Ceauşescu, *Scinteia*, 24 May 1974. Similarly, there have been statements emphasizing the passing of leadership responsibilities to the younger generation. See for example Emil Bodnaras' comments in *Scinteia*, 10 Feb. 1974. Finally, there are a number of articles stressing the need to pay more attention to the aspirations, training, and complaints of young factory workers.

[21] In connexion with this see the recent article by the President of the German Working Men's Council, Eduard Eisenburger, " Unitatea de tip nou intre toti cetatenii patriei, indiferent de nationalitate . . . ," in *Era Socialista, 8 (aprilie 1974)*, pp. 20–24.

[22] Many elements enter into the growth of such a cult. To begin with, in most contemporary societies an individual's claims to personal power must be rationalized in terms of his skills and abilities rather than a set of ascriptive characteristics. The problems the potential leader identifies must strike a critical number of sub-leaders as

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What has been the social response to these developments? First, there is a great amount of discussion, more than at any time since 1964–65, or 1968. Its existence testifies to the positive changes since Gheorghiu-Dej's time; a new generation is obviously more ready to engage in discussion. It is, however, marked by apprehension about what is happening or may happen. This apprehension exists within the Party, both among older members who are no longer part of the "leadership team" and among some young communists who look critically at the renewed emphasis on hierarchy and favour more openness, debate, and the directions of 1967–68. Among the younger members one might differentiate between those in the 25–30 age bracket and those in the 30–40 range. In the absence of systematic data one must be cautious here, as elsewhere, in generalizing; however, it does appear that many in the 30–40 age group are in a more ambivalent situation than those somewhat younger. The older group is in the success-mobility dilemma of seeing in the "second revolution" opportunities for influence and advancement; they might bring more skills and a more sophisticated training to bear on pressing problems, while they are also aware of the dangers associated with the secretary-general's accumulation of too much power. Those in the 25–30 age group experience less conflict and are more dissatisfied with current developments, in part, because they are not yet in the hierarchy and have had much less exposure to a Stalinist form of political education.

One can also point out more specific reactions to the regime's increasing emphasis on hierarchical unification and organizational compression. At a recent debate in Timisoara a number of critical remarks were made by Ion Iliescu (former head of the UTC) and by several propagandists from the city Party organization. Similarly, comments by a number of philosophers should be considered. Articles by Wald, Masek, and Ionita, as well as by the writer Al. Ivasiuc, though phrased quite differently, all argue for a very different approach to

real and important, while he must strike them as someone who can deal with these problems in a way that is consistent with their cultural-ideological dispositions.

While one must be careful not to confuse every concentration of power with a personality cult, the two do have what Weber might term an "elective affinity. . . ." The concentration of power is a typical political response to major domestic cleavages and/or international threats. Roosevelt's rule during the Depression and war years, de Gaulle's in France and the power of Mexican presidents are by no means identical phenomena. Rather each was (or is) produced through the interaction of specific social cleavages and political cultures. In fact one could argue that social cleavage underlies the tendency towards the concentration of power while political culture determines whether or not this concentration will result in a cult of personality as well as a cult of office (i.e. THE Presidency).

In the Rumanian case there is plenty of evidence of social dislocation resulting from a long period of intense developmental efforts. Add to this a decade of Soviet hostility and the fate of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Finally, one must consider the strong preference among higher Party cadres for personal rule, a preference shaped by the absence in their own country's experience of legal-institutional rule, the presence of strong historical reference figures who fought for Rumanian autonomy, and reinforced by the fact that these cadres, including Ceauşescu, were largely shaped by a Stalinist interpretation of Leninism.

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unity and development than that currently espoused by Ceauşescu.[23] It is of some interest that all of these individuals are committed Marxists and that each has arrived at a position stressing the need for an inductive rather than deductive or hierarchical approach to unity, one that emphasizes articulation and debate more than discipline, one that sees culture as related to but distinct from ideology.

For broader segments of society, there is, in general, irritation with the flux brought about by the rapid and seemingly unending changes in organization. This irritation seems particularly great among engineers. Among workers there are some indications that resentment exists over the new production demands and in certain instances because of the reduced opportunities to become *fruntasi* (leading workers with increased pay). Again, there are some grounds for believing that secretaries in certain factory Party organizations are facing a problem of morale. Given the regime's increased emphasis on more and better production, when the factory director belongs to both the factory Committee of Working Men (COM) *and* to the superior Party organization, it often places the Party secretary in a situation of dual subordination to the director. The Party secretary is not usually an *apparatchik* (i.e. salaried political activist) but someone with an occupational position in the factory inferior to that of the director. This, combined with the director's membership in the Party organization above the factory, places the Party secretary in a dependent position. Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain just how representative this situation is, but when it occurs, the Party activists become quite disgruntled, as their standing with the workers, self-image and power are all jeopardized.

The attitude of the peasants is something that I cannot comment on. The regime hopes that its new organizational-incentive system of *acordul global* which provides for the re-emergence of the family as the basic work and income-receiving unit will stabilize this area.[24] As for the youth, they can hardly be considered an enthusiastic support element for the current developmental strategy. In fact, in a number of respects they have to be considered the most volatile social element, not simply or primarily in their capacity as students, but also as workers and Party members.

GIVEN the generally negative and critical reaction to the combined efforts towards hierarchical unification (i.e. through the fusion of party and state hierarchies) and organizational compression (i.e. through extension of the Socialist Unity Front's control over certain

[23] See *Era Socialista, 2 (ianuarie 1974)*, pp. 59–60; *Contemporanul,* 24 May 1974, pp. 4, 6; *Era Socialista, 8 (aprilie 1974)*, pp. 44–49; *Era Socialista, 1 (ianuare 1974)*, pp. 11–16.

[24] For a discussion of the *acordul global* system see Mihai Cernea, *Sociologia Cooperativei Agricole de Productie* (Bucuresti, 1974), pp. 199–213.

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social and cultural organizations) one naturally asks: why are the Party and regime girding their loins?

The Party has committed itself to a more intense form of economic mobilization. The leadership has concluded that in the light of the growing gap between developed and underdeveloped areas, what is accomplished in the next 20 years will decide whether or not Rumania will become a developed country. The strategy of hierarchical unification and organizational compression reflects the need to focus efforts towards this single overriding goal of development, the need to compensate for a mass culture partially working against increased work efficiency and productivity,[25] *and* the need to prevent the growing heterogeneity of Rumanian society (a product of intense economic development) from expressing itself as a plurality of goals which might divert resources from intense economic development.

In addition, the Rumanian leadership recognizes the value of emphasizing and demonstrating the greatest possible degree of unity in the light of increased Soviet attempts at standardization in Eastern Europe and in anticipation of negative Soviet reactions to the Party's developmental programme. The most significant feature of this developmental programme is the central role assigned to theory, more particularly to the need for more adequate theoretical and conceptual formulations *and* the Party's right to independently formulate its own theoretical and conceptual statements. In 1964–65 the Party declared its right to decide domestic and foreign policy, independently of Soviet preferences.[26] It is now asserting its right to innovate in the field of ideology and theory.[27] Evidence for this can be found in a group of articles whose significance has gone virtually unnoticed in the West. The two most important articles appeared in recent issues of the theoretical journal, *Era Socialista*, one by the regime's leading ideologist Cornel Burtica, the other by Ion Mitran, the journal's assistant chief editor. In addition, a very important piece by Miron Constantinescu in the social science journal *Viitorul Social* on Togliatti, an article by the secretary in charge of cadres Gh. Pana, and

[25] What the regime apparently does not appreciate is that its continued reliance on a strategy that emphasizes external, hierarchical, and organizational control reinforces this culture as much as it undermines it. See f.n. 16.

[26] In practice, of course, the Rumanian Party's independence is limited, by both the proximity and preferences of the Soviet Union. The constraints imposed by the Soviet Union are *the* central feature of international politics for Rumanian policy-makers around which everything else revolves.

[27] As the Rumanian experience demonstrates, it is necessary conceptually to differentiate between policy and ideological autonomy. Brzezinski, for example, differentiates between domestic and foreign policy initiation but confuses the latter with ideological initiatives. The Rumanian case, particularly between 1964 and 1970, provides an empirical instance of a regime engaging in foreign policy initiatives without having a well-defined ideological framework which integrated these policies with domestic policies. In 1964–65 Rumania expanded its policy autonomy to include foreign policy; it is now about to claim the right to ideological-theoretical autonomy. For Brzezinski's argument see, *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1967), p. 506.

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one by Aneta Busuioc in the Central Committee's socio-political journal, *Anale de istorie,* should be seen in this context.[28]

The most striking feature of these articles is the argument that each Communist Party must now " think with its own head " (*a gindi cu capul propriu*). Party sovereignty means not only the right to adjust policy domestically or internationally; rather, sovereignty and success in " building socialism and communism " is now tied directly to theoretical and ideological innovation. The argument now being made is that policy autonomy in the absence of a conceptual and theoretical framework derived from and relevant to specific national settings is an insufficient guarantee of both sovereignty and successful domestic development. With these arguments and claims, the Rumanian regime has reached a critical point. Whether or not it acts on its declared intention to formulate an authoritative theoretical and programmatic statement will be evident by the time of the eleventh Party congress scheduled for this winter. The intervening time period will, of course, be one of conflict and bargaining with the Soviet Union, gauging international developments, and " perfecting " the organizational " locking " process that has been evident domestically. Consequently, at this time it is not possible to detail the innovations the Rumanians may propose. However, it is possible to suggest the types of innovations that may be proposed and acted on.

First, there is likely to be a more precise statement of the norms governing relations among communist nations, not just a repetition of general principles such as non-interference. Such a set of norms will be intended to complement those set forth by the Rumanians for inter-Party relations.[29]

Second, one should expect a revision of the ideological boundaries of the socialist camp to include such " progressive socialist " regimes as the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, and perhaps Peru and Algeria. This tendency on the Rumanians' part to widen the boundaries (and thereby influence the character) of the Soviet bloc is not something new.[30] However, at the July 1972 Conference Ceauşescu gave it added significance when he noted that there

[28] See Cornel Burtica, " Activitatea ideologica—atribut esential al exercitarii rolului conducator al partidului in societate ", *Era Socialista, 5 (martie 1974)*, pp. 7–16; Ion Mitran, " Realitatea sociala si dezvoltare contemporana a marxism-leninismului ", *Era Socialista, 9 (mai 1974)*, pp. 3–9; Miron Constantinescu, " Palmiro Togliatti, eminent militant al miscarii comuniste si muncitoresti internationale," *Viitorul Social,* 1 (1974), pp. 5–16; Gh. Pana, " Activitatea organizatorica si exercitarea rolului conducator al partidului nostru in etapa actuala," *Era Socialista, 6 (martie 1974)*, pp. 3–10; Aneta Busuioc, " Trasaturi ale activitatii ideologice a Partidului Communist Roman in etapa actuala," *Anale de istorie*, 3 (1974), pp. 78–91.

[29] Paul Niculescu-Mizil outlined the appropriate norms for inter-party relations in an article for *Scinteia* on 29 Feb. 1968. One can find a discussion of them in Robert Farlow, " Rumanian Foreign Policy: A Case of Partial Alignment," in *Problems of Communism* (Nov.–Dec. 1971), pp. 57–58.

[30] I first analyzed this tendency on the Rumanians' part in an article for *World Politics* (Oct. 1970), which was included in the book *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 233–73.

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"still existed many exploiting classes in Rumania when it entered on the socialist road . . . and despite this, Rumania was included among the countries that were building socialism." [31] He argued that Rumania must broaden its relations with developing countries and by implication blurred even more the boundaries between Marxist-Leninist and developing countries. In particular there seem to be very warm relations between the Congolese Labour Party and the Rumanian Party. In fact it was in connexion with his visit to the Congo in March 1972 [32] that Ceauşescu signalled what was to be a new role for Rumania. Rumania is now presented as an ex-colonial country with a developmental strategy that may be studied with great benefit by contemporary developing countries. This position has most recently been outlined by one L. Stroja in the socio-political review *Contemporanul.* Stroja notes that economic underdevelopment cannot be eliminated as quickly as political imperialism. According to Stroja there are many stages in the process of development and "Rumania's experience—that of a socialist country in the process of development—creates the possibility for other (developing) states to share the lessons of unquestionable practical *and theoretical* value (gained by Rumania in the course of its own development)." [33] In effect, Rumania is offering itself as a model and leader much as Yugoslavia did in the mid-fifties. With typical finesse, it is doing so by arguing the value that will accrue to the socialist camp by having a Marxist-Leninist regime play a leading role in organizing and shaping the evolving community of developing countries ranging from Argentina to Zaire. The weakness of the Rumanian "reform with radical intentions" strategy is the weakness of any reformist strategy directed at a powerful group or institution (in this case the Soviet elite) whose definition of leadership and membership (in this case of and in the socialist camp) is almost completely antithetical to that offered by the reformers.

Third, the Party itself is likely to be subjected to major organizational changes. There may well be a greater role assigned to one of the new Party-state organizations, the Workers' Central Control Council. In conjunction with this there is likely to be an upgrading of the "public activists" vis-à-vis the *apparatchiki.* One can find suggestions of this at the 1972 conference and in more recent statements during the winter of 1973.[34] The possible diversification of influential membership categories within the Party would of course be a major development. However, diversification *per se,* i.e. breaking

[31] Ceauşescu, *Conferinta Nationala* . . . , p. 104.

[32] Nicolae Ceauşescu, *Rumania on the Way of Building up the Multilaterally Developed Society,* v. 7 (Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House, 1973), pp. 94–105. Ceauşescu addressed a special plenary meeting of the Congolese Labour Party's Central Committee. President N'Gouabi returned the visit in July 1973. And on 8 June 1974 a delegation of the Congolese party arrived for talks with Ceauşescu.

[33] L. Stroja, "Un imperative contemporan: lichidarea subdezvoltarii," *Contemporanul,* 31 May 1974, p. 12.

[34] Ceauşescu, *Conferinta Nationala* . . . , p. 61; and *Scinteia,* 17 Nov. 1973.

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the monopoly held to date by the *apparatchiki* in the Party (equivalent to the Roman Catholic Church granting some effective power to deacons and breaking the monopoly held by priests) does not automatically mean the appearance of a public political domain.

Rather, if diversification proceeds in conditions of regime-stability, it will do so in a setting marked by the appearance of a plebiscitarian-type leader, concentrating widespread powers in his hands, emphasizing (in a neo-Prussian fashion) a service ethic and following a strategy of organizational compression and hierarchical unification, designed to forestall the formation of critical socio-political groups. In such a setting, diversification is more likely to resemble a process of levelling carried out under official-hierarchical auspices than an extension of party citizenship connected with the evolution of something resembling a public domain.[35]

Fourth, one should be prepared for a new Party organization in the rural areas and a new organizational format and relationship between the state and cooperative farms (suggested in Ceauşescu's 28 February speech).

There are likely to be new proposals directed at the international security position of the Balkans, a more developmental and central role for the Army,[36] and a more prominent position for the Orthodox Church; and undoubtedly statements about the importance of the United Nations, similar to those made at the recent Yugoslav Congress.

Finally, there will be new proposals concerning Rumania's relations with Comecon; already several statements affecting these relations have been made.[37] From these one can see how the Party has arrived at a synthesis of its national and international positions, starting with the central notion of Rumania as a developing country. All the statements that have appeared to date refer to the Complex Programme drawn up by the members of Comecon in 1971 in Bucharest. A composite of the arguments presented in these articles would include: a defence of the nation as the basic economic complex in opposition to regional units; a defence of interstate v. either suprastate or trans-

[35] I have analyzed this differentiation of *aktiv obstesc* and *aktiv politic*, of what in the Soviet Union Khrushchev termed *obshchestvenniki* in contrast to the *apparatchiki* in a paper, " State, National, and Civic Development in Eastern Europe " (June 1973), and will develop it in a work now in progress, *Political Organization and National Development: The Absence of a Public Domain in Communist Countries.*

[36] On 1 June 1974 Ceauşescu in the course of a highly critical talk to the party *aktif* in the province of Dolj asked why the provincial leadership had not enlisted the Army's aid in resolving its economic problems. Earlier in the year he had pointed to the success in resolving certain problems in the Constanta area following the appointment of an Army general to an important administrative post.

[37] See Radu Constantinescu, " Perfectionarea formelor si metodelor colaborarii economice si tehnico-stiintifice dintre, tarile membre ale C.A.E.R.," *Era Socialista, 8 (aprilie 1974)*, pp. 24–31; Constantin Moisuc, " Colaborarea si integrarea economica socialista," *Era Socialista, 9 (mai 1974)*, pp. 25–30; Roman Moldovan, " Egalizarea nivelurilor de dezvoltare economica-legitate a colaborarii tarilor socialiste," *Scinteia,* 19 May 1974; and Costin Murgescu, " Principiile relatiilor internationale socialiste—baza perfectionarii cooperarii in cadrul C.A.E.R.," *Scinteia,* 4 June 1974.

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national integration; a desire for more interstate integration within Comecon and an expansion of economic interactions with the "third" and capitalist worlds. Very strong arguments are made against theories and proponents of "international economic complexes," possibly led from "one centre." As the author of one recent article noted, "the concept of economic integration is bounded by the realities of the contemporary world; any skipping of stages would only serve to empty the concept of its positive content."[38] He went on to note that there is a very long historical epoch between the unitary capitalist system of 1917 and that of the future unitary communist system.

All these arguments and concerns have been part of the Rumanian position for ten years; however, a new element has been added. Operating with the notion of Rumania as a developing country, the Party now argues that the practical definition of "socialist internationalism" and "comradely aid" is the extent to which the developed socialist countries contribute to the rapid development of the less developed socialist countries.[39] The Rumanians now argue that the shift from an agrarian to an industrial-agrarian economy can only be considered a first step on the road to equalizing levels of development among the members of Comecon.[40] They point out the commitment within the Complex Programme to achieve this end and suggest the creation of "special conditions in the form of temporary preferences, forms and methods of assistance in favour of less developed socialist countries."[41] It is pointed out that economic integration is really only feasible if all the members of Comecon have sophisticated economies. According to the Rumanians, given the growing gap between developed and underdeveloped countries and the neo-colonialist practices of the developed capitalist countries, any rapid resolution of the developmental gap within the socialist world offers the greatest possible proof of the new character of interstate relations among socialist regimes; it would also demonstrate the ability of socialism to solve the most pressing of international problems—underdevelopment (thereby increasing even more the attractiveness of Marxism-Leninism). Here again one encounters a certain type of reformist skill at manipulating the intentions and meanings of Soviet-sponsored commitments, in this case concerning Comecon.[42] The Rumanian arguments are intended to produce a major shift in the activities of this organization, but are phrased in terms that offer little opening for Soviet charges of "heresy." By no means would I conclude that

[38] Constantin Moiscu, *Era Socialista, 9 (mai 1974)*, p. 29.
[39] See in particular Roman Moldovan's article, *Scinteia,* 19 May 1974.
[40] Radu Constantinescu, *Era Socialista, 8 (aprilie 1974)*, p. 25.
[41] Moisuc, p. 28 and see Moldovan.
[42] As the term "manipulation" almost always carries perjorative connotations, I should point out that in this context it refers to the skill the Rumanians have demonstrated in the art of politics. Recognizing the constraints they face and responding rather consistently to their basic ideological and policy commitments, the Rumanians have thus far largely avoided both romanticism and opportunism in their political behaviour.

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the Soviets must or will go along with this reformulation (any more than they must go along with the Rumanian initiatives regarding the boundaries of the World Socialist System). However, the Rumanians have raised a major issue and presented it both subtly and squarely to the Soviets. The developed members of the bloc are being challenged to demonstrate the superiority of interstate socialist relations. A refusal by the Soviets (East Germans and Czechs) will be taken as proof of the Chinese claim that all super-powers are imperialist, interested in maintaining and not removing inequalities in developmental levels. If, on the other hand, the Soviets respond favourably, then the Rumanian right to innovate ideologically is given at least *de facto* recognition and Rumania both receives aid and consolidates her dual socialist-developing country status. If the Soviets do not respond favourably, the Party will be faced with two choices: reverse itself or consider an even more radical formulation of its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its relations with Comecon, the third world and Asian communist countries. As long as Ceaușescu remains leader of the Party, the latter course, even in the light of the armed threat of the Soviet Union, appears likely. One expects, of course, that the Rumanians will try to prevent such a hard-choice situation from occurring. However, *the comprehensiveness and increasing specificity of the Rumanian position tends to diminish the zone of ambiguity in which they can operate. What they gain in ideological-policy coherence they lose in political manoeuvrability.*

THE question of what may happen if Ceaușescu pursues his current course can only be dealt with in broad terms. Domestically the regime is in a race; the race is between achieving the economic development suggested by the 1972 Conference goal of modernizing Rumania by 1990 and facing the type of social unrest that occurred in the Valea Jiului mining area in September 1972. The situation there was such that Ceaușescu had to meet the miners, remove a large number of officials, temporarily reduce the production plans (some two months after emphasizing at the National Party Conference that the Plan was to be fulfilled in four and half rather than five years), and initiate a crash programme to upgrade the delivery of all sorts of goods to the area.[43]

Since 1969 the emphasis placed by the Party on a "science of leadership" has been taken very seriously. Its rationale is to enhance the Party's capacity to see and respond to potentially disruptive situations, before they duplicate events such as occurred in Poland in December 1970.[44] The current emphasis on rotating leaders from

[43] See Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Rumania On The Way . . .*, v. 7, pp. 599–610.

[44] Throughout 1969–70 a great deal of emphasis was placed by the Party on leadership studies. This movement was well along before the Polish events of December 1970. The stress continues but has been modified. In many ways the "science of leadership" phase was a transitional one between the period that began with the ninth

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central to provincial areas is one by-product of this concern with leadership, and is designed in part to ensure accurate information about conditions in the provinces.[45] More generally, the regime is counting on its ability to deliver an increasing and visible amount of what might be termed social welfare goods, i.e. housing, food, cultural amenities, higher wages, and consumer goods, to prevent whatever psychological irritation may accumulate from being set off by economic hardship. The regime is also to some extent counting on the traditional "passivity" of the Rumanian population, on a cultural intelligentsia that at least until now could be absorbed in questions of who will get to manage what journal or be given permission for extended stays in the West (to date with permission to return when they wish). Provision is also made for what might properly be termed "repressive tolerance" outlets, so that dissatisfied Party members or intellectuals can write in professional journals about the need for sharper criticism, open debates, or the need to investigate more thoroughly social contradictions. Such outlets are also provided for broader social categories and range from the popular American television series, "Columbo," to the sharp but selective criticisms levelled at certain aspects of the regime by Adrian Paunescu, the editor of the highly popular weekly, *Flacara*. Together these policies are designed to prevent the unnoticed accumulation of social tensions, to defuse them, and to manipulate as well as selectively resolve them. Along with his continued commitment to socialist legality and national independence, Ceauşescu's policies are designed to allow a Leninist regime with an authoritarian, social welfare, and plebescitarian cast to carry out a "second revolution" *without* the use of terror. Whether or not the Party will be successful domestically depends largely on what stance the Soviet Union adopts in response to the organizational, policy and ideological innovations being considered by the Rumanian Party.

The Soviets can be expected to react very sharply against any tendency by the Rumanians to set themselves up as independent ideological spokesmen. The Soviets are likely to argue that by assuming and emphasizing the office of President (over that of secretary-general of the Party), elevating members of his (and his wife's) family and adopting a strategy that fuses Party and state offices,[46] Ceauşescu, far from preserving or enhancing the institutional integrity of the Party,

congress in 1965 and ended with the tenth congress in 1969, and that which began in July 1972 at the national Party conference.

[45] In Rumanian, rotation may also be defined as something resembling a tumble down a hill and this aspect of the current policy certainly exists for individuals such as Virgil Trofin, formerly in charge of cadres and currently a provincial party leader.

[46] This process of organizational compression and fusion is termed *impletire*. Symbolically it is expressed by the recent addition of the national to the party flag over the Central Committee building and by moving the Council of Ministers into the same building. *Impletire* is viewed by the Rumanians as an original organizational and ideological contribution. It is certainly a political issue both within the Party and between the Rumanians and several of their Warsaw Pact allies, and will undoubtedly be the focus of debate at least up to the Party congress this winter.

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is actually undermining it. They will undoubtedly make the parallel charge that Ceauşescu's notion of Rumania as a developing country and his attempts to reduce the distinctions between the socialist camp and the third world threaten the integrity of Rumania as a socialist country. Certainly, in reading Kardelj's speech on non-alignment at the tenth Yugoslav congress one is struck by how close the Rumanian position is to the Yugoslav. One could say that in effect Rumania has adopted the Yugoslav non-alignment position, but as Kardelj noted in his talk, "not all the non-aligned countries participate with equal intensity . . . in the movement. . . . It depends on their international position, the types of international pressure to which they are exposed . . . and so on." [47]

One particular aspect of the Soviet criticisms must be seriously considered; namely, they may find some support within the Rumanian Party itself. It appears that to date Ceauşescu has been successful in persuading influential and prestigious Party members that Rumania has the potential to achieve the ambitious economic goals set forth in 1972, that this potential must be realized rapidly, and that a strategy of hierarchical unification and organizational compression is necessary to achieve this. However, elite consensus at this level cannot be assumed to extend automatically to the political issues such a strategy generates. Dominating all other issues is the question of whether or not hierarchical unification of the regime can be accomplished, while allowing for a continuous and constructive tension between what some leaders feel is necessary to maintain the Party's corporate identity and what Ceauşescu finds necessary to act rapidly and flexibly on his domestic and international policies. If we draw an analogy between the Soviet Union in 1928 and the Rumanian developmental programme, then 1934 is the analogous date for the issue of political organization.

In connexion with this issue, the recent inclusion of the entire Party Secretariat into the new Permanent Bureau may be seen as both an addition to Ceauşescu's power and as an indication that he is sensitive to the concern in the Party over institutional power and identity. It may not be coincidental that this unprecedented inclusion occurred just when Ceauşescu enhanced his role by creating the new office of President of the Republic. The appointment of an individual with impeccable *apparatchik* credentials, Ilie Verdets, as a member of the Secretariat and head of the recently created Workers' Central Control Council—an organization with its own political apparatus—may be another instance of Ceauşescu attempting to simultaneously increase his own power and avoid too direct a challenge to certain sectors of the Party (not to mention "interested observers" outside the country).

However, there are limits to simultaneously upgrading the corporate

[47] Printed in *The Guardian*, 7 June 1974.

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power of the Party and the power of its secretary-general. These limits soon become evident in the context of a strategy that calls for greater discipline, obedience and unity. In several respects, Ceausescu's position and behaviour approximate Khrushchev's in the early sixties. Like Khrushchev, he is formally committed to maintaining the Party's political integrity, opposed to terror as a policy or instrument and to the security police as a leadership organization. Yet, as in Khrushchev's case, he appears increasingly convinced that only by developing his personal role to the point where the Party cannot check, divert, or delay his policies can he ensure the successful development of his country.[48] In practice, Khrushchev began to define hierarchical power as personal power and attempted to create a neo-patrimonial apparatus staffed in part by relatives like his son-in-law, Adzhubei. Ceauşescu's "Adzhubei" is his wife Elena. First made a full member of the Central Committee at the National Conference in July 1972, a year later she was made a full member of the Party's Executive Committee at the June 1973 plenum. Her prominence as a political figure, scientist, and social personality[49] has been continually expanded in the course of the last two years. One can detect efforts to assign her a special place politically and counter-efforts to ensure that her role is placed on a par with that of other Executive Committee members.[50] The conflict over her position is the most striking illustration of the struggle currently taking place between exponents and opponents of a more hierarchical and personalized leadership. The success or failure that Ceauşescu experiences in attempting to upgrade his wife's role may be taken as a very useful index for the outcome of the struggle. Thus far, Ceauşescu is succeeding where Khrushchev failed. However, with respect to both domestic political organization and international affairs, the question of what may happen if Ceauşescu pursues the course indicated at the 1972 Conference will be answered as much at the international level as at the national level.

ONE can expect and already find some suggestions of a "political poker game" between the Rumanians and the Soviets over what types of innovations are permissible and/or possible. Between March and July 1974, one could observe a series of encounters between the

[48] For an analysis of Khrushchev along these lines see Richard Lowenthal, "The Revolution Withers Away," *Problems of Communism* (Jan.–Feb. 1965), pp. 10–17.

[49] There are numerous occasions on which Elena Ceauşescu has been accorded a very special status. It always occurs when she accompanies her husband on foreign trips and also occurs when she is photographed with Ceauşescu (often together with Bodnaras); the emphasis is clearly placed on Elena's and Bodnaras' special relationship to Ceauşescu (see *Scinteia*, 12 Apr. 1974 and 15 June 1974). Recently her stature as a scientist (chemist) has been proclaimed in the pages of *Scinteia*, and during the recent Congress of the Socialist Unity Front she was referred to as a model social personality for Rumanian women (*Scinteia*, 26 May 1974).

[50] Possibly as a "balancing move" at the recent March plenum, Ceauşescu's assumption of the Presidency was accompanied by a more consistent policy of placing Elena in alphabetical order in official listings.

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two over the Warsaw Pact, Comecon and the question of an international meeting of communist parties.

In March two major exponents of the NEM policy in Hungary were demoted in a move completely consistent with the recent Soviet efforts at standardization in the bloc.[51] In the same month the Bulgarian leader, Zhivkov, re-emphasized his intention to increase the interdependence between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.[52] The Rumanian response came at the 25–26 March plenum when Ceauşescu assumed the office of President (of the Republic) and carried out a number of far-reaching Party and governmental changes, all in line with the directions laid out in 1972.

In April the former Rumanian ambassador to Moscow, T. Marinescu, visited Bulgaria; a high level meeting of the Warsaw Pact (attended by Ceauşescu) took place in Warsaw; and a number of important articles dealing with Comecon began to appear in the Rumanian press. Reportedly, at the Warsaw Pact meeting Ceauşescu was informed by Brezhnev that events in Rumania were causing concern.

In May talks with the North Koreans (in Bucharest) were followed immediately by Zhivkov's invitation to Ceauşescu for talks in Sofia. Following these talks, in his role as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, Ceauşescu paid a " working visit " to Constanta in the Dobrogea region (bordering on Bulgaria). He was accompanied by the head of the Army, Ion Ionita, the head of the Security Organs, Emil Bobu, and by Emil Bodnaras—a former head of the Rumanian military and the man most often used in contacts with the North Koreans and Chinese. During his visit a series of military exercises were held, and the emphasis was on the armed forces' readiness to defend the country and respond to Ceauşescu's orders.

In June more talks with the North Koreans took place. A report appeared in the Western press that the Soviets had demanded an extra-territorial passage through the Dobrogea region to Bulgaria. There is no concrete evidence that such a demand was made; however, it is interesting that in the communiqué signed by Ceauşescu and Sadat at the end of the Egyptian leader's visit to Bucharest in late June, a statement was made about the " inadmissibility of seizing territory by force *or any other means.*" [53] A meeting of Comecon was also held about this time in Sofia with no major announcements made at its conclusion.

In July the " game " continued between the Soviets and Rumanians.

[51] The Hungarian New Economic Mechanism was instituted in 1968 and has been distinguished by the significant extent to which command elements have been replaced by market elements.

[52] There have been reports in the West that Zhivkov spoke of political integration with the Soviet Union. This interpretation of his comments does not appear warranted. See for example *The Economist*, 6 July 1974.

[53] See *Romania Libera*, 1 July 1974.

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Tito paid a visit to Bucharest during which he stressed the growing interdependence of Rumania and Yugoslavia with particular mention of their border area. He also noted that Balkan problems could be effectively handled if outside powers did not interfere.[54] It has also been reported that he brought news of a proposal from the Soviets for a meeting of European communist parties with a corollary—a postponement of the Soviet request for a full international meeting.[55] Finally, during this period the North Korean ambassador to Rumania, Li Min Su, a former guerrilla with experience in partisan resistance and war and a high ranking comrade of Kim Il-sung's, ended his tour of duty in Bucharest. His replacement has not as yet been announced, nor is it clear why he has been replaced. At the same time Mihai Dalea, Rumanian ambassador to Moscow under Gheorghiu-Dej, was named head of the Soviet-Rumanian Association, an organization that in recent years has not received much attention.[56] Dalea is currently head of the trade unions and in that capacity a member of the Party's Permanent Bureau. The significance of his appointment to the Soviet-Rumanian organization will remain unclear until his trade union position is either confirmed or changed. Confirmation would indicate at least a positive symbolic gesture by the Ceauşescu leadership to the Soviets as Dalea is as orthodox and pro-Soviet a figure as one is likely to find in the Rumanian Party.

Overall, this sequence of events strongly indicates an ongoing and significant encounter between the Soviet and Rumanian leaderships, an encounter encompassing several arenas and including a number of participants (i.e. the Bulgarians, North Koreans, and Yugoslavs). One can envisage several broad results of this encounter: (1) Soviet attempts to heighten social tensions in Rumania and apprehension in the Party over Ceauşescu's growing power, followed by an invasion. (2) In the absence of any clear threat of invasion and in the presence of isolated social disturbances, the Rumanian regime would become more dependdent on the army and coercion (terror is less likely). (3) The growing threat of internal disturbances and of possible Soviet invasion would lead to a return to a pre-1972 political line domestically and the possible replacement of Ceauşescu by someone committed to economic growth and independence but employing a different style.

The exact outcome will depend on the flexibility shown by the Soviet Union, whose responses can range from "benign neglect" of Rumania to invasion, and on how strong the Rumanian commitment is to the set of organizational-ideological innovations suggested at the July 1972 Conference.[57] More specifically, the way in which the

[54] *Scinteia*, 8 July 1974.
[55] *The Guardian*, 11 July 1974.
[56] In connexion with Li's departure and Dalea's appointment see *Scinteia*, 6 July and 5 July respectively.
[57] One must not exclude the possibility of the outcome of the current conflict closely approximating Ceauşescu's preferences.

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Rumanian elite proceeds will reflect its evaluation of elite unity in the Soviet party, Sino-Soviet developments, Soviet actions in the rest of Eastern Europe and the Party's appraisal of domestic support for Ceauşescu and his policies. Thus far, Soviet commitment to increased control in Eastern Europe, their intransigence vis-à-vis China and Rumanian commitment to the political line laid down in July 1972 seem firm; given this situation I suggest the emergence of a major crisis in Soviet-Rumanian relations.

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The Gulag Archipelago, Volume 2: Life and Death in the Camps *

Michael Heller

AT the end of May 1974, six months after the publication of the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*, Volume 2, comprising Parts 3 and 4, appeared. Volume 1 had told of the horrors of arrest, the torments of interrogation and the suffering in prison cells and in transit to the Archipelago, and Solzhenitsyn had ended it with the following words: "And even the last human hope that there is something better ahead, that it will be better in camp, is a false hope. In camp it will be . . . worse."

Volume 2 is a book about the camps. Particular camps: camp 121 in Moscow, where Solzhenitsyn himself toiled as a prisoner, Solovki, the most notorious of the camps of the 1920s, the White Sea Canal, offspring of the first five-year plan, the Orotukan death camp and many, many others. But at the same time it is a book about all the camps—about the intolerably hard labour, the terrible starvation, the tyranny of the camp authorities and of death. The writer translates the official appellation " corrective labour camps " into the language of truth, and calls the third part of his book: " extermination labour camps."

Solzhenitsyn issues a warning right from the start: " Now there is no one to recount the important facts about these camps." All those who dug most deeply and experienced to the fullest are now in the grave. "And," he acknowledges, " the magnitude of this story and this truth is beyond the power of a solitary pen." But, he adds, " one can get the taste of the sea from a single sip."

The reader of the 657 pages of which this second volume is composed and which describe the hell on earth of the Soviet camps, will find himself gulping down more than one mouthful of that fearful ocean where the Gulag Archipelago lies scattered. As with Volume 1, the writer begins with a historical introduction, this time very brief, concerned with the origins of the camps. He cites a telegram which Lenin sent in August 1918 [1] demanding that " dubious persons be shut away in a concentration camp," and a decree issued by the Council of People's Commissars in September 1918 which read, in part: " The Soviet Republic shall be protected from class enemies by their isolation in concentration camps." The writer concludes: " So that was where the term ' concentration camps ' was invented and at once

* *Cf.* the review of Volume 1 in *Survey*, No. 91/92, 1974 by the same author.

[1] Solzhenitsyn writes that the telegram was sent " a few days before the attempt on Lenin's life." In fact it was dispatched on 9 August, i.e. three weeks before the assassination attempt.

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seized upon and sanctioned—one of the most important terms of the twentieth century, and one destined to enjoy an international future on a grand scale! And that was when—in August and September 1918." The Archipelago, writes Solzhenitsyn, "was born to the accompaniment of salvos from the Aurora." With his habitual reluctance to miss an opportunity for a bitter joke, he calls the first chapter of Volume 2 "The Fingers of Dawn." (If Solzhenitsyn had had at his disposal the writings of Trotsky as well as Lenin while working on his book, he would have discovered that the first use of the term "concentration camp" dates from a time even closer to the salvos from the Aurora than he supposed. In an order issued to the army, Trotsky, the then People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, mentions concentration camps as early as June 1918).

THE first of the notorious islands of the Archipelago was the Special Camp at Solovki, SLON (*Solovetskii lager osobogo naznacheniya*), which was actually situated on an island, in the White Sea. Solovki was a fitting precursor of the entire concentration camp empire. As he set foot on the island the prisoner heard the words: "Attention! This is not the Soviet but the Solovki Republic! (*ne sovetskaya a solovetskaya*). Be warned! You have NOT been sent here for correction! A hunchback can't be straightened out!" The formula was to be repeated for decades, in thousands of camps, and with time it became embodied in the expressive phrase: "The law is the taiga. The boss is the bear." In Solovki they torture people by starvation and for punishment tie them naked to trees in summer, at the mercy of the mosquito's bite, while in winter they put them out in the snow or strap them to a log and set them rolling down a staircase 365 steps high. They lead people out to execution by firing squad in broad daylight. "Couldn't they have done it quietly at night?" asks the author. "Why do it quietly? That would be a waste of bullets. In the rich light of day a bullet has educational significance. It's as if it strikes down ten men at one go." And in a footnote to the execution scene (footnotes play an unusually important compositional role in *The Gulag Archipelago*) Solzhenitsyn throws a bridge between two epochs: remarking that men condemned to execution by firing squad in Solovki had their hands tied with wire, the author comments: "A device from Solovki, oddly repeated on the Katyn corpses. Did someone remember the tradition? Or his own personal experience?"

THE significance of Solovki as a precursor of the Archipelago does not end with the trial run of a regime of lawlessness, brutality and destruction on that island in the White Sea. Solovki was the scene of the invention which gave birth to the Archipelago. This is how Solzhenitsyn puts it:

A legend persists in the Archipelago that "it was Frenkel who

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> thought up the camps." I believe that this fabrication, which is unpatriotic and even insulting to the [Soviet] regime, has been adequately refuted by the foregoing chapters. Although we have slender means at our disposal I hope we have succeeded in showing that the camps as places of repression and hard labour originated back in 1918. Without Frenkel's help they hit upon the idea that prisoners should waste no time on moral reflections but should labour. . . . Before Frenkel ever appeared they were already talking of "correction through labour." . . . And they didn't even need modern dialectical thought to suggest to them the idea of using prisoners for heavy labour in sparsely populated areas. . . . But still Frenkel really did become the nerve-centre of the Archipelago. . . . There were camps of a sort before Frenkel, but they had not yet assumed that final and homogeneous form that savours of perfection. . . .

The name of Naftalii Frenkel was widely known in the camps of the 30s and 40s, is mentioned in the small number of recollections of Solovki which have been published in the West and is extolled in the book *The Stalin White Sea—Baltic Canal. An Account of its Construction.* Former inmates of Solovki tell of the legends which grew up about the personality and life of the "inventor of the camps." In *The White Sea—Baltic Canal*, in which he is one of the chief characters, his biography is related with extreme brevity: "Starting as a simple lumber-man in Solovki, Frenkel travelled the whole way up the ladder of camp life and obtained a post which placed tens of thousands of people under his authority." Solzhenitsyn has managed to collect some more detailed biographical data about one of the most terrifying representatives of the twentieth century. A Turkish Jew who made millions out of buying and selling woodlands in the south of Russia before the First World War and took himself and his fortune over into Turkey when revolution broke out, Naftalii Frenkel returned to the USSR during the NEP period, ran errands for the GPU and was rewarded with arrest. In 1927 Frenkel was in Solovki. But in 1929 "a plane came for Frenkel from Moscow and flew him off to a meeting with Stalin. The convicts' (and Chekists') Best Friend showed great interest in Frenkel and spent three hours talking with him." Relinquishing the historians' passivity and scepticism Solzhenitsyn assumes the novelist's right and claims: "It was precisely Frenkel, and evidently in precisely this conversation, who suggested the all-embracing system of punitive food-rationing in the camps (*lagernyi uchyot*)." The writer insists: "It was precisely Frenkel, and in precisely this conversation, who suggested that the reactionary system of equality in prisoner's diet be dropped. . . ." In view of the fact that, as Solzhenitsyn himself admits, there was no official transcript of Stalin's talk with Frenkel, one may call into question the iron certainty of the author of *The Gulag Archipelago* that it was "precisely Frenkel" who, "in precisely this conversation," patented

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the diabolical idea of paying prisoners for their slave labour with food, a literal application in the camps of the principle " he who does not work shall not eat."

The writer's stubborn desire to name the instigator and the day of the " invention " of the labour camps is, I believe, connected not only with his striving to personify evil, but also with his determination to link together two of its chief embodiments: Stalin and Frenkel. Is not Frenkel's career in some respects a repetition of Stalin's biography? It not Frenkel's character similar to Stalin's? It is Frenkel, the architect of the White Sea Canal, who is described in the following terms by a well-known Soviet writer:

> He believes that the most important thing for a person in authority is power, absolute, unshakeable and total power. If for power's sake people have to fear you, then let them fear you. If they have to dislike you, let them dislike you. But the will of his subordinates must be entirely at the mercy of the person in authority.

Solzhenitsyn cites these words in abbreviated form, and supplements them with one more sentence which seems to him to contain " the key to both Frenkel's character and his career ": " He spoke harshly with the engineers, and tried to humiliate them." Perhaps this is the psychological key to the soul of Stalin's favourite. However, the main factor was, I believe, something else which the Soviet biographer of the " head jailer " notes: " He owed all his success to the system in which he found himself." Did not Stalin also owe his success to this?

Solzhenitsyn calls Frenkel " the ideologist of a new era," who formulated the supreme law of the Archipelago: " We have to take everything away from the prisoner in the first three months, and after that we don't need him." The classification system devised by Frenkel for inmates of labour camps was simple and universally applicable: all prisoners were divided into groups, of which there were four—A, B, C and D. Everyone who was not employed in the daily running of the camp (category B), had not been declared sick (C), and was not undergoing punishment in an insolation cell (D), " was obliged to do his stint every day of his term." But this " every con must work " was only half the formula. The other half was that a prisoner would be fed only in return for his labour, and in accordance with the quota of work he fulfilled.

THIS formula was given its first large-scale trial during the construction of the White Sea—Baltic Canal, that favourite child of the First Five-Year Plan. 226 kilometres through rocks and swamps, with no machinery of any kind, just the hands of slaves. " No, it would be unjust, unjust to compare this barbarous twentieth century construction project with the pyramids of Egypt: for the pyramids were built using the modern technology of the day!! Whereas we used

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the technology of forty centuries ago!" And the writer draws the conclusion: "*That* was our machine of death. We had no gas for gas chambers."

The White Sea Canal was the first gigantic "extermination labour camp." The canal was completed, but during "the first winter of 1931–32 a hundred thousand [convicts] died—as many as the number engaged in its construction at any one time." The figure is not, of course, an official one, but is there any reason not to believe it, asks the writer. Indeed it is, if anything, an underestimate: "in similar conditions, in the wartime camps, a mortality rate of one per cent per day was commonplace, common knowledge. So on the White Sea Canal a hundred thousand could die off in little more than three months. And there was still a summer. And another winter." Two hundred and fifty thousand corpses lay on the canal bottom. Solzhenitsyn quotes from the unpublished memoirs of D. P. Vitkovsky, who was an inmate of Solovki and then worked on the White Sea Canal:

> At the end of each working day corpses would be left lying on the track, and the snow would gradually cover their faces. One would be huddled under an upturned wheelbarrow, his hands thrust into his sleeves, frozen to death as he was. Another would stiffen with cold, his head tucked between his knees. Two more would be seated back to back, leaning against each other and frozen to death. . . . Sledges came to pick them up at night. The drivers threw the corpses on to the sledges with a dull thud. And in summer, corpses which had been left too long soon became nothing but bones and ended up in the concrete mixer along with the gravel. In this manner they found their way into the concrete used for the last lock at the town of Belomorsk and there they remain, preserved in perpetuity.

As he was writing the final pages of *Gulag* Solzhenitsyn "felt the urge to travel the length of the Great White Sea Canal and have a look for myself." It turned out that there were no passenger boats along the canal, and the writer made no attempt to beg a passage on a cargo boat: his name was by that time already suspect. He went by train as far as Medvezhegorsk and then took a stroll along the canal, spending altogether about eight hours beside it.

> During that time one barge passed going from Povenets to Soroka, and a similar barge passed from Soroka to Povenets. . . . Both carried absolutely identical cargoes: identical pine logs, already old and fit only for firewood. Subtract and you get zero. And in your mind are those quarter of a million.

The canal, built at a cost of a quarter of a million lives by inhuman toil, carved out of the rock by bare hands in an unbelievably short time, turned out to be too shallow, unusable, and moreover unnecessary. It was unnecessary economically and even strategically. The person whose idea the canal had been—Stalin—had needed it for other

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reasons. The elucidation of these reasons is one of the purposes of Solzhenitsyn's book.

CAMP labour, its meaning and its meaninglessness for the prisoners and the creators of the camp system, is a very important theme in *The Gulag Archipelago*. Maxim Gorky, the chief editor and main author of *Belomorkanal* (*White Sea Canal*), the most shameful book in the history of Russian literature, wrote: "In the only country in the world where labour is freely given, the labour of prisoners has become a source of selfless and often enthusiastic toil. . . ." Gorky does not go into the reasons why there has come to be convict labour in "a country where labour is freely given," contenting himself merely with the assertion that it is "selfless and often enthusiastic toil." Solzhenitsyn lays bare the real content of these words. The evolution of the slogans which decorated the gates of camps is sufficient indication of the change that occurred not only in the nature of camp labour, but in the attitude of the camp authorities towards that labour, and provides an insight into the process by which the pretence was done away with. The first inmates of Solovki were greeted with a poster saying "We are showing the world a new way. The ruler of the world will be labour." (Solzhenitsyn writes that Shepchinskii, the son of an executed general, tried to post up on the entrance gates the slogan: "Solovki for workers and peasants," but it was "discovered and removed.") On the White Sea Canal, convicts were spurred on by the more realistic slogan: "Shock work is the way to early release." This was evidently later translated into the German "Arbeit macht frei." After the war, in the fearful camps on the Inta, the Cultural and Educational Section (KVCh) campaigned under the slogan: "work well and you'll be buried in a wooden coffin!" Solzhenitsyn explains:

> there was once a belief in old Russia that a dead man couldn't go without a coffin. The meanest serfs, paupers and tramps were buried in coffins. So were convicts on Sakhalin and Akatuisk. But in the Archipelago that would have meant wasting millions of rubles' worth of timber and labour.

In the Archipelago one not only had to earn one's living by back-breaking labour that led to one's death; one had to earn one's coffin too, for after death.

When describing the labour of Soviet convicts Solzhenitsyn resorts time and again to comparisons in order to help the reader understand a truth which refuses to sink in. "The furnaces of a polar Auschwitz have been set alight and its ovens opened to all who have ever been brought here." That is only the beginning—Solovki. The writer compares Soviet "extermination labour camps" with the gas chambers on more than one occasion. But here is his description of Orotukan, a penal labour camp on Kolyma 506 kilometres from Magadan:

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> Winter 1937–38. A wood and canvas settlement, that is, tents with holes. . . . When a new lot of convicts arrives, a new batch of men doomed to investigation, even before they go through the door they see that every tent in the colony is stacked on three sides—every side except the door—with piles of stiffly frozen corpses! (This is not a deterrent; there is simply no alternative—people die, the snow is six feet deep, and beneath it is the permafrost). . . . The tents are overcrowded, there is no room to stretch, people lie for weeks on end. . . . The ration is three hundred grams. And one bowl of rotten soup per day. In addition they hand out salmon that has been rejected by the health inspector. It is very salty. After you've eaten it you are thirsty, but there is never any hot water. Never. There are barrels of ice-cold water. . . . G.S.M. urges his friends: "Refuse the salmon, it's your only hope! All the calories you get from the bread will be wasted on warming this water inside yourselves! . . ." M. doesn't eat it himself. Now he tells us about Orotukan. . . . All who have experienced Orotukan say they would prefer the gas chamber. . . .

Solzhenitsyn compares the labour of Soviet convicts with that of the slaves who built the Egyptian pyramids—and finds that the Egyptian slaves had an easier time. He compares Soviet hard labour with the labour of Russian serfs and finds that, although there are similarities, there are more differences. "But here is the surprising thing: all the differences are in favour in serfdom! All the differences are to the discredit of the Gulag Archipelago!" Serfs did not die of starvation, they had holidays on which they did not work, they lived in permanent cottages, and they had their own property and their families. The final comparison Solzhenitsyn draws is between penal servitude in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet "extermination labour camps." Here too all the differences are to the discredit of the Archipelago.

> In the harsh penal servitude of Akatuisk work norms were easily fulfillable by everyone. . . . A summer working day consisted of eight hours altogether, including the trek to and from the work-place, from October onwards it was seven hours and in winter only six. . . . And as for the convicts who served in Omsk with Dostoyevsky, they did hardly more than loaf about, as the reader will easily discover.

Solzhenitsyn cites the evidence of the writer Varlam Shalamov, who recalls that, whereas the Decemberists in Nerchinsk were obliged to quarry and load three poods of iron ore each per day (48 kilograms! a quantity small enough to lift at one go!), he, Shalamov, had to do 800 poods in Kolyma.

THE chief conflict described by Solzhenitsyn in the second volume of *The Gulag Archipelago* is the eternal conflict between the slave who is unwilling to work, and the overseer, whose aim is to squeeze

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as much as possible out of the slave. In Soviet camps this conflict assumes a special form.

The overseers employ the Frenkel system, forcing convicts to work not only by the stick, but by denying food to those who do not work, or who work too little or not well enough. Fulfilment of one's norm entitles one to one's food ration; overfulfilment of the norm, which is encouraged by the overseers, entitles one to supplementary rations. But these supplementary rations can never ever restore the strength expended in over-fulfilling the norm. And the terrible question arises: is it better to die on supplementary rations than on regular ones? "In the camp," says Solzhenitsyn, quoting a popular proverb, "it's the big ration, not the small one, that kills you." The more and the better a man works, the sooner he uses up his strength—and dies. But those who transfer to "light physical labour" also die, purely and simply of starvation.

It is impossible to say what the convicts' choice would be, if they were given the opportunity to choose. They have no such opportunity, for, along with the system of feeding "according to work done," yet another diabolical device is employed.

> The idea of the brigade was thought up. And indeed, how could we have failed to hit upon it? The Populists in our country wanted to progress to socialism by way of the commune, and the Marxists by way of the collective. What is it our papers write even today? "The most important thing for man is labour and it has to be labour in the collective." Now, if a productivity norm is set, not for each individual, but for an entire brigade, and if not each individual but all the members of the brigade are fed subject to their fulfilling the norm, the brigade will then become a motive force which will compel all its members to put their last ounce of strength at the service of the camp.

But this is still not all. Solzhenitsyn goes on to carve through layer after layer of the superstructure of falsehood and hypocrisy, in his attempt to get to the bottom of Soviet society, at the core of which lies the Gulag Archipelago. An important incentive that impels the camp authorities, who in their turn drive the prisoners, is the "urgency" of the task.

> Everything that is constructed, quarried or executed must be constructed, quarried or executed "in the shortest possible time." Eleven kilometres in a single month in winter. . . . The task appeared impossible. Three hundred thousand cubic metres of excavation had to be carried out by sheer manual effort.

Citing these words from an official journal, *Solovki Camps,* Solzhenitsyn asks: "why in a month? Why could it not have been postponed until the summer?" He reminds us that this was construction work in the arctic circle, in permafrost conditions. But that was the task set! Certain tempos were required! The White Sea Canal too was declared

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an "urgent project." "The canal had to be built cheaply and in a short time!" Those were Stalin's instructions, and he had allowed twenty months for the entire project. "Because," writes Solzhenitsyn, "in those years nothing was done in our country that was *not* urgent. If something was not urgent no one would believe that it was of vital importance, and even the prisoners dying under the upturned wheelbarrow had to believe in this importance."

"Tempos," Stalin claimed, "tempos decide everything"; "urgency" and "importance" become effective psychological means of coercion, acting alongside the physical means. And it is on the basis of these psychological means that an ethic, a philosophy, a world-view is formulated that can be expressed by the words: "the important thing is the result. . . ." Solzhenitsyn writes:

> This is not a joke, it is a contagious idea. . . . The notion that the only important thing is the material result has wormed its way so deeply into us that when, for example, a Tukhachevsky, a Yagoda or a Zinoviev is declared a traitor who has done a deal with the enemy, the population simply gasps and wonders collectively: "what else did he want?! . . . He had enough grub to fill his belly, twenty suits, two dachas, a car, a plane, and he was famous —so what else did he want?!" Millions of our fellow-countrymen are incapable of conceiving that a person may be impelled by anything other than the profit motive!

Solzhenitsyn reveals the historical roots of this psychology. Where did we get it from? he asks. "In the first instance from the idea of the glory of our flag and 'our country's (so-called) honour.' We choked, hacked and slaughtered all our neighbours, we expanded our dominions—while in our homeland the idea gained ground that it was the result that was important." Then, Solzhenitsyn continues,

> . . . we got it from our first capitalists, Russian merchants. And then, from all the varieties of socialists, and most of all from the latest, infallible, impatient Doctrine, which consists of this and only this: it is important to get results! Important to knock together a militant party! To seize power! To hold on to power! To eliminate opponents! To conquer in iron and steel! To launch rockets!

At the end of the 20s when this ideology of "profit," of "results," was taking a firm and definitive hold, the most discerning Soviet writers began to notice the phenomenon. In his novel, *Envy,* Yury Olesha portrayed a hero who asserted that the sausage had priority over the soul. The hero of Veniamin Kaverin's *Artist Unknown* bluntly says: "Ethics? I've no time to think about the word. I'm busy. I'm building socialism. But if I had to choose between ethics and a pair of trousers I'd choose the trousers." And a quarter of a century later in Vladimir Dudintsev's novel, *Not By Bread Alone,* the new-type manager not only repeats the words of his predecessors: "We are

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running a race with the capitalist world. We must build the house before we start hanging the pictures." Now he has acquired—from Chapter 4 of the *Short Course in the History of the Communist Party*—a philosophical theory which justifies everything. "He who works on a material basis can know no extremes. Because matter has primacy."

The Gulag Archipelago reveals the process by which the philosophy of "results," of the all-justifying "material basis" became established and ethics were obliterated (oddly enough, along with the renunciation of ethics came the disappearance of both sausage and trousers). The camp becomes an exact model of society as a whole.

SOLZHENITSYN unfolds before the reader's eyes a panorama of camp life. Along with a detailed description of the life of the convict in particular camps, including the first camp where he himself spent some time, the writer presents a composite image of life in all the camps, life in The Camp. If in Volume 1 Solzhenitsyn was primarily a historian, in the second volume he is first and foremost the sociologist and psychologist. He analyses two aspects of the camp: the life, and the inmates.

Camp life is treated in all its aspects: labour, food, clothing, the convicts' sleeping quarters, the medical unit, the punishments; but it also includes escape attempts (more often than not failures), coercion to inform on friends, and finally death.

Labour is the chief function of the camp and determines the convict's life and his death. Analysing the many and varied aspects of camp labour, Solzhenitsyn devotes particular attention to the problem of its economic viability. He turns to a favourite topic of argument in the camps: has convict labour ever been a source of profit to the state? "Of course," writes Solzhenitsyn, "if one is to believe the Soviet leaders the fact is indisputable." He cites Molotov's words on the use of convict labour: "We have done it in the past, we are doing it now, and we shall continue to do it in the future. It is profitable to society. It is beneficial to the criminal." And he comments: "Note that it is not profitable to the state but to society itself! And for the criminal it is beneficial. And we shall continue to do it in the future! And that's that." But the author of *The Gulag Archipelago* tries to define the question more precisely, and to do so he breaks it down into sub-questions:

"Are the camps justified in the political and social sense? Are they economically justified? Do they pay their way? (There is a difference between the second and third questions despite their apparent similarity)."

Solzhenitsyn finds the answer to the first question easy: "for Stalin's purposes the camp was a splendid place into which millions could be driven as a means of intimidation. Therefore they were poli-

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tically justified. The camps were also profitable in the sense that they operated in the interests of an enormous social stratum. . . ." (the writer has in mind camp officials, overseers and guards, "parasites," as he calls them). There could be no doubt about the economic benefits of the camp system either, for it provided a work force—unpaid:

> . . . (in ancient times they at least paid money to purchase a slave; to buy a convict no one paid), undemanding, prepared to be driven from one place to another at any time, without the liability of families, and requiring no fixed accommodation, no schools, no hospitals, and, for certain periods of time, no meals or baths.

To the third question, however, Solzhenitsyn replies in the negative. The state would very much have liked to have camps that cost nothing, that is, camps that paid their own expenses. The state's dream had been "to make the Archipelago run for nothing!" But the dream did not come true. And Solzhenitsyn enumerates the reasons why the state has to pay so dearly for "the pleasure of having the Archipelago." The first and main reason is:

> the irresponsibility of the prisoners, the negligence of these foolish slaves. Not only will you wait in vain for them to show any socialistic selflessness; they do not even display simple capitalist application. The only thing they are interested in is how they can ruin their boots and not have to go to work; how they can damage a winch, dislocate a wheel, break a shovel, sink a bucket. . . .

The conflict between the state's aspiration to "cost-free," self-sufficient camps and the efforts of the "irresponsible" prisoners to evade work determines the quality of camp life in its every aspect. It was to reduce the cost of the camps that the authorities literally starved prisoners to death. "If you asked a wartime convict what was his supreme, final and totally unattainable object, he would reply: 'to eat my fill of black bread just once—and then die.'" Solzhenitsyn compares the normal diet in the most terrible Tsarist penal colonies with the food in Soviet camps, showing that in the former, prisoners who did not work were fed ten times better than convicts engaged in the heaviest physical labour in the Soviet "extermination labour camps." The author of *The Gulag Archipelago* recalls that there were geese in the yard of the jail described by Dostoyevsky, and adds that when *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was published, Shalamov charged Solzhenitsyn with embellishing reality: "What's that hospital cat doing walking about in your camp? Why haven't they slit its throat and eaten it yet?" To cut the cost of running the camps the authorities starve prisoners to death (the scenes in which Solzhenitsyn describes prisoners dying of starvation can only be compared with the most terrible pages in accounts of Hitler's death camps), refuse to give them clothes, and accommodate them at best in wooden barracks, more often in dug-outs, and sometimes simply in tents. In this context the writer

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reminds us what the Russian climate is like: "It is impossible to picture our accursed Archipelago under a hot sun: it is eternally covered with snow, and over it eternally the blizzards rage."

And of course, reducing the cost of the camps is uppermost in the minds of the slave-owners who devised the system whereby those who are unwilling or unable to work are given the cruellest punishment. The writer devotes a whole chapter to those prisoners who decide they want to "change their fate," who seek the assistance of the "green procurator," that is, try to escape from the camp. This chapter is of particular interest, for it not only gives an account of some extremely colourful individual human destinies, of people who kept their will to resist under the most terrible conditions; it also shows a country in which the man who escapes from behind the barbed wire of a small camp finds himself in a bigger one.

Solzhenitsyn draws his very detailed picture of all aspects of camp life—and death—with one reservation: "I am virtually excluding Kolyma from the compass of this book." He makes only the occasional reference to Kolyma, the pole of coldness and cruelty, the most fearful island in the Archipelago, both because it requires separate treatment and because it is the subject of Varlam Shalamov's *Tales of Kolyma*, which "will give the reader a truer feeling of the Archipelago's pitiless spirit and the limits of human despair." Kolyma is the final circle of hell.

SOLZHENITSYN divides the Archipelago's inhabitants according to various criteria. He devotes special chapters to women and children in the camps (since 7 April 1935 "all punitive measures," including execution by firing squad, have been applied to all persons over the age of twelve). He divides prisoners according to the article under which they have been convicted—politicals or criminals; according to their status in the camp—loafers or hard workers; according to their attitude towards their sentence and towards the camp—those who acknowledge the necessity and justice of everyone's conviction except their own, those who fatalistically accept what has happened, and those who refuse to resign themselves to injustice.

Solzhenitsyn has never liked hiding his feelings: he has always openly expressed his sympathies and antipathies. Analysing the psychology of the Archipelago's inhabitants the writer makes it known from the outset that "he is writing on behalf of mute Russia," the embodiment of which is Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, with whom he carries on an intermittent conversation in the pages of *The Gulag Archipelago*. Ivan Denisovich symbolises the concentration camp population: achieving through his sharpness of mind an understanding of events, carrying out the heaviest physical tasks in the camp, aware that it is slave labour, but not refusing to perform them—not only because he cannot avoid it, but because a man cannot *not* work.

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Solzhenitsyn denies party members who attempted to justify the terror and were then "hoist with their own petard and tried to justify the logic of it" the right to call themselves "political prisoners." He takes as his criterion the formula: "a political prisoner is one who holds convictions, the renunciation of which would gain him his freedom." The orthodox communists—conformists, or right thinkers, as Solzhenitsyn calls them after Orwell's expression—had no convictions. That is why he denies the conformists who died in the camps and prisons even the right to be said to have "died a tragic death"; pitiless as always, he describes their death as "comic." And he ends the part of the book devoted to them with the words: "But anyway, why this chapter? Why this lengthy review and analysis of the loyal? In its place let us write in letters a yard high the names Janos Kadar and Wladyslaw Gomulka. They suffered unjust arrest, and interrogation with torture, and served a few years each in jail. The whole world can see how much they learned from the experience. The whole world knows what they are worth." In a footnote written in 1972 Solzhenitsyn says: "And now the name of Gustav Husak can be added too."

HAVING described camp life in all its nightmarish detail and the inmates of the camp, the author of *The Gulag Archipelago* asks the crucial question: "but what was our will? What kind of a country was it that bore the Archipelago within itself for decades?" And he answers with an analogy:

> I once carried within my body a tumour the size of a large man's fist. This tumour . . . prevented me from eating and sleeping; I was always aware of it (although it constituted less than half a per cent of my body, while the Archipelago accounted for 8 per cent of the country). But the terrible thing was not that it was pressing upon and displacing adjacent organs; most terrifying of all was the fact that it was emitting toxic substances which were poisoning my whole body. In the same way our country too was completely poisoned by the venom of the Archipelago.

Solzhenitsyn reveals the channels by which the poison seeps into the body of the country; and how the boundary between the small camp (the camp proper) and the large camp (the whole country) becomes indistinct. He shows how slave labour in the camp has polluted the concept of labour and caused the entire population of the country to feel an aversion to it; how the servile ideology of convicts has become the ideology of all citizens; and how even the language of prisoners has infiltrated into colloquial and literary Russian.

In the short section entitled "Barbed wire and the soul," in which the writer summarizes his conclusions, he says: "Yes, the corruption of the camps was a mass phenomenon. Not only because the camps were terrible places, but also because we, Soviet people, set foot on the soil of the Archipelago spiritually unarmed, long since ripe for

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corruption, already touched by it at liberty." Thus the existence of the Archipelago guarantees it a continuous influx of new inhabitants, obedient slaves who accept the camp as a normal way of life.

But in spite of everything the writer still has hope and faith in the strength of the human spirit, and is still firmly convinced of the need to fight against evil. "By experiencing prison and camp," writes Solzhenitsyn,

> I understood the truth of all the world's religions: they are fighting evil in man (in every man). . . . I understood the falsity of all revolutions in history: they destroy only the bearers of evil in their time (and in their indiscriminate haste the bearers of good as well); evil itself, magnified still further, they take as their inheritance. . . .

And, grateful for the truth and faith revealed to him in prison, the writer proclaims: "Blessed be thou, prison, that thou wert in my life." But then he adds: "But the answer comes to me from the graves: It's all right for you to talk, you who survived!"

AT the end of Volume 2 of Solzhenitsyn's book, the reader will doubtless ask himself how it differs from Volume 1. Volume 2 is written with the same astonishing brilliance as Volume 1, the same breath-taking mastery of language (and will perhaps prove even more difficult to translate than Volume 1). Volume 2 contains fewer references to Solzhenitsyn's own experiences and feelings. Nevertheless, when he needs to, the writer draws upon his own recollections to the full. For instance, in the chapter about informers (*stukachi*), in which Solzhenitsyn describes the system of secret informers which exists outside as well as inside the camp, the writer admits that he lacks material ("old camp inmates are somewhat reluctant to tell me how they were recruited") and so he tells us how he himself was recruited. Volume 2 displays much more powerfully than Volume 1 Solzhenitsyn's talent as a satirist. His remarkable satirical talent had been revealed earlier, in *Ivan Denisovich, The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward*, but their tragic themes had pushed the satirical element into the background and prevented the critics from noticing it. In the second volume of *The Gulag Archipelago,* satire underlines the horror of the description and enables the reader to endure it. Solzhenitsyn makes masterly use of the whole gamut of satirical devices, from the sharpest, most relentless sarcasm to deadly irony. In 1929 in Solovki there was an epidemic of a terrible disease in which black blotches appeared on the body and death followed inevitably. "It could not have been the plague or smallpox, the inmates of Solovki reasoned," writes Solzhenitsyn, "because those two diseases had been completely conquered in the Soviet Republic. So they called it 'Asian typhus.'" Another example of Solzhenitsyn's satire is his account of the members of a sect who repudiated all official papers—documents, passport,

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money—as the work of the devil. They were all put into a camp, since, as the author of *The Gulag Archipelago* writes, " it was clear to any educated man that these sectarians would never become socialists because to do that one has to have a very great deal to do with papers, and therefore the best thing would be for them to die." Describing the many and varied activities of prisoners who perform the heaviest, most complicated and most amazing tasks, Solzhenitsyn concludes: " it is easier to list the things a prisoner has never done: make sausages and manufacture confectionery."

One of the chief targets of Solzhenitsyn's satire is Soviet officialese, the basis of Soviet ideology, which occurs in condensed form in the language of Stalin. The chapter " The cons as a nation " is a magnificent example of the writer's satirical skill. Taking the " widely-known, solely scientific definition of a nation given by comrade Stalin," the author creates an " ethnographical study " which proves convincingly that the convicts are a race apart. (" Our scope is particularly broadened," the satirist notes with satisfaction, " by comrade Stalin's genial observation that racial-tribal community of blood is not at all obligatory! ")

Perhaps it is Dostoyevsky's words which best express the meaning and purpose of Solzhenitsyn's satire. " Tragedy and satire are two sisters and go side by side, and the name of both together is: truth."

To tell the truth about the Archipelago, about the country which has borne and still bears it within itself, the truth about the hell in which people are living and dying: this is Solzhenitsyn's purpose.

In her poem *The Last Circle* Zinaida Gippius wrote:

> Think yourself fortunate, Dante, that through a friend's concern,
> You knew not all the habitation of the dead,
> That your companion guided you away
> From the last circle—and you beheld it not.
> For even were you not to die of fright,
> Still you would not tell us of the sight.

This new Virgil, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, conducts the reader through all the circles of hell, right to the very last one. This new Dante tells all.

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The New *Kontinent*

Hilary Sternberg

WITH increasing numbers of Russia's cultural "underworld" in exile, it was inevitable that speculation would mount about the possibility of their somehow joining forces to produce a literary or political journal. Plans for *Kontinent* were announced earlier this year, and in October, preceded by a great deal of international publicity, the first issue appeared. Running to an impressive 410 pages, it is edited by Vladimir Maximov, with the collaboration of a group of eminent intellectuals from both Eastern and Western Europe, and with contributions from writers on both sides of the Iron Curtain—which is why Maximov insists that it is *not* "another émigré journal." The publisher is Ullstein Verlag, Berlin, a house with a tradition of publishing Russian writings ever since *Rul,* the Russian Democratic Daily, was published under its auspices in the 1920s.

Ullstein Verlag claims that "*Kontinent* continues the tradition of Russian almanacs in which the great novels of the nineteenth century were serialized." *Kontinent's* editor rightly adds that it was the *political thinkers,* not the literary experimenters, who in the last century were obliged to resort to publication *abroad*; the narrowly political interpretation of literature and its consequent suppression has been a feature of Russian revolutionary socialism, of the Marxist dictatorship, something, he claims, in which even Tsarism in its darkest days never indulged. In this sense, then, *Kontinent* is the heir to a political, not just a literary tradition: in a country where official literature is regarded as a political commodity and freedom of expression has become by the official definition synonymous with anti-Soviet propaganda, it is as political non-conformists that writers resort to publication in *samizdat* and *tamizdat* ("publication over there," i.e. abroad).

The aims of *Kontinent* do not end with the provision of yet another forum for Russian and East European *samizdat.* Nor is it simply a platform for émigré nostalgia. Publications of this kind already exist and some are of undeniable value. *Kontinent,* though, seeks to go further: to draw on what it sees as the common experience of Eastern—and some Western—intellectuals over the last few decades and from this to distil a "message," to develop a philosophy which, while uniting East European exiles, would also serve as the basis for a fruitful dialogue between them and the West, because it would—hopefully—provide the West with that insight into the Eastern European experience which it lacks.

This is where *Kontinent's* editors run into difficulties. What is the message to be? Who is qualified to convey it? For whom exactly is it intended? What approach should be adopted? And to whom will the opportunity, the *privilege,* of reply and dialogue be granted? (Reply in the pages of *Kontinent*, that is. A string of editorial prefaces to the first issue provides some tentative answers. Maximov calls upon "all anti-totalitarian forces of Eastern Europe" to initiate the dialogue. Solzhenitsyn, who has lent his prestigious support to *Kontinent* and here

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contributes a Preface and a previously unpublished chapter from *The First Circle,* expresses his respect for the eminent editorial board of the journal and its contributing editors (who include, as well as himself, Igor Golomshtok, Alexander Galich, Milovan Djilas, Ludek Pachman, Andrei Sakharov and Andrei Sinyavsky). Solzhenitsyn writes that they represent " the voices and opinions of Eastern Europe " and he hopes that in due course *Kontinent* " might indeed become a true voice of Eastern Europe " and " reach those ears in Western Europe which are not closed to the truth " . . . " the journal is intended to have an international appeal . . . in our times, when the perils threatening society and the tasks which emerge from them can no longer be confined within national frontiers. . . ." " The intelligentsia of Eastern Europe," he says—and this is a somewhat debatable claim—" speaks a common language. . . ." In yet another preface, this time written in Moscow, Andrei Sakharov charges *Kontinent* with a more practical, very different, and typically Sakharovian task: " to supply as much factual information about the socialist countries as possible, as well as about the world as a whole . . . and to create and formulate the philosophical, moral and ethical values which contemporary humanity so desperately needs. . . ."

HOW far does the first issue of *Kontinent* come towards fulfilling these aims?

If, as Maximov says, rather than being concerned with political polemics, *Kontinent* " will confront aggressive totalitarianism with the literary creativity and spirituality of Eastern Europe," the journal has got off to an excellent start. The subtle intellect of Brodsky, the mordant prose of Solzhenitsyn, the imaginative, provocative reflections by Sinyavsky on the literary scene in Russia, as well as the briefer contributions by Golomshtok and Pyatigorsky, cannot fail to lend the journal immediate prestige simply as a literary platform. Nevertheless, whatever these men write as evidence of their " literary creativity and spirituality " is bound to have profound political implications. Not surprisingly, it is in Solzhenitsyn's contribution (a chapter from *The First Circle*) that a clear, political anti-Marxist message emerges. This chapter is, as it were, the focal point of *Kontinent,* and illustrates a typical Solzhenitsyn theme: the national agony of the shared, acknowledged LIE, expressed in the private agony of the Party propagandist who, with sweating brow, delivers a two-hour lecture on " Dialectical Materialism—the Progressive World-View," knowing full well that it is all based on a LIE, and that his audience knows that it is all based on a lie, so that the two hours become a shared ordeal, an endurance test of virtuoso self-deception. Is this the same teacher of Marxist philosophy, perhaps, who (as described by Alexander Pyatigorsky in his article on " The Metaphysical Situation in Contemporary Russia ") delivers a routine lecture on " The Primacy of Matter over Consciousness " and then packs his bags and goes off into the country to a privately organized unofficial seminar where he reads a paper on " The Illusoriness of the Material World and the Reality of the Conscious Being? "

This lie, this surely incompatible conflict between the public and

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private image and activity of individuals, is a central theme of some other contributions to *Kontinent*. Using a metaphor from the art world, Igor Golomshtok describes the total Soviet situation as the ultimate in surrealism, a cultural vacuum in which "underground" artists experiment not merely with imitative avant-gardism but—more significantly—find freedom from the official lie in *traditional* forms. When socialist realism has become the most surreal school of art—and of life—the artist paradoxically seeks spiritual satisfaction by reverting to traditional realism. Similarly, as Sinyavsky points out, in the teeth of officially inculcated *narodnost*—that cloying pseudo-folksiness of the mass-produced popular song—a real "folklore" has developed, in the form of "underground" poetry sung to guitar accompaniment (the music of Galich, Vysotsky and a host of amateur disciples). Carrying the parallel into the political sphere, the juggling with words, the jargon of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* and Radio Moscow, has produced the parallel culture—and a thriving one it is! —of the *anekdot*, the political joke, and the (not-so-) mythical Radio Yerevan with its improbable—but not entirely impossible—question-and-answer programme (Listener: "What is the best way for us to withdraw our troops from Czechoslovakia?" Radio Yerevan: "Through Rumania."). Sinyavsky sees all these "twilight phenomena" not only as evidence of nature's abhorrence of a vacuum, but as a parallel development by-passing socialist realism entirely and thus continuing the Russian cultural tradition. In the field of literature this counter-culture or parallel culture, call it what you will, has taken the form of *samizdat*, and in his essay Sinyavsky vividly conveys the socio-political atmosphere in which *samizdat* was born and now flourishes, the ideals of its authors (often politically immature, but always worthy of the highest respect for their honesty and courage), and his hopes and fears for its future. In the process he reaffirms the paradox that culture may sometimes thrive best in the poorest soil; that the greatest freedom is sometimes a product of a dictatorship. The unfree writer, artist or musician is more likely to produce inspired work than his comfortably-off bourgeois equivalent in a democratic society where superabundance has cheapened cultural values and words, sounds, images have lost what Sinyavsky calls their "magic power." Only in a country where words still have this power (and it is a power that Stalin, claims Sinyavsky, knew how to use to the full, for Stalin was a regular magician of the word who enthralled his captive audience into believing that dragons, demons, vampires and other evil beasts were roaming the country, and inspired his valiant knights and minions to seek them out and destroy them)—only in such a country is the writer most inspired, most revered—and most persecuted for his power.

GRANTED the writer in Eastern Europe, and in Russia in particular, does enjoy far more esteem than his Western counterpart; but the editors of *Kontinent* must not fall into the trap that has ensnared other émigrés and exiles before them: that of assuming that the East European experience has surely given them an intangible superiority, because they have something to tell the world. Certainly they have a great deal to tell us, but there are passages in *Kontinent's* first issue which

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seem to betray a slightly over-defensive attitude. True, Maximov has said that he is ready to consider for publication contributions or letters from people who disagree with his four stated principles, which are: (1) Unconditional religious idealism, (2) Unconditional anti-totalitarianism, (3) Unconditional democratism, and (4) Unconditional *bespartiinost* (non-Party affiliation), but many would-be-contributors might find these principles too sweeping and vague. Flexibility and experimentation will be needed if the journal is not to become simply a dialogue between the converted.

Among the contributors to the first issue who seem best able to provide us with insight into the East European experience are: Pyatigorsky's fascinating, all too brief excursion into the unofficial philosophy scene in Moscow; Igor Golomshtok's account of unorthodox artists (who seem at last to be on the way to achieving some tolerance, if not recognition, to judge by the recent exhibition they succeeded in staging in Moscow); and above all, Andrei Sinyavsky's very personal essay on the status of the writer and the word in Russia. Sakharov's hope that *Kontinent* will, at the very least, provide information about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not be disappointed. That our insight into the Russian experience is still—and probably will remain—imperfect becomes clear when we read the only work of fiction in this first issue of *Kontinent*—the first half of Vladimir Kornilov's novella *No Arms, No Legs.* Set (so far) in wartime and post-war Moscow, this work is so saturated with a particular atmosphere, with nuances, references and allusions, that many Western readers will inevitably find themselves inadequately equipped to appreciate it on any level beyond the purely literary one. For Kornilov, a Moscow poet, this is a first excursion into prose, and it promises to be a very worthwhile one. The novella portrays the post-war young generation in the Soviet Union, bewildered by the war experience on the one hand, and on the other, over-optimistic, unsure of how to interpret Stalinism, unclear of its own values and attitudes (for example, towards the Jews). The middle-aged, harmlessly disturbed, slightly manic Kozlov has, just come from a course of psychiatric treatment in a Moscow mental hospital. Today, one might add, he would almost certainly still be in that hospital, probably under KGB supervision, and would have been diagnosed (as some dissidents have in recent years) as suffering from "reformist delusions" and "a mania for truth."

The remainder of this first issue is devoted to historical source material (extracts from Cardinal Mindszenty's Memoirs), book reviews, and articles on the future of Russia in a European context, and Russo-German relations. These seem to me to be more suitable for an East European audience—indeed, the editors of *Kontinent* hope that their journal will circulate in the Soviet bloc as other émigré publications have done and do—with the difference that Soviet and East European readers may feel free to contribute to *Kontinent* in the knowledge that it is not financed by foreign governmental sources (which will not, of course, prevent the Soviet authorities from branding it as a hostile, anti-Soviet publication and treating Soviet contributors accordingly if they so desire).

Given the idealistic aim of *Kontinent's* editorial policy, what can the

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journal hope to achieve? It has undertaken a mission that is difficult to realize; it may be over-optimistic in hoping to shake the West out of its traditional indifference (as Easterners see it). But as a literary journal it is a worthy successor to *Novy Mir* in its heyday. So we come back to Maximov's first aim, that *Kontinent* should confront totalitarianism with " literary creativity and spirituality." If the standard of this first issue is maintained, *Kontinent* will certainly be fulfilling this aim. Perhaps it is Sinyavsky who, for all his gift of fantasy, looks most realistically at " the power of the word," both inside and outside Russia:

> . . . But, while we may take a sceptical view of placing our hopes in the power of the word to change anything or set anything right in this world, we can and must make use of our age-old, purely Russian habit of perceiving the word as something real, as a whole reason in itself for putting people up against the wall—in order that, in this fertile, fruitful soil, we may breed something marvellous and exotic, if not in the real-life sense, then at least in the verbal, the literary sense proper. We shall not move the mountain, but a fairy-tale may appear nevertheless.

THE *KONTINENT* FUND

A fund for the magazine *Kontinent* has been set up. It will be used to further the aims outlined in the editor's preface to the first issue of the magazine: to provide for the further financing of the magazine, to propagate its ideas and to give material aid to writers, artists, musicians, etc., in Russia and Eastern Europe.

The Management of the Fund includes: Archbishop John of San Francisco, J. Czapski, R. Conquest, M. Djilas, E. Ionesco, V. Maximov, L. Pachman, A. Sakharov, A. Sinyavsky, V. Siedler.

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Agnes Smedley: A Reminiscence

Philip J. Jaffe

IN the early and middle thirties Agnes Smedley was a legend in China. Her inspirational books, *Chinese Destinies* (1933) and *China's Red Army Marches* (1934), were published both in English and Chinese (the latter was also published in the same year in Moscow as *Red Flood over China*), and were read widely and avidly by students throughout China. She certainly was then the most talked-about foreigner in China. Even at her death in 1950, the *Peking People's Daily* wrote: "It was Agnes Smedley who first made known to the world the truth about Red China . . . the death of Agnes Smedley is a great loss. . . ." And on May 6 1951, one year after her death, her ashes were placed in China's Arlington, the National Revolutionary Martyrs' Memorial Park at Papaoshan outside Peking and her simple marble cenotaph reads: "Agnes Smedley, revolutionary writer and friend of the Chinese people."

And yet today, except for a recent American reprint of her autobiography, *Daughter of Earth*, all of her books are out of print in the West as well as in China. More important, except for Chou En-lai's calling Agnes Smedley "a great American" in a conversation with Edgar Snow in 1960, her name is never mentioned in Peking, either in speech or in print—a forgotten "friend." Even Edgar Snow, the executor of her estate, in an enlarged 1968 edition of his *Red Star Over China*, mentions Agnes Smedley only in one small and insignificant footnote. It is said that today, apart from Edgar Snow, the most illustrious dead foreigner in China is Dr Norman Bethune, a "hero" manufactured by Mao Tse-tung. Why has Agnes Smedley been forgotten? Before this question can be dealt with, a brief outline of the main events in her life is essential.

AGNES Smedley, daughter of Sarah Rolls and Charles Smedley, was born in 1893 in the small town of Northern in north Missouri and was brought up in a mining camp town in Colorado. After a drab and brutalized childhood, described so painfully in her autobiography of 1929, and with virtually no elementary schooling, she left her family at the age of 16 in a desperate search for an education. Moving from city to city and state to state, and working at a variety of menial jobs, it was not until 1911 that she finally attended classes at Normal School in Temple, Arizona. From 1912 to 1916, she lived in California where she married Ernest W. Brundlin. In 1915, she attended summer school at the University of California at Berkeley, and while there she became interested in socialism through the writings of Upton Sinclair. Following her divorce in 1916, she arrived in New York City where for a full year she attended night school at New York University.

In New York, just as the United States was entering the First World

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War, Agnes Smedley met and studied with the prominent Indian exile, Lala Laipat Rai, who introduced her to the Friends of Freedom for India. She soon became involved in the anti-British Indian liberation movement. On the British accusation that she and her Indian friends were German agents, they were all arrested in March 1918, and Agnes spent a few weeks in solitary confinement in the New York City Tombs.

Not long after the war, in 1919, Agnes Smedley left America on a Polish ship, working as a stewardess. She jumped ship in Danzig and went to Berlin, where she made her home until 1928. In Berlin, she met Virendraneth Chattopadhayaya and, although he was married, they lived together as man and wife for the next eight years. In June 1921, accompanied by Chatto and four other Indian nationalists, she arrived in Moscow to attend the Third Comintern Congress. It is interesting to note that M. N. Roy, who was present at this Congress, called her the " driving force " of the group. In February 1927, again with Chatto, she attended the Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in Brussels, organized by Willi Münzenberg for the Comintern. There she met Nehru, who was to remain one of her political idols.

Agnes Smedley's eight years in Germany from 1920 to 1928 were hectic ones. In Berlin, she studied at the University and even led a seminar on English there. She wrote articles on Indian and Chinese history, established a birth-control clinic, and was a never-ending propaganist for the emancipation of women. Her life with Chatto was not a happy one; it consisted of endless domestic quarrels that led her even to contemplate suicide and finally to undergo psychoanalytic treatment. As for Chatto, he went to Leningrad in 1933, and was purged in 1937 for having criticized the Russian attitude towards the League Against Imperialism.

In 1928, after writing her autobiography, Agnes Smedley was hired as a correspondent for the Social Democratic newspaper, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and assigned to the Far East—a change that shifted her chief interest from India to China and finally freed her from the unhappy relationship with Chatto. On the way to China, she stopped in Moscow to attend the Sixth Comintern Congress (17 July–1 September 1928). Travelling across Siberia and north China, she finally arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 and made the city her headquarters.

In Shanghai Agnes Smedley met Mme Sun Yat-sen, various left-wing writers, Randall Gould, the editor of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, Harold Isaacs, and in November 1930 the man who was to become the famous Soviet spy in the Far East, Richard Sorge. She organized the China League Against Imperialism and began to write for the *China Forum*, edited by the young Isaacs before he became a Trotskyist in 1933. The May 1932 special edition of the *Forum* was published in Shanghai as a 136-page illustrated book under the title, *Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction*, and dedicated " To the martyred heroes and the living fighters of the Chinese Revolution." The entire book was written by Agnes Smedley, as she claimed. The style is hers and not Isaacs'.

However, her life in Shanghai was not without its troubles. Being well known as a supporter of Indian Independence and openly propagandizing the cause of revolution in China, she was harassed by the

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British Secret Service, the Kuomintang police, and even the police from the French Concession. Her possession of both American and German passports, and her previous use of several pseudonyms, complicated her life still further. She was even under arrest for a short period while on a trip to Canton.

Eight difficult years in Berlin followed by four strenuous years in Shanghai, during which the city was invaded by the Japanese, broke Agnes Smedley's health. She left Shanghai on 17 May 1933 for the Soviet Union, where she entered a health sanatorium. After several months, she regained her health, joined the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow and wrote *China's Red Army Marches*, the story of the growth of the Red Army in Kiangsi. In the late summer of 1934, she returned to New York City for a brief stay, and that is where I first met Agnes Smedley, and a most peculiar first meeting it was.

Knowing that I was editor of *China Today*, Agnes Smedley wrote to me that she would like to meet Comrade Ho, chairman of the China Bureau of the American Communist Party. I arranged to have this meeting at my home. Late one morning, I arrived at a small hotel on 29th Street, just off Fifth Avenue, and telephoned to her room. When I greeted her as she came down, she said: " How do I know it's you? Have you any identification? " Startled, I said that I had no identification and paid no further attention to her question. Outside, I hailed a cab and opened the door for her, when she said: " How do I know where you are taking me? " Whereupon I said somewhat sharply, " Miss Smedley, this is New York not Shanghai." And so we arrived safely at my home. I do not remember the conversation with Comrade Ho, but I recall that it was insignificant.

By the end of October 1934, Agnes Smedley was back in Shanghai. By this time, because of Hitler's rise to power, she, of course, lost her job with the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. In Shanghai, she occupied herself with work for the defence of political prisoners and with promoting the work of the League of Left Writers that included such well-known figures as Lu Hsün, Mao Tun and Ting Ling.

But Agnes Smedley was a restless soul. Revolutionary upheaval was in her blood. Having heard of the arrival of the Red Army in Shensi Province, following its successful 6,000-mile " Long March," she left Shanghai in the fall of 1936 and began to travel northwards. It was only natural for Agnes Smedley to be wherever there was political or social unrest. And so she was in Sian in December 1936, when the sensational arrest of Chiang Kai-shek by Chang Hsüeh-liang occurred. There, using the radio and correspondence, she broadcast and wrote constantly on what became known as the " Sian Incident," demanding the continued incarceration of Chiang. She started a furore both in China and the United States when she criticized the Soviet Union for demanding the release of Chiang Kai-shek.

When a group consisting of myself, my wife, Owen Lattimore, T. A. Bisson and our driver, Effie Hill, arrived in Yenan on 21 June 1937, Agnes Smedley was among the large group awaiting our arrival at the main gate of the now " sacred " city. She had been there since February.

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The following day, Miss Smedley gave me a long letter addressed to Earl Browder, General Secretary of the American Communist Party, in which she castigated him for his part in the following incident. While Chiang Kai-shek was being held captive in Sian in December 1936, Tass issued a dispatch that was also published in *Izvestia*, charging that the Sian incident was a Japanese plot to replace Chiang with their puppet, Wang Ching-wei. Moscow called for the immediate release of Chiang. Agnes Smedley, in her broadcasts, criticized Moscow in no uncertain language, following which the American C.P. *Daily Worker* denounced her and declared that she was no longer a friend. When I delivered the letter to Browder, all I got in response was a benign smile.

I WAS in Yenan too short a time to learn much about Agnes Smedley, except for one mystifying experience. When my wife and I visited the Communist Party school in Yenan, Lo Man (Li Wei-han), its director, asked me to send him several books on scientific subjects. When I asked whether to send them care of Agnes Smedley, he quickly said, "No, no, please, not to her, but direct to me." I did not understand the significance of that reply until many years later, through the writings of Edgar Snow and his first wife, Nym Wales, who was in Yenan when I was there.

Apparently, Miss Smedley and her feminist approach in a somewhat puritanical atmosphere, was a thorn in the flesh of the leadership of Yenan. She, Lily Wu (Wu Kuang-wei), a beautiful 26-year-old actress, who played the lead in Gorky's "Mother," and Ting Ling, the well-known writer, did not believe in traditional marriage and were open feminist propagandists. A sensational event occurred in Yenan in the summer of 1937. Ho Tzu-ch'en, the second wife of Mao Tse-tung, whom he had married in 1930, openly charged Lily Wu with the alienation of Mao's affections. Mao denied the charge and, at his request, was granted a divorce by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Immediately, both his wife and Lily Wu were expelled from Yenan. Ho Tzu-ch'en then left for the Soviet Union (Mao did not marry his present wife, Chiang Ch'ing, until 1939). Agnes Smedley, however, did not escape the fate of the two expelled women. She was accused of being a go-between for Lily Wu and Mao, and she was resented for being a propagandist for the emancipation of women in an atmosphere which at the time could not tolerate it. In general, she was accused of being a trouble-maker. Nym Wales reports in one of her books that one afternoon Agnes Smedley came to tell her that Mao had ordered her to leave Yenan as soon as possible. It was no surprise to Nym Wales, for at one time she had called Agnes Smedley a demanding paranoic with a terrible feeling of insecurity (Agnes Smedley may have been many things, but she was no paranoic). In 1937, in Shanghai, I also learned from the editors of *The Voice of China* that Mme Sun Yat-sen had ordered Agnes Smedley out of her house, a fact that was emotionally corroborated by Agnes Smedley's refusal to talk about Mme Sun.

On 7 September 1937 Agnes Smedley did leave Yenan with a group that included Nym Wales and Tung Pi-wu, but she went only as far as Sian for X-rays for back trouble. She returned to Yenan and was

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then permitted to visit the North Shansi front headquarters of the Eighth Route Army in Taiyuan. However, on 3 January 1938, Chu Teh said to her: "We would like you to go to Hankow. There is this and that and the other thing there that you alone can do." After a long and tearful refusal, she finally said: "If it is your wish, I must go." Agnes Smedley arrived in Hankow on 8 January 1938, a city which was the capital of China from 12 December 1937 to 25 October 1938, the day the Japanese occupied it. In 1938, she became an accredited correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian,* an assignment she held until 1941.

In Hankow, Agnes Smedley worked with the Chinese Red Cross Medical Corps. After the Japanese occupation of the city, she joined the New Fourth Army (Communist) and stayed with it until January 1941, when it was ambushed and defeated by Kuomintang troops. This event proved to be the final blow to the increasing deterioration of the United Front. For Agnes Smedley, it meant a sad goodbye to China. Unable to return to what was for her an unfriendly Yenan, she returned to California in the summer of 1941, a few months before Pearl Harbour. She soon settled in New York City where she remained until her last journey to London in 1950. In New York, she lectured at Skidmore College and contributed many articles on China to a large variety of left-wing and liberal magazines and was active in a number of left-wing organizations. In 1943, she published her finest book, *Battle Hymn of China.*

ON 8 November 1944, Agnes Smedley came to the office of *Amerasia,* a magazine of which I was the editor. When I showed her a news item in the *New York Times* reporting that the day before, on the 27th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, both Richard Sorge and Ozaki Hotsumi had been hanged in Tokyo, she turned pale and almost collapsed. Sorge was the head of the most famous and most sensational espionage operation of the twentieth century. I had never before heard of either name and the significance of the emotional scene in my office did not become clear to me until 1949.

Richard Sorge, a member of both the German Communist Party and the Nazi Party, had worked for the Intelligence Division of the Comintern until 1929, after which he was assigned to the Fourth Bureau of the Red Army, the supreme espionage agency in the Soviet Union. From 1930 to 1933, he operated from Shanghai, after which he was assigned to Tokyo where the second in command of his espionage ring was Ozaki Hotsumi, an influential Japanese, a high-ranking member of the Council around the Emperor. The almost unbelievable achievements of Sorge and Ozaki in the world of espionage are well known. Eventually the entire ring was arrested, but only the two leaders were executed.

On 20 February 1949, SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) issued a long report, detailing the history of the espionage ring in Tokyo under the leadership of Sorge. Major General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, in his analysis of the SCAP report, accused Agnes Smedley of being a member of the Sorge Soviet spy ring in Tokyo. Although the Department of the Army in Washington repudiated the SCAP report, Willoughby became a

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friendly witness of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and repeated the charge. But as later evidence indicated, Willoughby proved to be wrong about many individuals he named, especially about Agnes Smedley. An Associated Press item, datelined Washington, 19 February 1950, reads:

> The U.S. Army, under criticism for issuing its recent report of wartime Soviet espionage in Japan, admitted today that it had blundered. Col. George S. Eyster, Deputy Chief of the Army's public information division, said among other things that the division had no proof at hand to back up the charge in the report that Agnes Smedley . . . was a Russian spy.

On the same day, the International News Service wrote:

> The Army's Public Information Division said flatly . . . that it was wrong and in error in charging [that] Agnes Smedley, an American writer, was a Russian spy. [Colonel] Eyster said " the Division has no proof to back up the spy charges. The report was based on information from the Japanese police and the report should have said so."

Through her attorney, O. John Rogge, Agnes Smedley threatened to sue General Willoughby, but the Army's denial of the charge against her made it unnecessary to continue with the threat of a law suit.

It is true that from 1930 to 1933, in Shanghai, Agnes Smedley acted as an informer and fact-gatherer for Richard Sorge. However, both she and Ozaki believed that Sorge was then merely an agent of the Comintern. They did not even know of the existence of the Fourth Bureau. And besides, whatever information Agnes Smedley was able to gather in Shanghai, Canton, Nanking and the Philippines, all of which she visited during the years 1930 to 1933, was of minor value, most of which could have been gathered by an attentive reader of the press or an intelligent listener to conversations in bars. However, what is more important is that early in 1934, after his assignment to Tokyo, Sorge forbade Ozaki to ever see or contact Agnes Smedley, because of her well-known communist associations. It is a standard and invariable instruction to an assigned member of a Soviet espionage ring to have no contact of any kind with anyone known to have communist or even left connections.

However, even though the War Department's action on the Sorge report exonerated Agnes Smedley, she continued to be harassed during one of the most shameful periods in American history—the McCarthy era, and the five years that preceded it. Ill in body and ill in heart, she left the United States for England, where she died on 6 May 1950 at Radcliffe Infirmary in Oxford following an operation for ulcers. For some reason, her death was not announced until 8 May. Her death in a foreign country, however, was grist to the grinding mill in Washington. Republican Representative, Harold H. Velde, a former FBI agent and a member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, said on 12 June 1950 that Agnes Smedley slipped out of the United States just as a subpoena was being issued for her appearance before his Committee, that she was " ready to talk " and that he was convinced " that Agnes

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Smedley was liquidated [by the GPU] to prevent her being called as a witness on her return." Mr Velde, however, continued: "I wouldn't say I am firmly convinced of it, because I have no evidence whatsoever. But her health apparently was good, and her death was unexpected." Whoever said that Mr Velde needed "proof" to support any accusation that he might have chosen to make? In this case against Agnes Smedley, he not only had no proof, but there was none to be found. She was no spy, and anything she could have told the Committee could have been found in her many articles and several books, which were uninhibited autobiographies. The truth is that Agnes Smedley was driven compulsively to be wherever she believed revolutionary history was in the making. It was a form of neurosis that led her to overreact and that led to some of her personal and political troubles.

NOW, to return to the question asked earlier: Why has Agnes Smedley been forgotten?

One important reason lies in the quality of her writings, which consist of seven books and scores of articles. They are emotional, passionate, impressionistic, full of instinctive judgments, powerfully propagandistic and frequently very moving, but they are also simplistic and frequently factually incorrect. As history, they have little value. As propaganda they are now outmoded, and as autobiography they are over-written, over-emotional, and often bathetic. Thus her writings have only a nostalgic value. Moreover they show no signs of any knowledge of political theory, Marxist or bourgeois. There was the time when she lectured on China before the John Reed Club, of which I was a member. Her talk was interesting and moving, but she was completely unable to handle the question period. She finally gave up and said that Phil Jaffe was in the audience and that he could answer these questions better than she could. And so I did.

However, the quality of her writings does not explain why Agnes Smedley has been forgotten in Communist China. Her devotion to the new China was unquestioned. Revolutionary China was in her blood. She worked and cried for it. In an inscription in her presentation of *Battle Hymn of China* to a friend, she wrote: "The face of China is stretched with tears, from a poem by Shih Ta-kai, most loved leader of the Taiping Rebellion." And it is these "tears" that she worked so hard to wash away. And yet the last honour Peking paid Agnes Smedley was in 1951 when they buried her ashes with the Chinese revolutionary dead. After that day—silence.

This callousness of the Peking of Mao and Chu Teh can be explained only by their ungenerous refusal to forget her weaknesses. And when Agnes Smedley wrote in the last paragraph of her long book, *Battle Hymn of China*, that "My decision to leave China had brought to a close the most important chapter in my life. Looking back I was far from satisfied. I knew I had made countless mistakes. I hoped that I had done a little good," she understood well what her mistakes were. It must have broken her heart to be forced to leave China in the middle of 1941 when the real war in China had hardly begun.

It is my belief that even though her last wish was to leave her estate

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to Chu Teh and for "her ashes to lie with the Chinese revolutionary dead," she really never forgave Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh for their callous dismissal of her. The last book she had published during her life-time was *Battle Hymn of China* in 1943. She lived another seven years during which she wrote innumerable articles and was active in several organizations, and yet her book, *The Great Road: Life and Times of Chu Teh*, was published in English only posthumously, some six years after her death. (It was published somewhat earlier in Japanese.) The reason, I believe, is that she could not face writing about the man she once had worshipped but later could not forgive.

Finally, there is that oft-quoted but misunderstood passage from *Battle Hymn of China*:

> For years I listened to communists with sympathy and in later years in China I gave them my active support, but I could never place my mind and my life unquestionably at the disposal of their leaders. I never believed that I myself was especially wise, but I could not become a mere instrument in the hands of men who believed that they held the one and only key to truth.

The thought and style of this quotation were not Agnes Smedley's. It was the language of critics of Lenin and Stalin. Written in 1943, it was her way of explaining her "mistakes," her "explanation" of why Mao and Chu Teh had exiled her, and why she could no longer revere them. But despite this explanation, her exile from Yenan and her disillusionment with the men she had once worshipped was to remain the real and final tragedy of Agnes Smedley's life.

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Morris Watnick 1914-1974

MORRIS WATNICK is perhaps best known to readers of *Survey* for his series of articles on the Hungarian Marxist aesthetician and philosopher, Georg Lukács (1958–59). These earned him international recognition as one of the few people who both knew and understood Lukács' work. But he had already made his mark, first with a perceptive critical essay on Toynbee's *Study of History* (1948) and then with a quite extraordinary article "The Appeal of Communism to the Underdeveloped Areas" (1952). Of this latter work, George Lichtheim (then writing as G. L. Arnold) said: "Mr Watnick probably has done more than any other recent writer in this field to illuminate the deeper causes of colonial 'unrest' and the link between agrarian disintegration and revolutionary intelligentsia politics." With the forthcoming publication of his translation of and introductory essay to Rudolf Hilferding's *Finance Capital*, and some of his materials on Georg Lukács and the theory of class consciousness, Morris Watnick's contribution will be the greater still.

Born and raised in New York City, Morris Watnick was educated in the public schools and colleges of that city, with degrees in history and international relations from the City College of New York (1936) and in economics from the New School for Social Research (1942). After teaching in the New York City high schools and serving in the US Army Air Corps during World War II, he worked for many years in the US Government, first as intelligence research analyst with the Department of State and then as publications editor with the US Information Agency.

The Washington years were both good and bad years. He formed rewarding and lasting friendships. He edited (and was in fact almost the sole contributor to) a little-known but remarkable journal, *Under Scrutiny*, for the US Information Agency. He learned to write quickly and voluminously, in contrast to his later scholarly work, where he was more sparing (in part because of recurring illnesses). But he also suffered, and bitterly resented, the careerism and intellectual timidity that characterized too many of those in the middle and upper reaches of the bureaucracy and that imposed violent excisions on critical analyses of public policy. From this time on he developed, and never ceased to cultivate, a mocking cynicism toward the conduct of foreign affairs and the motives of those who occupied higher offices.

He was glad to leave Washington, first for research fellowships at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (1957–60) and at Ohio State University (1960–61), then for teaching appointments at Brandeis University (1961–65) and at the State University of New York at Binghamton, where he served from 1966 until his death on 1 April 1974. Along the way he also held a Fulbright fellowship

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(1964–65), which enabled him to study in Berlin and Vienna and to interview Lukács in Budapest.

During those years his teaching interests centred on Marxist theory and international communist movements, leading him to offer courses not only on China and the Soviet Union but also on the history of political thought, economic planning, imperialism, and the politics of developing areas. Broader still was the range of his scholarship. Those of us who came to him with our manuscripts—for he was a superb editor—were repeatedly startled by the reaches of his learning. He gave unstintingly of himself, enriching our arguments with factual information and theoretical insights. But he never felt fully at home in academia. Despite his impressive success as a teacher, he was scornful of the bulk of his students, who were there not to learn but to consume time while "earning" a degree, and contemptuous of many of his colleagues, who were infected with entrepreneurial vigour and careerist ambitions and who did not understand, much less themselves observe, the requirements of dedicated scholarship.

Regrettably, he did not himself fully appreciate the high esteem in which he was held by many of his students and colleagues. For as two of the latter, Professors James P. Young and Arthur K. Smith, fittingly said:

> "The list of students and faculty colleagues who knew Professor Watnick and learned from him is long, going far beyond those who were fortunate enough to be his students in the formal sense of the word. His friends will remember him with special regard, as a kind and gentle man whose only enemies were sham, hypocrisy, and intellectual dishonesty. . . . Morris Watnick truly knew what it meant to pursue the life of the mind. We are all diminished by his loss, but in a deeper sense we, his colleagues and his students, are enlarged by his example."

Those of us who were privileged to have been his close friends deeply grieve the untimely interruption of a major talent and a tortured life. But we treasure the warmth and richness of his legacy.

DAVID SPITZ
BERNARD S. MORRIS

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